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ABSTRACT 
Both emergency  pl anners and di saster researchers c i te the l ack 
of emp i ri cal data on the probl ems and needs of speci al popul ati ons 
duri ng emergency evacuati ons .  Al though most evacuations of nurs i ng 
homes and rel ated care faci l i ti es are carri ed out successful ly ,  the 
effecti veness of an evacuation ( as measured by time to evacuate ) 
appears l i mi ted by certai n  constra i nts . Among the factors affecti ng 
such evacuati ons are resources ( such as the number of staff avai l ab le  
at  the time of  the evacuati on ) ,  type and number of  cl i ents , and com­
muni ty characteri sti cs such as  popul ation densi ty.  Thi s study 
descri bes sel ected organi zational characteri sti cs of nurs i ng homes 
and rel ated care faci l i ti es whi ch have recently experi enced ei ther 
a parti a l  or compl ete evacuation of thei r faci l i ti e s .  After di s­
cussi ng the theoreti cal aspects of organi zations i n  evacuations and 
the methodol ogy used for the study, the study di scusses both the 
quanti tati ve and qual i tati ve factors affecting organi zati onal be­
havi or duri ng evacuati on . 
It  i s  evi dent from the fi ndi ngs that the conti nui ty of 
responsi bl e  care for cl i ents i s  of cri ti cal concern to both manage­
ment and staff duri ng an evacuati on .  The fi ndi ngs suggest that 
i ndi vi dual s wi thi n  specia l i zed popul ations are unl i ke other 
di saster vi ctims and may requi re di fferent management strategi es on 
the part of agenc ies assi sti ng in the evacuation . 
i v  
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Background of the Study 
Socio logi sts have researched cri si s  s i tuati ons , i ncl udi ng emer­
gency evacuati ons , as a means of understanding how changes i n  socia l  
behavi or come about . Merton ( 1970 : xxv ) notes that whereas chroni c  
stress si tuati ons , such a s  the pl i ght of the homel ess , are l arge ly  
i gnored by the publ i c  because of  the socia l  form ' s i nv i s i bi l i ty, d i s­
asters are events that are hi ghly vi s i bl e  and can thus provi de impetus 
for d i scern i ng soci al processes that mi ght otherwi se remai n  hi dden . 
By exami ni ng the adapti ve behavi or of socia l  groups and organ i zati ons 
copi ng wi th an emergency , we can determi ne how group performances 
are mai ntai ned or al tered to cope wi th the evacuat ion . An examinati on 
of organi zational behavi or duri ng emergenci es al so extends our know­
l edge of the unrecogni zed or hi dden dimens ions of organi zati onal 
structures that i nfl uence change . 
Di sasters and cri si s  events that i n sti gate evacuati ons wi 11 con­
ti nue to occur i n  the future but our response to them can be made 
more effecti ve wi th an improved and extended base {Drabek , 1986:319 ) .  
Once the effects that resul t from the consequences of an emergency 
are known , i t  becomes possi bl e  to pl an mean i ngful l y  for di sastrous 
events {Quarantel l i , 1985 ) .  
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Revi ews of evacuati on studies ci te the need for more detai l ed 
and systemati c i nvesti gati ons of evacuati on behavi or of i n sti tuti onal ­
i zed popul ati ons ( Quarantel l i ,  1980 ; Drabek ,  1986 ) . Asi de from a 
few speci fi c  studi es ( Stal l i ngs , 197 5 ;  Bl anshaw,  197 5 )  and anecdotal 
observati ons (Marks and Fri tz , 1954 ; Resow , 1955 ; Tayl or , Zurcher , 
and Key , 1970 ) soc ial scienti sts have general l y  overl ooked the be­
haviors and probl ems of organi zations that resul t  when ei ther a par­
tial  or total evacuation occurs at a spec ial i zed faci l i ty ( Drabek , 
1986 ; Vogt and Sorensen , 1985 ) .  Thi s  omi ss ion fol l ows from a concen­
trati on on i nd iv i dual , not organi zati onal , behavi or patterns observed 
i n  hazardous s i tuati ons .  These pattern s are refl ected i n  the concen­
trati on on i nd iv i dual case studies . 
Research Objecti ves 
Si nce few stud ies have exami ned the behavi or of organi zati ons 
in the heal th care fi e ld  duri ng an evacuati on ( Drabe k ,  1986 ) , thi s 
study adds to the general body of knowl edge on evacuati ons by exami ni ng 
those soci al processes that occur when nurs ing  homes and rel ated home 
care faci l i ti es ( housing cl i ents needing chroni c  or supervi sory care ) 
evacuate because of a threat .  
The goal of  thi s research i s  to i denti fy the soci al factors , 
i ncl uding  the constrai nts and faci l i tators , that i nfl uence organi za­
ti onal responses to emergenci es whi ch resul t i n  evacuati ons of faci l i ­
ties housi ng speci al popul ati ons . I ncl uded i n  the soci al factors 
are those el ements of emergency management techni ques and strategi es 
whi ch i nfl uence the effecti veness of organi zational cop i ng behavior.  
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By exami n i ng the behavi oral factors i nfl uenci ng the performance 
of organi zations duri ng  evacuati on , the study provides a base l i ne 
for future work on speci al i zed or i nsti tutional i zed popul ati ons and 
a framework that may be used to make _sound pol i cy deci s ions  both by 
emergency managers and organi zations about evacuation s .  
Conceptual Framework 
Fi gure 1 presents a conceptual framework i denti fyi ng  the rel ati on­
shi ps between the organ i zati ons and factors affecti ng  the evacuati on 
experi ence i n  thi s  study . Characteri sti cs of the communi ty and the 
organi zati on as wel l  as the threat i tsel f pl ay i nterl ocki ng rol es 
when a hazardous event forces an evacuati on .  The conceptual framework 
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i s  adapted from Quarantel l i ' s  macro-l evel model of evacuation behavi or 
for a commun i ty threat ( 1980 ) .  The model states that the threatened 
commun i ty ( i n  thi s  case , the immedi ate envi ronment of the specia l i zed 
faci l i ty)  provi des a context for the di saster threat and subsequent 
impact ,  the context i ncl udes capabi l i ti es and resources , socia l  l i n kages , 
and the prevai l i ng soc ial cl imate both wi thi n and external to the 
organi zation ( Quarantel l i , 1980 : 24 ) . Thus , fi ve factors are si gn ifi cant 
predi ctors of response to threat (Quarantel l i ,  1980 ) : 
1 .  resources 
2. soc ia l  cl imate 
3. soc ia l  l i nkages 
4. extracommun i ty setti ng 
5. threat .  
Threat Resources Social Climate Social Unkages Extracommunity Setting 
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Figure 1. Ana lytic Framework 
These factors i nfl uence performances of personnel wi thi n  the organi za­
tion and predi ct both the time to evacuate and the evacuati on rate 
per person . The post-impact , or recovery phase , of an evacuati on 
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i s  noted as a feedback l oop of the framework but i s  not cri ti cal  to 
thi s study. Duri ng  the recovery period , the overri d ing  concern for 
most heal th care faci l i ti es i s  returni ng to 11the o l d  routi ne 11 ( Bl anshaw, 
1978 : 178 ) .  
The study wi l l  concentrate on organi zati ons rather than the com­
mun i ty ,  because organi zations , for exampl e  nursing  homes , are di rectly 
responsi bl e for evacuati ng specia l  popul ati ons .  The effects of the 
l arger communi ty on evacuati on wi l l  be seen only through the eyes 
of the organi zati on ' s  managers . 
Several aspects make the study of organi zati ons cari ng for 
speci al i zed popul ations s i gn ifi cant for soci ol ogi ca l  study.  The fi rst 
aspect has to do wi th organi zati onal performance i n  an emergency .  
Organi zati ons must perform adequatel y to mai ntai n  l egi timacy and survi ve 
as a social  uni t .  Performance i s  especial ly  cri ti cal when the heal th 
and safety of cl i ent  popul ati on is i nvol ved . 
The effecti veness of organ i zati onal behavi or i n  an emergency 
i s  the degree to whi ch an organi zati on performs the desi red outcomes , 
depending on the preferences of the consti tuenci es or other i nterested 
parti es (Zammuto , 1982 } . Wi thi n  that framework , the performance of 
i nd iv idual organ i zati ons can be exami ned and patterns among organi za­
tions can be anal yzed for s imi l ari ties and di screpanci es . 
Resources i ncl ude both l abor and materi al  suppl i es an organi zati on 
can use qui ckly i n  emergencies . Compared to i nd iv idual evacuees , 
members of spec ial i zed groups requi re more resources to cope wi th 
an emergency because of thei r  parti cul ar needs and constrai nts . 
The number of persons avai l abl e to assi st i n  an emergency may be as 
important as the l evel of preparedness in responding  to an emergency. 
Determi n i ng the resources used duri ng an emergency a ids the under­
standi ng of evacuati on needs . 
The soc ia l  cl imate , or envi ronment i n  whi ch the event occurs , 
i nfl uences the performance of the organi zati on i n  meeti ng the demands 
of the threat .  The context i n  whi ch the threat occurs has certa i n  
si tuati onal factors speci fi c to the event such a s  the time of  day, 
the season of the year ,  and the number of peopl e  at the s i te at the 
time of the threat .  For exampl e ,  seasonal i ty i s  cri ti cal to an 
evacuati on study when the popu l ati on of a communi ty changes 
dramati cal ly  because of the i nfl ux of touri sts and emergency pl ans 
are based on normal popul ati on si ze .  Li kewi se , the number and type 
of cl i ents at a faci l i ty at the time of the threat i nfl uence the 
demands on staff duri ng the evacuati on . 
Soci al l i n kages , or the rel ationshi ps between the organi zati on 
and external agencies , form social  networks whi ch bi nd i ndi v idual s 
and organi zations to the col l ecti v ity, or communi ty at l arge . Even 
for h i gh ly  control l ed faci l i ties  such as pri sons or heal th care 
faci l i ti es wi th menta l l y  i ncompetent or resi stive i nd iv idual s ,  the 
necessary backup and speci al ly  trai ned emergency workers , such as 
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fi re or pol i ce personnel , general l y  come from outs i de the faci l i ty 
to a id  the organi zati on .  By determi n i ng these l i nkages we can better 
understand adapti ve behavi or of organi zati ons i n  coping wi th thei r 
envi ronments duri ng stressful events . 
The capabi l i ties  of the l ocal communi ty and the speci al i zed 
faci l i ty organi zation are further i nfl uenced by the "extracommuni ty" 
(or l arger society )  i n  the defi n i ti on and response to the threat . 
For exampl e ,  the abi l i ty to detect unusual or hazardous weather pat­
terns i s  general l y  the respons ibi l i ty of the Nati onal Weather Serv ice 
( NWS } ,  a federal agency , but the recepti on and transmi ssion of that 
i nformation to the di rectly affected popul ati ons i s  general l y  a state 
or communi ty functi on i nvol ving a vari ety of soc ial l i n kages . How 
an organi zation l earns of the threat and acts (or does not act ) on 
that i nformation i s  determi ned wi thi n  the organi zati on . Si nce thi s  
study i s  l imi ted to evacuati ons of special i zed popul ations and not 
to enti re communi ti es , di scuss ion of the extracommuni ty wi l l  i ncl ude 
onl y  factors perta i n i ng di rectly to those faci l i ti es ,  such as 
experiences wi th quasi -publ i c  agencies such as the Red Cross . 
Cri ti cal characteri sti cs of the threat creati ng the stress on 
the organi zati onal structure i ncl ude (1) the speci fi c type of agent 
creati ng the threat , and ( 2 )  the si tuati onal factors at the time of 
the cri si s .  Together wi th the organi zati onal context , these 
characteri sti cs generate certai n social  processes whi ch emerge as 
the emergency occurs over time .  The type of agent affects organi za­
tional processes by the magni tude of the threat ,  by degree of impact 
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of threat and by the i ntens ity of the threat . For exampl e ,  the degree 
of certa i nty that a threat wi l l  pl ace the cl i ents at ri sk affects 
preparedness acti ons , espec ial ly  in the time it takes to ma ke the 
deci s ion to evacuate the faci l i ty. 
Practi cal Cons iderati ons  
A cl ear i ndi cator of  the need for research on  n ursi ng home popul a­
tions i s  the "agi ng" of the Ameri can popul ati on . An agi ng  popul ati on 
refers to the i ncrease i n  the rati o of el derly person s--general l y  
6 5  and ol der--to the number of younger persons . The trend has been 
documented by the U . S .  Bureau of the Census. 
I n  the U . S . , the numbers of persons aged 65 and over rose 
from 16 . 6  mi l l i on i n  the 1960 census to 25 . 5  mi l l i on i n  
1980 . The most dramati c i ncrease i n  the popul ati on i s  
vari ously termed "ol dest ol d "  or "extreme aged , "  arbi trari l y  
defi ned a s  aged 8 5  and above . Whereas there were 0 . 9  mi l l i on 
persons 85 years or ol der i n  1960 , by 1980 there were ful ly  
2 .  2 m i  1 1  i on .  �1oreover i n  each decade s i nee 1940 , the popu­
l ation aged 85 years and ol der has i ncreased by more than 
50% ,  a rate of growth far i n  excess of that of the total 
popul ati on 65 years or above for a s imi l ar peri od . [ It  
i s] al so si gn i fi cant to observe that [the] proporti on of 
the e l derly who were over 85 remai ned at 40% between 1900-
1940 . The percentage has i ncreased at each census s ince 
1940 , reachi ng  8 . 8% i n  1980 ( Suzman and Ri l ey ,  1985 : 179 ) . 
The trend appears l i kel y to conti nue at l east unti l the year 
2020 . The middl e seri es projected by the U . S .  Census Bureau shows 
the popu l ati on aged 85 and above doubl i ng between 1980 and 2000 and 
reachi ng 14. 1% of the total aged at a l ater date ( Manton and Sol do , 
1985 ; Suzman and Ri l ey ,  1985 ; Rosenwai ke and Dol i n sky ,  1987 ) .  Thi s 
i ncrease means  that a growi ng setment of the Ameri can popul ati on wi l l  
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l i kely requi re the servi ces of nurs i ng homes and/or rel ated home care 
faci l i ti e s .  
Wi thi n  nurs ing  homes and rel ated care faci l i ties the popul ati on 
wi l l  have a l arger proportion of the very ol d .  Thi s  11 grayi ng 11 of 
nursi ng home popul ations was reported by the Nati onal Center for Heal th 
Stati sti cs (NCHS ) ( 1987 ) .  I n  1977 , 40% of the res i dents were over 
85 ;  by 1985 that proporti on had ri sen to 45%. Thi s  i ncrease i n  the 
number of ol der persons ( the 110l d ol d 11 ) ra i ses two rel evant i ssues 
for nurs ing  home organ i zati ons and emergency personnel . The fi rst 
i ssue i nvol ves resources . Management of nursi ng homes and rel ated 
heal th care faci l i ties  wi l l  requi re more physi cal serv i ces duri ng 
evacuations because of dimi n i shed phys i cal capaci ties of even more 
el derl y cl ients . Secondly ,  nursi ng home and respondi ng emergency 
personnel can expect a greater percentage of 11 resi sti ve11 cl i ents due 
to impai red cogn i ti ve functi ons among the very ol d .  
Overvi ew of Di ssertati on 
The di ssertati on i s  d iv ided into fi ve chapters fol l owed by the 
appendi ces . Chapter I I  presents the rel evant theoreti cal and empi ri ­
cal probl ems i n  the research l i terature about evacuations , parti cul arl y 
those that have i nvol ved chroni c  and acute heal th care faci l i ti e s .  
Chapter I I I  descri bes the methods of data col l ecti on , the popul a­
ti on avai l abl e for study , the operati onal i zation of concepts and how 
the i nterview schedul e exami ned those concepts . 
Chapter IV  descri bes the characteri sti cs of the non-response 
group , provi des a uni vari ate analys i s  of sel ected vari abl es and 
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di scusses the findi ngs as rel ated to the hypotheses . 
Chapter V di scusses impl i cati ons for emergency management pol i ci es 
and the need for future research .  
The appendi ces i ncl ude a l i st of abbrevi ati ons used in  the text , 
the i ntervi ew schedul e ,  the l etter sent to admi ni strators i ntroduci ng 
the study , a sampl e cod i ng form used to ana lyze the evacuati on arti cl es , 
and the evacuati on model resul ts .  
CHAPTER I I  
THEORETICAL PERSPECTI VES ON EVACUATION 
The l i terature rel evant to the soci o l ogi cal study of evacuati ons 
of speci al i zed popul ati ons can be d iv ided i nto three general  cate­
gori es :  ( 1 )  the soc i ol ogi cal  l i terature whi ch deal s wi th evacuati on 
as a soc ia l  process , ( 2 )  the l i terature whi ch deal s wi th evacuati ons  
of  threatened i n sti tuti ons such as nursing  homes and  other heal th 
care i nsti tuti ons ( i ncl ud ing  the socio logi cal  l i terature about evacua­
tion behavi or and fi ndi ngs );  ( 3 )  the organi zati onal l i terature that 
descri bes organi zati onal behavi or and strategi es i n  cri si s  si tuat ions  
i ncl uding  the l i terature deal i ng wi th evacuati on strategies  of  heal th 
and rel ated care faci l i ti es. llork consi sting of atti tudes and be­
havi ora l  i ntent case studies i s  not rel evant to the di ssertati on and 
i s  not di scussed . 
I nvestigati ng Emergency Responses 
Over the past several decades researchers have i nvesti gated be­
havi oral response to emergencies that ari se from ei ther natural  or 
human-i nduced threats . I n  1920 , Samuel Pri nce was the fi rst sociol o­
gi st to study i nd i v i dual behavi or i n  a di saster.  The subject of 
hi s study was the 1917 expl osi on of a ship  carryi ng mun i ti ons i n  
Hal i fax ( Canada ) harbor .  Pri nce wanted to  know how normati ve patterns 
of soci al  i n teracti on were adapted to fi t cri si s si tuati ons  and bri ng  
about soc ia l  change . Incl uded i n  hi s descri pti ons of group behavi or 
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fol l owi ng the expl osi on was the process of recovery i n  the d i saster 
stri cken communi ty.  As a resul t of hi s observati ons ,  the concept 
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of therapeuti c communi ty was devel oped . Thi s  concept of a commun i ty 
response woul d  be repeated as a central theme i n  a lmost every earl y 
study of di sasters ( Barton , 1970 : 207 ; Cornel l ,  1976 : 257 ; Drabek ,  1986 ) . 
Two decades l ater ,  Soroki n ( 1942) exami ned the major consequences 
of soci etal di sasters such as war ,  fami ne , di sease and pesti l ence . 
Sorokin advocated the study of di sasters for i n s ight i nto genera l 
or everyday soci al processes ( Dynes and Pel anda , 1987 ) .  
I n  Commun i ties  i n  Di saster , Al l en Barton ( 1969 ) attempted to 
i ntegrate the di verse fi ndi ngs of sociol og i cal  research about commun i ty 
di sasters . Wi th the use of a col l ecti ve behavi or perspecti ve , Barton 
organi zed hi s findi ngs as responses to "col l ecti ve stress si tuations" 
whi ch occur "when many members of a soci al system fa i l  to recei ve 
expected condi tions of l i fe from the system ( Barton , 1969 : 38 ) . 
Exami n i ng the factors whi ch i nfl uenced both i nd iv idual and communi ty 
organi zational behavior,  Barton argued that an emergency soci a l  system , 
l i ke any other soc i al system , has the probl em of organi z ing  human 
behavi or . When a system i s  stressed bas ic  soci al processes are 
accel erated . Characteri sti cs whi ch emerge under stress are h i dden 
or l atent unti l the emergency occurs . By studying the patterns  of 
response to stress s i tuati ons , sociol ogi sts can better understand 
overal l socia l  behavi or . 
Di sasters are stressful events whi ch draw on extraordi nary re­
sources from i ndi vidua l s or communities to cope wi th the di srupti on 
to socia l  l i fe .  Di sasters consti tute a major category of 11COl l ecti ve 
stress si tuations 11 ( Barton , 1969:38 ) .  The col l ecti ve stress may be 
l imi ted to onl y  smal l systems or may occur onl y  to a smal l un i t  wi thi n  
the system as a resul t of stress to a l arger system . The effect of 
stress on a smal l er system or un i t  may be enti re ly  di fferent from 
stress on the l arger system , dependi ng on the i sol ati on or l i n kages 
to the l arger system ( Barton , 1969 ) . How stress from a threat i s  
handl ed by the system wi l l  vary accord ing to the scope of impact of 
the threat , the speed of onset of the threat , the durati on of impact 
of the threat and the preparedness of the soci al uni t ( Barton , 1969 ) . 
Al though not al l di sasters resul t  i n  evacuati ons , most di sasters i n  
the Uni ted States force some or al l of the popul ations a t  ri sk  to 
evacuate. for a peri od of time .  
The proposi ti on that normati ve behavi or conti nues to operate 
i n  a di saster rema i ns strong i n  the l i terature ( Drabe k ,  1986 : 158 ) . 
A pri nci pl e of conti nu i ty pervades a di saster wi th l i ttl e or no  change 
i n  norms or behavi or .  Quarantel li and Dynes state , 11 [A] di saster 
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does not i ni ti ate major changes 11 ( 1977 : 34 ) . If  offi c ial s are effecti ve 
pri or to an event , then they are l i kely to be percei ved as effecti ve 
duri ng a cri si s--or s imi l arly ,  as i neffecti ve . Post-di saster behavioral 
change l i ke ly  i nvol ves pre-di saster trends that were al ready i n  pl ace 
i n  communi ty (Quarantel l i  and Dynes , 1977 : 35 ) .  Yet many of the di saster 
myths about pan i c  and i mmobi l i ty of vi ctims remai n strong i n  publ i c  
perceptions of di sasters (Wenger,  James , and Faupel , 1980 ) .  
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The col l ecti ve behavi or model requi red sh ifting  from stimul us­
response reacti ve model s i n  whi ch evacuees were viewed as passi ve 
respondents to the event to pro-acti ve model s whi ch recogni zed evacuees 
as acti ve parti ci pants i n  the evacuati on process . Offi ci al s and obser­
vers wi th fi eld experi ence questi oned the stimu l us-response model 
because movi ng persons out of danger was more than a matter of i ssuing 
correct warni ngs and maki ng sure peopl e recei ved the correct i nforma­
ti on . Most schol ars i n  evacuation research now acknowl edge that 
peopl e fol l ow general norms of behavi or--such as accounti ng for ki n 
before evacuati ng ,  confi rmi ng the threat ,  or wai ti ng for more i nfor­
mati on before maki ng a deci s ion as to the appropri ate action { Perry , 
1979b ; Drabek , 1987 ) .  
Turner and Ki l l i an { 1972 )  suggested that crowd behavi or was not 
homogeneous in i ti al l y  but became more simi l ar as norms emerged through 
group i nteracti on . They hel d that behavi or fol l owed general normati ve 
patterns that may have been l atent pri or to the event . Behavioral  
norms emerge as the event unfol ds {Quarantel l i  and Dynes , 1977 ) .  
On di fferent occasi ons , crowds wi l l  respond very di fferentl y to a 
simi l ar event .  Gi l l i ps ie  { 1986 ) has suggested that emergent norm 
theory may hel p  expl a i n  why crowds wi th simi l ar resources i n  s imi l ar 
emergency si tuati ons behave very di fferently from one another .  The 
argument  i s  that a number of norms are dormant and behavi or that becomes 
evi dent i s  speci fi c to the event i n  both time and pl ace . 
One source of vari ati on i n  the pool of dormant norms i n  di saster 
behavi or i s  di fferences in cul tural background and ethn i c i ty of 
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i ndi v idua l s i nvol ved (Turner and N igg ,  1979 ; Perry and Mushkatel , 
1987 ) .  For exampl e ,  prescri bed behavi or on Cari bbean i s l ands duri ng 
hurri canes i nvol ves shel tering i n  concrete bui l di ngs and not evacuating .  
llhen i sl anders i mmi grate to  the southern Uni ted States , assumptions  
about seeking shel ter may travel wi th them (N i gg ,  1985 ) .  
Fi nal ly ,  di sasters are events wi th both functional and dysfunc­
ti onal consequences . The strengtheni ng of fami l y  ties has been reported 
i n  i nd iv idual case studies . More effecti ve pl ann i ng acti v i ties  between 
emergency agencies and organi zati ons al so resul t from the di saster 
experi ence . On the other hand , some major di sasters have s i gn i fi cantl y 
di srupted communi ty l i fe to the poi nt of di ssol uti on ( Eri ckson , 1976 ) .  
Defi n i ti on of Evacuati on 
Evacuati on of any popul ation for any reason impl i es di srupti on 
of soci al l i fe and normal routi nes . Evacuations are i n sti tuted for 
a vari ety of reasons duri ng various times of the day or ni ght and 
may be of short or l ong durati on . Timi ng  affects response because 
routi nes are more easi ly  di sturbed when mi n imum staff are avai l ab le  
or  when cl i ents are otherwi se occupied , for exampl e ,  s l eepi ng or  eati ng .  
Fol l owi ng Quarantel l i  ( 1980 : 10 )  evacuati on is  defi ned as 11the mass 
movement of peopl e ,  of a temporary nature , that col l ecti vely emerges 
i n  coping  wi th communi ty threats , damages or di srupti ons . .. Usi ng 
thi s col l ecti ve perspecti ve , Quarantel l i  notes that evacuati on i s  
11primari ly a communi ty l evel phenomena general l y  organ i zed around 
a l ocal l y  i ntegrated soci al enti ty such as town or c ity . .. Quarantel l i  
argues that conceptual l y an evacuati on i ncl udes a return tri p as wel l  
as i n i ti al wi thdrawal and an evacuation shou l d  be cons idered as a 
11round-tri p11 event . However,  Aqui rre ( 1983 )  argues that theoreti cal ly  
the return i s  unnecessary because i n  some i nstances ( e . g . , severe 
and prol onged droughts ) ,  peopl e  evacuate unti l the hazard i s  gone , 
whi ch may mean permanent rel ocation or wi thdrawal from the area . 
Evacuati on (Aqui rre , 1983)  i s  a conti nuum wi th temporary shel ter at 
one end and permanent wi thdrawal at the other.  For thi s study, and 
for most emergency practi ti oners and researchers , the concept of a 
round-tri p event appears more useful and better refl ects the actua l 
si tuation . 
Several promi nent features of evacuations can be underscored . 
Fi rs t ,  evacuati ons may be requi red for ei ther exi sti ng or potenti al 
threats . For exampl e ,  evacuati ons are regul arl y  carri ed out for bomb 
threats even i f  the bomb source ( the threat )  cannot be i denti fied . 
Some evacuati ons are carried out for precautionary reasons before 
a si tuati on turns hazardous . I n  some evacuati ons the threat never 
materi al i zes , as i n  the case of hurri canes when a sudden change i n  
wi nd  di recti on changes the areas a t  ri sk by hundreds o f  mi l es .  
A threat o r  hazard impl i es ri sk  and ri sk has many dimens ions . 
Of primary concern to thi s  research i s  the sequence i n  whi ch a 
threat i s  defi ned as a ri sk for the nursing  home organi zati onal 
management .  Thi s  i ncl udes the timing of the event and the consequent 
deci s ion-maki ng about the protecti ve acti ons regardi ng that ri sk .  
Thi s  dynami c feature of  ri sk i nvol ves vari ous i nterested parties at 
di fferent times wi thi n  the organi zati onal deci s ion-making  structure . 
Such parties may have varyi ng  degrees of power and respons i bil i ties 
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as wel l as confl i ct i ng preferences about what act ions  to take (Al l i son , 
197 1; Kunreuther and Ley , 1982 : 3 ) .  Deci si on-makers for evacuati ons 
of chron i c  care faci l i ties i ncl ude admi n i strators or di rectors, fi rst 
responders such as staff or mai ntenance personnel , or external 
responders such as fi re or ci v i l  defense personnel . 
Evacuations may be i n i ti ated through recommendati ons or orders 
of a l ocal or state ci v i l authori ty. Such recommendati ons  often make 
an evacuat i on mandatory , at l east for the cl i ents of such organ i zati ons , 
whether the threat i s  percei ved by the organi zational management as 
necessi tati ng an evacuati on . Furthermore , emergency managers of both 
publ i c  and pri vate organ izati ons are charged wi th protecti ng the general 
publ i c  from dangers whether they stem from human-i nduced or natural 
hazards . Thus precauti onary evacuati ons may be i nsti tuted for speci a l ­
i zed popul at ions even when a threat does not actua l l y  exi st to present 
a ri sk  to the popul ati on at l arge . 
Recogn i ti on of Threat and Response 
To i n i ti ate emergency response , an event must be defi ned as 
threateni ng to an i ndi vi dual or group . Of foremost concern to thi s 
research i s  the sequenti al nature of defin i n g  an event as a threat 
to the organi zati on . The defi n i ti on of a threat i nvol ves vari ous 
i nterested part ies wi thi n  the organi zati onal deci s ion-maki ng struc­
ture . Such parties may have varyi ng degrees of power and respons i ­
bi l i ties  a s  wel l  as confl i cting preferences about what acti ons to 
ta ke (Al l i son , 197 1; Kunreuther and Ley , 1982 : 3 ) .  Dec i s i on-ma kers 
for evacuati ons for chron i c  care faci l i ti es i ncl ude admi ni strators 
or di rectors , fi rst responders such as staff or mai ntenance personnel , 
or external  responders such as fi re or ci vi l defense personnel . 
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The el ements of the response process consi st of the i nteracti ons 
between the communi cator , the communi cati on mode and the warn i ng  con­
tent wi th the rece i ver ( Drabek ,  1986 ) .  Frequently the i n i ti a l  response 
i s  di sbel i ef ( Fri tz and Mathewson , 1957 ; Moore et a l . ,  1963 ;  Drabek , 
1969, 1986 ; Quarantel l i ,  1980 ; Perry et al . ,  1981 ) .  The determi nant 
of an i nd i vi dual ' s  fi rst acti on after rece i vi ng  a warn i ng message 
has been found to be a functi on of the extent the message i s  bel ieved 
and the associ ated fi rst assessment of ri sk  (Perry et al . ,  1981 ; Perry 
and Mushkatel , 1986 ) .  The warn i ng response process may be conceptual i zed 
as a seri es of s i x  i ndependent but rel ated steps : 
1 .  Recei ve fi rst message 
2 .  Arri ve at i n i ti al assessment  of warn i ng bel i ef and personal  
ri sk  
· 3 .  Undertake fi rst acti on 
4 .  Gather further i nformati on regard i ng threat 
5 .  Arri ve a t  final assessment of warni ng bel ief and ri sk  
i ncl udi ng deci s ion about protecti ve action 
6 .  Make fi nal dec i s i on to i gnore warn ing ,  compl y  wi th message 
contents i f  gi ven , or adopt i nnovati ve al ternate acti on . 
(Adapted from Perry and Mushkatel , 1986 : 50-51 . ) Mul ti pl e warni ngs 
are frequently gi ven and recei ved by i nd iv idual s about a hazardous 
si tuation ( Perry and Mushkatel , 1986 ) ,  wi th some messages provi d i ng 
i nadequate or confl i cting i nformati on . 
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When confronted wi th the unexpected , organ i zational systems i n i ti al 
responses--l i ke i nd i vi dual processing--refl ect l ong-stand ing  normati ve 
gui del i nes to the threateni ng si tuati on ( Drabe k ,  1986 : 158 ) .  Thus 
the warn i ng of a threat must be recei ved by organi zati onal personnel 
before deci si on-maki ng can begi n about the appropri ate protect ive 
acti on. 
Organi zational Aspects 
Three probl ems arose for researchers when groups , rather than 
i nd iv idual s ,  were stud ied duri ng cri si s si tuations ( Haas and Drabek ,  
1973) .  The fi rst probl em was how to exami ne emergency agenci es whose 
organi zati onal boundari es di d not have the cl ass i c  structure of organi ­
zati ons and i n sti tutions a s  i denti fi ed i n  soci ol ogi cal theory si nce 
Max Weber: Such agencies i ncl uded the Red Cross as wel l as the al ­
trui sti c organi zati ons l i ke the Quakers who provide hel p i n  di sasters . 
These groups d i d  not have the typi cal constra i nt structures and other 
characteri sti cs whi ch defi ne the l imi ts of formal organi zati ons ( Haas 
and Drabek ,  1973 ) . 
Secondl y ,  the structure of the emergency organi zati ons d i d  not 
fi t wi thi n  organi zati onal theory. Many of the organi zati ons were 
very l oose ly  structured wi thout cl ear hierarchy. And thi rd ly ,  emergency 
si tuati ons tended to have a number of emergent groups whose members 
organi zed to perform speci fi c tasks duri ng the event but who di spersed 
afterwards once the demands were met. General organi zational theory 
did  not address such i ssues . Since the early 198o • s ,  however ,  there 
has been a better mesh ing of col l ecti ve behavi or theories wi th 
organi zati onal theories from the study of emergent group acti vi ty 
duri ng cri s i s  events ( Drabek ,  1985 ).  
Defi n i t i on of Organi zati on 
Organi zations are soci al uni ts predomi nant ly  ori ented toward 
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the attai nment of speci fi c goal s ( Parsons , 1956; Etz ion i  and lehman ,  
1980 ) .  An  organi zation as a soci al uni t i s  di fferent from other soci al 
groups because as a group it exh ib its certai n  bureaucrati c character­
i sti cs i n  the attai nment of goal s ( Parsons , 1956; Etzioni  and lehman , 
1980 : i i i ) . Organi zati ons vary as to the degree of formal i zati on ( Hal l , 
1987 ) .  Formal i zati on represents the use of rul es by the organ izati on 
( Hage and Ai ken , 1967 : 7 9 )  and i nfl uences the control an organi zation 
hol ds over the i nd i vi dual wi thi n the organi zati on. In h i ghl y formal i zed 
organi zations , there i s  stri ct adherence to procedures. Wi th mi n imal 
formal i zati on , members may be expected to use thei r own di screti on 
in deci ding  what to do ( Hal l ,  1987 ).  
The degree of formal i zati on al so i nd icates how organi zati onal 
deci si on-makers view the behavior of thei r members. Organi zati ons 
deal i ng  wi th human probl ems such as in mental heal th cl i n i cs are pre­
sented wi th uni que si tuati ons i n  whi ch precedents do not al ways exi st. 
Al though much work i s  routi ni zed , new si tuati ons are frequentl y encoun­
tered whi ch requi re ad hoc measures. Such si tuati ons exi st for 
teachers , soci al workers , pol i ce offi cers , j udges , l awyers and pri son 
guards who need a great deal of di scretion i n  carryi ng  out thei r work 
i n  " street-l evel bureaucraci es" ( Li psky ,  1980 : 79 ,  as found i n  Hal l ,  
1987 : 74 ) . The degree of vari ati on that i s  tol erated wi th i n  roles  
determi nes the degree or  formal i zati on wi thi n  the organi zati on ( Hal l ,  
1987 ) .  
To accompl i sh objecti ves , managers of organi zations rel y  on rul es 
rather than orders ( Kahn , 1964) but not al l rules  are speci fi cal ly  
arti cu l ated or  wri tten . For exampl e ,  rul es that govern acti ons of 
vari ous professi onal s are sel dom enunci ated ; thi s  l eads to necessary 
and conti nual negoti ati on among members of an organi zati on ( Strauss 
et a l . ,  1963 ) .  General l y  organi zati onal rul es functi on to reduce 
confl i ct rather than to remove the i nherent tensions  created wi thi n  
a bureaucrati c envi ronment ( Goul dner , 1954) . Thus , rul es tend to 
ease commun icati on among organi zati onal members , provi de l eeway i n  
gai n i ng cooperati on , and set general standards that can be appl i ed 
to a number of s i tuati ons .  Rul es can al so provide justi fi cati on for 
pun i shment or di smi ssal when speci fi c procedures are not fol l owed 
( Goul dner , 1954 ) . 
Organi zati ons• Systems Duri ng Emergency Response 
Drabek ( 1986 ) g i ves fi ve general pri nci pl es of response patterns 
of organi zations  that refl ect both the qua l i ty and structure of the 
organi zati on . Fi rst , routi ne emergency pl ann i ng differs qual i tati vely 
for management of organi zations pl ann i ng for emergencies  dependi ng  
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on whether or not pl ans for rare events such as di sasters are i ncl uded . 
Dynes and Aqui rre ( 1979 )  noted that the structural condi tions of the 
emergency make for uncertai nty,  di vers i ty ,  decreased formal i zati on 
and decentral i zati on among organi zati ons .  Taken together these factors 
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i ncrease commun i cati on and coordi nati on among organ i zati onal  personnel 
and sometimes between organ i zational systems duri ng  an emergency ( Drabek ,  
1986 : 29 ) . The l ack of understandi ng of the parti cul ar demands an 
emergency imposes on personnel i s  refl ected i n  organ i zati onal pl ans . 
I n  a comprehensi ve study of chemi cal emergencies , Quarantel l i  ( 1979 )  
reported that chemi cal company executi ves general ly  v iewed routi ne 
safety pl ann i n g  i n  the same vei n  as pl ann i ng for di sasters . 
Second , rol e  confl i ct among organi zati onal personnel does not 
resul t i n  rol e abandonment , but i n  an i ncreased tendency for persons 
to remai n at work duri ng  the emergency .  Thi rd , the l arger organi za­
tions are more l i ke ly  to have di saster pl ans. Smal l er organi zati ons 
do not view themsel ves as subject to threat and thus are l ess  i nter­
ested i n  di saster pl ann i ng ei ther for themsel ves or wi th the communi ty 
at l arge ( Quarantel l i ,  1982 ) .  Resources for pl ann i ng may be more 
avai l abl e ,  or the consequences for not pl ann i ng greater ,  gi ven the 
l arger si ze of an organi zati on. Fourth , emergency agency offi ci al s 
can i ncrease response of ci ti zens by propos ing  adapti ve actions  rather 
than by emphasi z i ng only the dangers of the ri sk  or threat .  Fi fth , 
organi zati onal offi ci al s have more i ns i ght i nto human responses to 
di sasters than the general publ i c  does. Wenger et al . ( 1980 ) showed 
more offi ci al s  (43 percent ) were abl e to g ive correct answers on a 
general d i saster knowl edge scale  than d id  the general publ i c  ( 29 . 5  
percent ) ( Drabek , 1986 : 31 ) .  
23 
Organi zati ons as Tota l  Insti tuti ons 
Most organi zati ons cari ng for speci al i zed popul ations are regarded 
as total i n sti tutions , i . e. , an i nsti tuti on whose rul es encompass 
al l the behavi or of i ts members. Al though every i nsti tuti on has encom­
passi ng tendenci es , total i nsti tuti ons have a lmost total control over 
thei r cl i ents (Goffman , 1957 , 196 1 ) .  Thi s power i s  often symbol i zed 
by barriers to the outs ide that are bui l t  i nto the physi cal pl ant-­
l ocked doors , barbed wi re--or through the l ess obvi ous use of i ncreased 
geograph ical di stance from other soci al  l i fe. 
I n  a total i nsti tuti on there i s  a bas ic  spl i t  between the l arge 
managed group of cl i ents and the smal l supervi sory staff. Each group 
tends to concei ve of the other i n  terms of stereotypes whi ch i nhi bi t  
communi cati on between the groups and whi ch d i stances the staff from 
the cl i ents. The l abel i ng i s  important in exami n i ng emergency responses 
of the organi zati onal staff and cl i ents. Di stanci ng provi des staff 
members wi th a certai n  degree of power over the cl i ents . Dependence 
of the cl i ents through condi ti ons  resul ti ng from i nfi rmi ty ,  age , gender , 
or l egal status augment  thi s power. 
The staff-cl i ent rel ati onshi p has further impl i cati ons i n  an 
emergency. I n  respondi ng to an emergency , percepti ons of threat are 
defi ned by the management and staff personnel , not by an i nd iv idual 
cl i ent. Thus  the respons ibi l i ty for determi n i ng the threat rests 
wi th a smal l ,  el i te group. The consequences of thi s aspect on emergency 
response have not been addressed i n  the l i terature. 
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Organi zati onal Effecti veness 
Organi zati onal effecti veness i s  the extent to whi ch an organi zati on 
i s  abl e to atta i n  i ts goal s wi thout jeopard izi ng i ts future materi al 
or organi zati onal resources or l ong-range interests (Theodorson and 
Theodorson , 1969 ) .  Effecti veness as  rel ated to emergency procedures 
means that the primary goa l s  or functi ons  of the organi zati on are 
not reduced or pl aced i n  danger duri ng the response to a threat and 
that the organ i zati on survi ves the emergency . 
I nterorgan i zati onal effecti veness i n  respondi ng to an event can 
be enhanced through preparedness (Mi l eti and Sorensen , 1987; Kartez 
and Li ndel l ,  1987 ) .  The key determi nant to maximal effecti veness 
i s  the speci fi cati on of work rol es duri ng an emergency .  The defi n i ti on 
of rol es faci l i tates parti ci pati on of actors i n  the event wi thout 
sacri fi ci ng personal and organ i zational costs . Moreover , i n  pl anni ng 
for l ow probabi l i ty events , fl exi bi l i ty must be mai ntai ned to maximi ze 
coordi nati on and enhance effecti veness (Mi l eti and Sorensen , 1987 ) .  
Depl oyment of resources by a n  organi zati on i n  an emergency depends 
on whether there was an evacuation pl an for the commun i ty pri or to 
the cri si s and whether the organi zation has i ts own evacuati on pl an 
( or pl ans ) .  The questi on al so ari ses about i nterorgan izational co­
ordi nati on as a constra i nt to organi zational effecti veness duri ng  
a cri si s si tuati on ( Drabek et  al . ,  1981 ) .  For exampl e ,  how does the 
faci l i ty ,  general l y  sel f-contai ned most of the time , coordi nate wi th 
other organ i zati ons that may have to be used i n  an emergency? Emergency 
needs may encompass the hel p of fi re personnel , Swat teams to control 
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terrori sts wi thi n  the faci l i ty,  contact wi th the Red Cross to set 
up and staff temporary shel ters , contact wi th other hospi tal s or 
i n sti tuti ons out of the threatened area to which pati ents may be taken 
unti l the threat i s  over ,  or managi ng vol unteers or other "hel pers " 
ei ther from the communi ty or beyond who arri ve to assi st i n  the evacua­
ti on effort . Furthermore , the probl em i s  not just one of coordi nati on , 
but i nvol ves consi derati on of l i abi l i ty and other l egal i ssues of 
respons ibi l i ty .  
The i ssue of  pl anni ng has been of concern not onl y to researchers 
but to pol i ti cal actors ( Drabek et al . ,  1�81 ) .  Whether the type of 
evacuati on pl an i s  a generi c one desi gned to accommodate a number 
of emergenci es or whether speci al i zed pl ans exi st for vari ous categories 
of emergenci es are both pol i ti cal and envi ronmental i ssues . A general 
or i ntegrated pl an for emergenci es wi th speci fi c areas outl i ned for 
these events coul d  reasonabl y be expected for communi ti es wi th ongoi ng 
hazards or a hi story of frequent events requi ri ng  emergency response , 
i . e . , hurri canes or tornadoes .  More speci fi c pl ans may be made for 
warn i ng certai n  segments of the communi ty i n  di fferent  ways . For 
exampl e ,  commerci al i nterests may requi re addi ti onal time to move 
i n ventory out of danger duri ng an anti ci pated fl ood or tsunami . Heal th 
organi zati ons requi re add i ti onal time to cal l  i n  addi ti onal staff 
to a id  i n  an evacuati on or to contact transport servi ces . 
One pl ann i ng concern i s  how the organi zati on defi nes emergencies . 
Does the organi zati on treat a fi re threat i n  the same manner as prepari ng 
for evacuati on from fl ood i ng of thei r premi ses?  The defi n i ti on may 
be part of regul atory procedures. The organi zati on or faci l i ty may 
be requi red to have a prepared emergency pl an to be regul ated or 
l i censed by state or federal agenci es. Other agencies i nfl uencing  
pl ann i ng i ncl ude i nsurance agencies and those quasi-publ i c  agenc ies 
from whi ch organi zati ons get the ir  pl ans approved for certi fi cati on 
or accred i tati on. 
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Organi zati onal effecti veness al so depends on a cl ear cha i n  of 
command. Who assumes , or can assume , respons i bi l i ty for dec i s i on­
maki ng duri ng  an emergency i nfl uences effecti veness. Questions  ari se 
about rol es adopted duri ng an emergency .  Are the rol es of staff mai n­
tai ned i n  the normal operati ng manner,  or are there speci fi c personnel 
who assume respons i bi l i ty for the evacuati on procedures ? For exampl e ,  
mai ntenance personnel , ward supervi sors , or other staff are sometimes 
especi al l y  trai ned for emergency tasks . Fol l owi ng through wi th the 
concept of conti nu ity ,  one woul d expect rol es and tasks to be performed 
wi th greater effi ciency i f  those tasks were s imi l ar to work tasks 
assumed duri ng normal operati ng behavi or. 
Other organi zati onal  mechani sms faci l i tate conti nui ty duri ng  
cri ses by prov id i ng "standby resources " such as  vol unteer support 
groups ( Stal l i ngs , as found i n  Dynes and Pel anda , 1987 : 247 ) .  Some 
evacuation pl ans recogni ze that "the el ements of opportuni ty" ( such 
as vol unteer or other hel per groups ) are as important i n  effecti ve 
evacuati on acti v ity as the pre-pl anni ng for emergencies . Yet as 
Drabek ( 1986 ) has noted , despi te the importance of how organi zati ons 
mobi l i ze for evacuations , l i ttl e theoreti cal or empi ri cal work exi sts 
on the topi c .  Systemati c i nvesti gati on of the characteri sti cs of 
cop ing strategi es organi zati ons  empl oy i n  the evacuati on process has 
not been part of research agenda . Al though such i nformati on i s  avai l ­
abl e i n  trade journal s  and associ ati on memoranda , the di scussions  
l ack the preci seness and cl ari ty for di scern i ng organi zati onal be­
havi oral patterns i n  evacuati ons. Thus both organi zati onal l eader­
sh ip  i n  evacuati ons as wel l  as organi zati onal structure and evacuati on 
effecti veness shou l d  be studied systemati cal l y  for such popul ations 
( Drabe k ,  1986 ) .  I t  i s  through systemati c stud ies our knowl edge i s  
gai ned about the enti re evacuation experi ence . 
Organi zati on Model s  
A number of model s  have been devel oped to expl a i n  organi zational 
deci s ion-maki ng  strategies . As thi s study focuses on the organi za­
ti onal processes i nvol ved in making a deci s ion to evacuate when the 
safety of the i n sti tuti onal i zed popul ati on i s  threatened , we wi l l  
exami ne only those model s that di rectl y affect deci si on-maki ng 
strategi es. Of three model s--the resource-dependence model , the 
natural -se l ection model and the rational -conti ngency model , the most 
useful model i s  the perspecti ve whi ch focuses on resources and 
dependence of the organi zati on on envi ronmental external i ti e s .  
The model ' s  bas i c  premi se i s  that deci s ions deal i ng wi th the 
external  envi ronmental condi ti ons are made internal l y  wi thi n  organi ­
zati ons . The process i nvol ves active parti ci pation of the organi za­
ti on i n  deal ing  wi th the envi ronment that i ncl udes attempts to 
man i pul ate that envi ronment .  Internal power arrangements , i ncl ud i ng 
manageri al strategies , and the demands of external groups are central 
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to the deci si on-maki ng process. Al dri ch and Pfeffer ( 1976 )  argue 
that the resource-dependent perspecti ve suggests that admi n i strators • 
management of thei r envi ronments may be more cri ti cal than the manage­
ment of thei r organi zati ons. Consequently ,  the effecti ve management 
of threats from external sources i s  crucia l  to the ongoi ng  structure 
of the organization. 
Communi cation of Threat 
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A bas i c  i ssue i n  emergency response to threats concerns how i nfor­
mati on about the threat i s  communi cated to affected popul ati ons ei ther 
i nd iv idual l y  or i n  groups. The evacuation l i terature on i nd i v i dual 
response to emergencies descri bes four modes of warn i ng : ( 1 ) di rect 
confrontati on wi th the threat ,  as i n  a fi re , expl osi on , or bomb threat; 
( 2 )  tel ev i sed or rad i o  broadcast warni ng messages of potenti al ri sks ,  
as i n  hurri canes , fl oods , or tornadoes; ( 3 )  organi zati onal l i n kages 
or networks i n i ti ated by warn i ng cal l s  from the pol i ce or other com­
muni ty offi cia l s such as by s i rens or offi ci al  warni ngs; and 
( 4 )  through soci al  networks ( Perry , 1979; Quarantel l i ,  1980; Perry 
et al . ,  1981; Drabek ,  1986 ) .  Peopl e at ri sk  are frequentl y contacted 
by friends , peers , rel ati ves , who heard of the threat and fel t  moti­
vated to  cal l about the warn i ng ,  often wi th offers of  shel ter ( Drabek , 
1986 ).  Whether these communi cati on modes are appl i cabl e  to organi za­
tions i s  probl emati cal . 
Psycho l ogi cal Aspects 
A rel ated i ssue concerns  the psychol ogi cal dimens ions of response 
patterns to threats. Jan i s and Mann {1977 )  theori ze that effecti ve 
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emergency deci s i ons  are more l i kely made when a vi gi l ant coping  pattern , 
as opposed to a hyperv igi l ant pattern , i s  domi nant .  A v i gi l ant copi ng 
pattern requi res that four mediating cond i ti ons be present .  The fi rst 
i s  the awareness of seri ous ri sks i f  no protecti ve acti ons are taken . 
The second requi res an effecti ve apprai sal of expected effecti veness 
regardi ng a protecti ve action if that action i s  taken . The thi rd 
condi ti on states that there must be a moderate or hi gh degree of hope 
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that a better means  of escape i s  real i sti cal l y  possi bl e .  And fi nal ly ,  
there must be suffi cient time avai l abl e to sel ect and eval uate i nforma-
ti on and advi ce .  Thi s theoreti cal model of deci sion-maki ng has not 
been tested extens ively .  For organi zati ons whi ch are commi tted to 
the care or protecti on of speci fi c personnel , the cogni ti ve aspect 
of deci si on-making may mean that the concern for safety of cl i ents 
enhances the sal i ency for making pl ans for emergencies . 
Rol e  of Experience 
If  regu lar  fi re dri l l s  are requi red for regul atory reasons , 
deci s ions to expand the dri l l s  to i ncl ude evacuation strategi es due 
to other l ess sal ient or i nfrequent threats may not be deemed necessary. 
The rel i ance on fi re dri l l s for non-fi re rel ated emergency evacuati ons 
has been noted by some researchers . Arnol d et a l . ( 1982 ) stud ied 
evacuee behavi or fol l owi ng an earthquake i n  southern Cal i forni a .  
The study found that evacuees foll owed normal procedures of emergency 
evacuati on i n  exi ti ng the si x-story offi ce structure , even i f  i t  meant 
choosi ng a l ess  safe or more compl i cated route to l eave the bu i l di ng .  
Queri ed later about why such routes were taken , evacuees reported 
fol l owi ng 11dri l l  procedures . .. 
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Burton (1981 )  notes that the Missi ssauga trai n derai l ment , whi ch 
resul ted i n  the evacuati on of over 250 ,000 peopl e over a fi ve-day 
peri od wi thout l oss of l i fe and wi thout i njuri es , was effecti ve because 
of previous experi ences the agenci es i nvol ved had i n  worki ng together. 
Thus organi zati onal l i n kages were strengthened by pri or experi ences 
even though the threats were very di fferent ( the former threat had 
been an ai rpl ane di saster )  ( Burton , 198 1 ) . 
Rol e  Abandonment Duri ng an Emergency 
Another aspect of emergency response concerns  the i ssue of rol e  
confl i ct and the abandonment of work-rel ated rol es duri ng emergencies . 
The i ssue of rol e  abandonment has been rai sed mostl y by i ntervenors 
i n  l i tigati on over nucl ear power pl ant l i censi ng . The i ssue i s  im­
portant to thi s study because of the need for continuing  care for 
cl ients duri ng evacuati ons . 
Whi te's (1952 ) earl y studies suggested that rol e confl ict exi sts 
among emergency workers duri ng an emergency and coul d  hamper response 
when emergency rol es were uncl ear . Mi l eti ( 1985 ) argues that when 
emergency rol es have been made cl ear prior to an event , rol e  confl i ct 
el i ci ted by the emergency does not resul t  i n  abandonment of the emer­
gency ro le  by workers . Mi l eti concl uded that prior emergency pl ans 
and worker tra i ni ng for emergency rol es al l eviated the stress of un­
certai nty caused duri ng the unexpected event and thus was benefi ci al 
in establi shi ng effecti ve response patterns to emergencies . Moreover ,  
i f  the emergency response i s  percei ved as good , then pri or experience 
wi l l  hel p i n  the next emergency.  
Vari ous i s sues about evacuations i n  heal th faci l i ti es are di s­
tincti ve . One i ssue that surfaces i n  the medi cal l i terature i s  the 
probl em of mai ntai n i ng accurate records on patients ' whereabouts and 
condit i ons  duri ng evacuati ons ( Fi sher, 1986 ) .  Another uni que concern 
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i s  the removal of non-ambul atory patients , especi al l y  i f  l i tters are 
requ i red to carry cl i ents ( Hargest , 1981 ) .  The probl em wi th nonambul atory 
cl i ents i s  that several  persons are needed at once to transport cl ients 
compared to si tuations where several cl ients at one time can be guided 
to safety.  
Hargest ( 1981 )  a l so menti ons  the probl em of hi gh-ri se structures 
in evacuati ng pati ents when el evators cannot be used to transport 
pati ents between fl oors . Of greater concern to emergency personnel 
such as fi refi ghters i s  the removal of resi sti ve pati ents from an 
i mmi nent threat ( Kl i en , 1987 ) .  Pati ents sufferi ng from seni l i ty and 
auti sm may not be abl e  to comprehend danger.  Li kewi se , attendi ng  
to pati ents who do  not speak Engl i sh or  have a deep fear of  authori ties 
impai rs rescuers ' attempts to a id  pati ents and may pl ace emergency 
personnel i n  danger themsel ves , especi al l y  when time i s  of the 
essence ( Kl i en , 1987 ) .  
By far the most common threats mentioned i n  the med ical l i terature 
are those about fi res . Drabek ( 1986 : 36 )  notes that testi ng and fi re 
dri l l s  are commonpl ace i n  hospi tal s of vari ous types because of the 
formal certifi cati on requi red by the Ameri can Hosp i tal  Associ ati on . 
However ,  he notes that l i ttl e i s  known on the behavioral responses 
duri ng  actual di sasters . Drabek further notes that researchers offer 
l i ttl e guidance about emergenci es i n  hospi tal s .  A Canad ian study 
by Al l red et al . ( 1982 : vi i ) states : 
• . •  A hospi tal fi re i s  treated somewhat di fferently from 
one i n  other types  of bui l di ngs .  Gi ven a fi re i n  a normal 
h i gh ri se , the fi rst deci sion wou l d  be to evacuate . Gi ven 
a fi re i n  a hospi tal , the fi rst deci s i on i s  to attempt to 
avo id  an evacuati on if at al l possi bl e .  . • • It i s  our 
concl usi on--based on what we saw at St .  Joseph ' s--that thi s 
approach to fi ghti ng fi res i n  hospi tal s i n  hospi tal s may 
not be enti rel y  justi fi ed ( Quoted i n  Drabe k ,  1986 : 36 ) . 
Al though many regul ati ons have been devel oped to prepare staff of 
chroni c  and acute care i nsti tuti ons for fi res , the regul ations  are 
based on the premi se that a fi re wou ld  be easi l y  contai ned ( Hargest , 
1981 ) .  Agreei ng , Dynes  ( 1979 : 57 )  states : 
. . •  The EMS ( Emergency Medi cal Serv ices ) l i terature i s  
a lmost usel ess for pl ann i ng purposes i n  connecti on wi th 
mass casual ty si tuati ons • . •  i s  general l y  l imi ted and 
sel ecti ve i n  coverage , wi th an admi n i strati ve focus or 
bias , i gnores many real and operati onal probl ems and . . 
• [ i s] deri ved from anecdotal accounts (Quoted i n  Drabek ,  
1986 : 43 ) .  
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An i ssue of parti cu l ar concern to heal th managers is the i ncreased 
ri sk  to cl i ents because of an evacuati on move ( Fi scher , 1986 ; Roberts 
and Mi l l s ,  1982 ) . Thus di scuss ion focuses on the compari son of morbidi ty 
rates before and after the emergency evacuations . The fear of i ncreased 
morbidi ty rates al so constrains  deci si on-maki ng unl ess the actual 
presence of the threat i s  evident . Morbidi ty rates do not necessari l y  
i ncrease after an evacuati on ( Fi scher,  1986 ) .  
Di saster Pl ann i ng for Heal th Faci l i ti es 
Most di saster p lans  for heal th faci l i ties  di ffer from other 
organi zati onal pl ans i n  one vi tal way: they are wri tten to prepare 
the faci l i ty to respond to the demands of an uncontrol l abl e event 
and not to control events ( Sel i ger and Simoneau , 1986 ) .  For a heal th 
care faci l i ty a di saster i s  defi ned as : 
• • •  any pati ent-generati ng i ncident whi ch overl oads 
exi sti ng  personnel ; or exi sti ng personnel , suppl i es ,  and 
equ i pment; or, whi ch occurs in such magni tude that resources 
such as personnel , suppl i es ,  and equi pment are not readi l y  
avai l abl e for stabi l i zati on and treatment of casual ti es· 
( Simoneau ,  1985 : 58 ) .  
Most hospi tal s  have d i saster pl ans that provi de for peopl e comi ng 
into the hospi tal duri ng a cri si s ,  i . e . , external di sasters , but pl ans 
for cri ses that may l ead to evacuation are often unavai l ab le  except 
for threats from fi res. 
Unresol ved Issues 
Studies of evacuati ons have been cri ti ci zed because evacuati on 
behavi or i s  poorl y defi ned . An evacuati on i s  often subsumed under 
the more broad canopy of hazard response . Response to threat does 
not necessari l y  imply evacuati on . Response can al so mean seeki ng  
shel ter , confi rmi ng where fami l y  members are l ocated before deci d i ng 
on what to do , or wai ti ng for further i nstructi ons  from an authori ty . 
Frequentl y evacuati on i s  viewed onl y  as wi thdrawal from an area 
wi thout reference to the overal l behavi or. Few studies  ask about 
speci fi c or fi nal desti nation poi nts of evacuees . Di d. the evacuees 
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travel to the fri end ' s  home four bl ocks away , four mi l es away , or 
leave earl y and go 400 mi l es to vi s i t  a fami l y  member? Questions 
are seldom asked about how far the evacuees traveled , wi th whom the 
journey was made { pets , nei ghbors , ki n )  or i f  stops were made on the 
way to buy food or obta i n  money from a bank. How long i t  actual ly 
took to make the journey to a safe pl ace i s  a l so uncl ear. 
Some behavi ors , such as wai ti ng to account for ki n ,  may impede 
safety of the evacuati ng popul ation by prolonging  exi t time .  Thi s 
probl em has surfaced for emergency planners i n  i ssu i ng warn i ngs about 
hurri canes and fl oodi ng . Storm surge can often i nundate l ow-lyi ng 
coastal h i ghways wi thi n  hours of an evacuati on order .  Some events 
such as a slow movi ng flood or vol cano fl ow may a l low peopl e to take 
more time to organi ze or to prepare to move out ( Perry and Green , 
1983 ) .  
Detai led i nformati on i s  l acki ng from the evacuati on li terature 
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on desti nati on poi nts of fami l i es and i nd iv idual s and i s  vi rtua l ly 
unknown i n  the materi al on organi zati ons when i nvolved i n  evacuati ons 
of speci a l  populati ons . I n  i nstances when the evacuati on of a speci al 
faci li ty has been menti oned , as i n  the Mi ssi ssauga tra i n  derai l ment 
i nci dent , there are frequent references to the d i ffi culti es i nvolved 
when the need ari ses for a second wi thdrawal ( Burton , 1981 ) .  Probl ems 
of sequenti al shelteri ng may stem from a lack of preparedness , p lann i ng ,  
or pri or experience wi th a threat ei ther wi thi n the communi ty o r  at 
the organi zati onal level of speci ali zed faci li ty.  
There are few stud ies on the return to the evacuated s i te by 
evacuees . When an evacuee returned or attempted to make the fi rst 
return tri p rema ins  uncertai n .  How peopl e fi nd out when i t  i s  safe 
to return or i f ,  when they returned , ho\i they found out they had to 
l eave agai n i s  uncl ear i n  most of the evacuati on stud ies . When peopl e 
are forced to l eave a second time , researchers have tended to treat 
the ensu i ng behavi or as part of a si ngl e evacuati on experi ence rather 
than d i sti ngu i shi ng  between the two behavi ors . There may be di sti nct 
di ssimi l ari ty between the two evacuati on experiences , i ncl udi ng the 
deci s ion of where to go and what to take a l ong .  
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Other i ssues rel ate to probl ems authori ti es have i n  keepi ng peopl e  
from return i ng to homes before a threat i s  resol ved . Duri ng the fi ve­
day Mi ssi ssauga evacuation i n  Canada , emergency offi ci al s requested 
the Humane Soci ety to enter the evacuated areas and feed the pets 
on a regul ar basi s so peopl e woul d  stay away unti l the threat was 
over ( Burton , 1981 ) .  Peopl e want to get on wi th thei r regul ar busi ness 
as qui ckl y as possi bl e after a di srupti on and to take up where they 
l eft off before they were so 11 rudel y11 i nterrupted . 
Anecdotal observati ons suggest that most evacuations of chroni c  
heal th care and rel ated types of faci l i ti es are carri ed out i n  a d i s­
organ i zed or ad hoc manner (Quarantel l i , 1970 ; Bl anshan , 1978 ) .  Yet 
most heal th care organi zations must have some sort of emergency pl an 
to be accredi ted wi thi n  a state or to carry i n surance . Whereas 
central i zed pl ann i ng has become a common feature i n  today ' s  heal th 
care faci l i ti es ,  most di saster pl anni ng i n  heal th care faci l i ties  
recei ves onl y  superfi ci al attenti on ( Sel i ger and Simoneau , 1986 ) .  
Thi s  study exami nes the pri or pl ann i ng and preparedness of 
organi zati onal personnel before the actua l evacuati on occurred. 
Assess i ng Evacuations of Chronic  Care Organi zati ons 
Zammuto ( 1982 ) notes that eval uati ng the behavi oral  performance 
of an organi zati on i s  often based on the i nformant ' s  subjecti ve ex­
peri ence wi th that organi zation. Thi s study used repl i cabl e measures 
to determi ne the characteri stics affecti ng response to the emergency 
evacuati on . The resul ts can then be compared across stud ies. 
Vari ous aspects of time are used to measure effecti veness of 
organizati onal acti v i ty .  El apsed time measures how qui ck ly  peopl e 
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are moved to safety or arri ve at a shel ter. For heal th care and rel ated 
home care faci l i ties  thi s i nvol ves a number of condi tions whi ch must 
be sati sfi ed , such as di stance to safety, percentage of ambul atory 
to non-ambul atory cl i ents , overal l s ize and characteri sti cs of cl i ent  
popul ati on , and the number of staff or  other personnel avai l abl e to 
assi st i n  evacuati on efforts. 
Time avai l abl e between the detection of the threat and the onset 
of event vari es by threat type . Response time i s  more cri ti cal i n  
a fast-moving  o r  cri si s si tuati on or when the threat i s  ambi guous 
wi th a hi gh probabi l i ty of ri sk or damage . An expl osi on or fi re often 
preci pi tates i mmediate action wi thout the advantage of preparati on 
or di ssemi nation of knowl edge about the threat among i n i ti al staff 
responders. 
37 
Response time i s  further affected by extracommun i ty or commun i ty 
resources that provi de warni ngs al l owi ng advance preparati on for heal th 
care managers. When a faci l i ty i s  warned by offi ci al s or through 
the media  that severe weather may cause temporary evacuati on of an 
enti re area , preparations general l y  i ncl ude procuri ng more equi pment 
and suppl i es. When an event such as a ri veri ne fl ood happens yearly ,  
preparations for di ssemi nati ng i nformati on about poss i bl e  evacuati on 
may be systemati cal l y  appl ied to organ i zati onal operations  as a matter 
of resource accommodation . Thus duri ng hurri cane seasons i n  the South-
east or tornado weather i n  the Midwest , adopti on of strategi es to 
respond immedi atel y  to events that requi re evacuati on may be more 
on the mi nds of organi zati onal personnel . Sal iency woul d  i nduce an 
emotional state of preparedness whi ch s igni fi cantl y improves effecti ve 
response to a threat ( Jan i s  and Mann , 1977 ) .  
Thompson ( 1973 : 21 )  argues : 
• • •  Organi zati ons pointed toward emergencies such as fi re 
departments , attempt to l evel the need for thei r serv i ces 
by acti v i ties desi gned to prevent emergenci es and by the 
emphasi s on earl y detection so that the demand i s  not al l owed 
to grow to the poi nt that wou ld  overtax the capaci ty of 
the organi zati on ( Quoted i n  Haas and Drabek ,  197 5 : 253 ) .  
As Haas and Drabek ( 1978 : 254 ) state , "The greater the organi zati onal 
stress , the greater the change i n  organi zati onal performance structure , "  
or,  a s  Brou l ette and Quarantel l i  ( 1971 : 40-41 ) have noted , the more 
stress to an organi zati on , the more of a • debureaucri ti zati on process •  
occurs wi thi n  the organi zation duri ng a cri si s . "  Li nn  and Kreps • 
( 1987 ) research i ndi cates that organi zational stress i ncurred by a 
di saster may l ead to restructuri ng of the organi zati on that can be 
cal i brated temporal l y  and spati al ly .  
Organi zati onal systems , l i ke the i ndi vidual s i n  organi zati ons , 
refl ect i n i ti al responses that are rooted wi thi n  normati ve gui del i nes 
( Drabe k ,  1986 : 158 ) .  The theme of normati ve conti nui ty,  as Drabek 
( 1986 ) notes , permi ts understandi ng  of the organi zati onal member ' s  
behavior duri ng times of stress .  Thus organi zations , such as uti l i ty 
companies , are often more prepared and effecti ve duri ng an emergency 
than those that do not deal wi th cri si s  events on a regul ar basi s .  
I n  Drabek ' s  revi ew of organi zati onal i n i ti a l  responses ( 1986 : 159 ) , 
he found case stud i es suggesting  both pl ann i ng and the degree of event 
predi ctabi l i ty were rel ated to response conti nui ty .  Thus response 
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to a stressful event i s  more conti nuous and more arti cul ated and timel y 
when preparati on for a threateni ng event has been accompl i shed pri or 
to an event • 
• . • Organi zati onal deci s ion-maki ng i n  cri ses has several 
di sti ngui shing characteri sti cs . The rate of deci si on-maki ng 
i ncreases , as does the number of deci si ons made , parti cul arly 
at the l ower l evel s  of the organi zati on . There seems to 
be l ess consul tati on among organi zati onal members , and such 
i nd i vi dual autonomy means that organi zati onal personnel 
and resources are commi tted qui ckly ,  often outsi de the 
organi zati on ' s  previ ous domai n  of competence. Organi zati ons 
usual ly  l ose autonomy when comi ng under the control of new 
" coord i nati on " arrangements; wi thi n organi zati ons , sectors 
wi th hi gh cri si s rel evance gai n  deci s ion maki ng autonomy 
( Dynes and Quarantel l i ,  1977 : 24; Drabek ,  1986 : 162 ) .  ( See 
a l so Quarantel l i , 1970a : 389; Drabek and Haa s ,  1969; Haas 
and Drabek ,  197 3 : 250-256; Yamamoto , 1981 : 66; Mi l eti and 
Sorensen , 1987 ) .  
Adaptati on to d i saster by an organi zati on wi l l  be i nfl uenced 
by three factors : ( 1 ) the preexi sti ng bureaucrati c structure , ( 2 )  
the emergency capabi l i ty ,  and ( 3 )  the perce i ved effecti veness and 
effi ci ency of the emergency response ( Broul l ette and Quarantel l i ,  
197 1 ,  as summari zed i n  Mi l eti et al . ,  1975 : 7 9 ;  Drabek ,  1986 : 162 ) .  
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Thus the contextual aspect of prior organi zati onal  arrangements i s  
cri ti cal i n  response effecti veness .  The effecti veness of  organizati onal 
capaci ty in copi ng  wi th extreme but l ow probabi l i ty events i s  dramati cal l y  
i ncreased when pl anni ng i ncl udes antici pation of such events wi th 
corresponding organi zational networks and l i n kages defi ned and cl ari fied 
across and among organi zations . 
The l i terature revi ew and analyti c framework suggest a number 
of hypotheses rel evant to nurs ing homes and rel ated heal th care 
faci l i ti es .  Appendi x  F presents the hypotheses and the rel evant 
findi ngs . 
CHAPTER I I I  
METHODOLOGY 
Choosi ng the Uni verse 
Part of the probl em in exami n ing evacuations of speci al i zed popu­
l ati ons was i dentifyi ng  faci l i ti es that had experienced an evacuati on 
of some or a l l  of thei r premi ses . Hazards and threats to peop l e  are 
consi dered newsworthy i tems ( Kreps , 1980; Rossi et al . ,  198 1 ) ;  there­
fore , we used the Nexi s/Lexi s computeri zed data based system to l ocate 
reported i nci dences of evacuati ons i n  syndi cated newspaper arti cl es 
by Uni ted Press I nternati onal ( UP I ) ,  the Associ ated Press (AP ) , and 
Reuters between November 1, 1983 , and December 31 , 1987 . We found 
35 arti cl es reporti ng actual evacuati ons of nursi ng homes and two 
other arti cl es reporti ng preparati ons for evacuati ons of such faci l i ­
ties i n  the Un i ted States . 
I ncompl eteness of arti cl es deal i ng wi th the evacuati ons requi red 
a further search to determi ne the name and l ocati on of the faci l i ty. 
On occasi on we contacted l ocal pol i ce or other emergency agencies  
in  the area of  the evacuati on for i nformati on on the evacuated faci l i ty. 
I n  further pursui t  of the media  reports of evacuati ons duri ng Hurri cane 
El ena , we were referred to a publ i c  document prepared for Pi nel l as 
County that l i sted 19 nursing homes among the number of medi cal  faci l i ­
ties  whi ch were evacuated . Duri ng the course of thi s research two 
evacuati ons  of nurs ing  homes took pl ace i n  Tennessee . These i nsti tu­
ti ons were vi s i ted and personal i ntervi ews conducted wi th staff members . 
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These were used to test the survey i nstrument and as case studies  
to  provi de an i n-depth ana lysi s .  
Ana lys i s  of  Documents 
The arti c les general l y  reported the date of evacuation , the 
number of persons evacuated , the number of i njuri es and deaths , fi rst 
responders , type of threat ,  and if others in the v i ci n i ty al so were 
evacuated . Some arti cl es al so reported where evacuees were taken 
and how l ong the evacuation l asted . Addresses of the faci l i ti es were 
determi ned from l i brary fi l es ,  tel ephone books and operators , pol i ce 
fi l es , or from newspaper edi tors or personnel . (Appendi x  C has a 
copy of the content anal ysi s form. ) To gai n  knowl edge about communi ty 
resources , secondary materi al was used to determi ne characteri sti cs 
of the county where the faci l i ty was l ocated . The data i ncl uded the 
s i ze and densi ty of the popul ati on . 
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The newspaper arti cl es provided a base of i nformation for al l 
members of the uni verse . Thi s i nformati on was used to compare inter­
vi ew respondents and non-respondents . Gi ven the smal l number of evacua­
ti ons , we deci ded to gather i nformati on from each faci l i ty i n  the 
uni verse rather than sel ect a sampl e .  
I n i tial  Contact 
Once the faci l i ty had been l ocated , a cover l etter descri bi ng 
the study and enl i sti ng the organi zati on ' s  hel p was sent to the 
admi n i strator of the organi zati on . The l etter di scussed the study ' s 
purpose and requested a copy of any i nternal report of the evacuation 
that woul d provi de background for the i nterview.  ( See Appendi x  B 
for a copy of the l etter . )  The l etter i ndi cated that a research 
worker woul d  cal l  the admi ni strator wi th requests for speci fi c i nfor­
mation about the evacuation . We al so outl i ned the procedures to 
protect those i nterv iewed . I t  was made cl ear i n  the l etter that al l 
i nformati on wou ld  be treated i n  a confi denti al manner i n  keep i ng wi th 
The Uni versi ty of Tennessee research pol i ci es on human subjects . 
Besi des mai n ta ini ng stri ct confident ia l i ty,  thi s  i ncl uded respecting 
a respondent ' s  refusal to answer questi ons . 
Data Col l ecti on 
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An i nterview schedul e was devel oped to i nvesti gate the evacuati ons 
at the faci l i ti e s .  The schedul e was revi ewed and pretested at a nurs ing 
home i n  Knoxvi l l e ,  Tennessee . Al though the nurs ing home i tsel f had 
not undergone an evacuati on i n  the l ast four years , the admi ni strator ' s  
comments were hel pful i n  recasting the questi ons .  A reti rement home 
adjacent to the faci l i ty chosen for pretesti ng had evacuated approxi ­
mate ly  fi ve years previ ous ly  and that experi ence was used as  a focus 
for questi ons perta i n i ng to evacuation procedures . ( See Appendi x  
E for the i ntervi ew schedul e . ) 
The i nterview form focused on the evacuati on as experi enced by 
the organi zati on ( not the cl ients ) .  Beg i nni ng wi th the i n i ti al i nfor­
mati on about the threat , the admi ni strator was asked to descri be the 
evacuati on to the poi nt when al l cl i ents were returned to the faci l i ty. 
Most questi ons d i d  not have fi xed choi ce responses .  Instead , the 
i nterview used di rected questi ons i n  conversati onal styl e .  A few 
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questi ons were di rected to gai n i ng bas ic  i nformati on about the organi za­
ti on ( i . e . , number of cl i ents and staff, servi ces provi ded , types 
of cl ients , contacts wi th other agenci es , evacuati on pl ans , and 
associ ations ) .  Speci fi c  i nformati on was gathered on the time taken 
to evacuate . The i nterview concl uded by asking  the admi n i strator ' s  
opi n i on on the effecti veness of the evacuati on and what changes woul d  
be made by the organi zati on i n  future evacuation s .  The i ntervi ews 
were conducted between January 6 ,  1988 , and May 30 , 1988 . 
A reti red nurse was recrui ted to hand l e  most of the tel ephone 
i n terviewi ng .  Hi ri ng her was extremely  advantageous because her medi ­
cal background and abi l i ty to "tal k shop " gave u s  credi bi l i ty wi th 
admi n i strators . She al so provided a background to hel p understand 
the probl ems of staff duri ng  emergenci es . 
Codes were devel oped for analys i s  of the data from the intervi ew.  
Data were recorded d i rectly onto schedul es duri ng the tel ephone i nter­
view.  Immedi atel y  fol l owi ng the i nterview ,  data were transcri bed 
to cod ing  sheets and entered i nto a data base for l ater ana l ysi s .  
Because of the nature of the i nterviews , we did  not systemati cal ly  
check for errors . Data thought to be i n  error were recorded as 
mi ss ing .  The code book is  avai l ab le  upon request and may be used 
wi th permi ssion of the author.  
Measurement 
Quarantel l i ' s ( 1980 ) typol ogy of factors i nfl uenci ng the abi l i ty 
of organi zati ons to cope wi th evacuations notes fi ve categori es : 
( 1 ) threat ,  ( 2 )  resources , ( 3 )  social  c l imate , ( 4 )  soci al  l i n kages , 
and ( 5 ) extracommun i ty .  I n  add i ti on we gathered data o n  response 
characteri sti cs . Wi thi n  each category the speci fi c vari abl es on whi ch 
data were gathered i ncl uded : 
1 .  Threat 
A .  Si tuati onal vari abl es 
1 .  Time of day of evacuati on 
2. Month and day of evacuati ons 
B. Agent vari abl es 
1.  Frequency 
2 .  Predi ctabi l i ty 
3 .  Durati on 
C. Soci a l -psychol ogi cal vari abl es 
1 .  Defi n i tion of ri sk 
2 .  Resources ( for both specia l i zed faci l i ty and communi ty ) 
A .  Evacuati on dri l l s  
1 .  Number of hours of staff time i nvol ved i n  actual dri l l s  
2 .  Number of hours of staff time gi ven to procedures 
B .  Evacuation pl ann i ng 
1 .  Number of  ful l -time hours per person devoted to  evacuati on 
pl ann i ng 
2 .  Level of dri l l s : paper and penci l ,  fi re dri l l s ,  mock 
s imul ati ons 
3 .  Level of preparedness for actual evacuati on 
4 .  Personnel i nvol ved i n  evacuati on pl ann i ng 
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C .  Phys i cal  
1 .  Spec ia l i zed or bui l t- i n  safety structures or uni ts ( i . e . , 
tornado shel ter , fi re doors , etc . ) 
3 .  Soci al cl imate ( for both speci al i zed faci l i ty and communi ty )  
A .  Ri sk  perception 
1 .  Number of previous experiences wi th s imi l ar threat( s )  
2 .  Number of evacuations compl eted 
B .  Hierarchy 
1 .  Number of l evel s 
2 .  Number of personnel i nvol ved i n  deci s ion about evacuation 
C. Compl exi ty of organi zation 
1 .  Number of cl i ents 
2 .  Part of  a l arger organi zati on 
3 .  Servi ces provided 
D .  Abi l i ty to recei ve warn i ng 
1 .  Method ( s )  warni ngs recei ved/transmi tted 
2 .  Respons i b le  agency for i ssui ng evacuati ons 
3 .  Speci al procedures for noti fi cati on about threats 
E .  Constrai nts to deci s ion-maki ng about evacuati on 
1 .  Previ ous fal se al arms 
2 .  Other constra i nts :  securi ty ,  i nabi l i ty to move cl i ents 
or i nexperi ence wi th movi ng cl i ents , no desti nati on s i te 
avai l ab le  
3 .  Densi ty of popul ati on of commun i ty 
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4 .  Soci al  l i nkages (for both speci al i zed faci l i ties  and communi ty ) 
A .  Interorgani zati onal l i nkages 
1 .  Number of organi zati ons i nvol ved i n  evacuati on 
B .  I ntraorgani zati onal l i n kages 
1 .  Cl ari ty of evacuati on procedures wi thi n organi zati on 
2. Soci a l -psychol ogi cal views about evacuati ons 
C.  Previous experi ence 
1 .  Number of organi zations worked wi th i n  past evacuations 
2.  I nd iv idual experience wi th prior evacuations 
D .  Speci al l y  desi gnated emergency uni ts 
1 .  Types of speci al l y  trai ned personnel duri ng evacuati ons 
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2 .  Number of past occasi ons requi ri ng use of speci al l y  trai ned 
uni ts .  
5 .  Extracommuni ty setting (for both speci al i zed faci l i ty and 
organizati on ) 
A .  Regul ations 
1 .  Number of regul ati ons affecti ng deci s ion-maki ng about 
evacuati ons 
2. Number of agencies affecti ng deci sion-making  about 
evacuati ons  
3 .  Number of  i nternal guidel i nes affecti ng deci sion-maki ng 
about evacuati ons 
4 .  Penal ti es 
B .  External resources 
1 .  Extent of assi stance avai l ab le  from state or federal agencies 
2 .  Extent of subs id ies avai l able  for pl anni ng/dri l l s  
6 .  Evacuati on response of speci al i zed faci l i ty 
A .  Time 
1 .  Time to make deci s ion to evacuate 
2 .  Time to compl ete evacuati on of  faci l i ty ( per capi ta 
i nvol ved ) 
3 .  Time to return ( round-tri p )  ( per cap i ta i nvol ved ) 
B .  Other factors 
1 .  Number of persons evacuated 
2 .  Deaths or  i njuries due to evacuati on 
3. Shel ters 
4. Probl ems . 
Threat Characteri sti cs 
Several characteri sti cs of the threat were known from analyz ing  
the arti cl es : the type of threat ,  the month , the day , and the year .  
To determi ne how the threat had been perce i ved , the respondent was 
as ked when and how the organi zati on had l earned of the probl em .  We 
a l so asked whether the news arti cl e contai ned correct i nformati on 
about the evacuati on . 
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These questi ons were desi gned to determi ne how the threat was 
detected , whether detecti on was i nternal  or external , and , i f  external ,  
was i t  from a l ocal or extracommun i ty source . Second ly ,  the questi on 
determi ned i f  the warn i ng was recei ved from an authori ty or i f  an 
offi c ia l  noti fi cati on was made to the faci l i ty. We al so confi rmed 
whether the reason for the evacuati on was a threat stated i n  the news 
arti cl e .  
To determi ne the frequency of evacuati on experiences wi thi n  an 
organi zati on , a questi on asked whether thi s  was the fi rst evacuati on 
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at the faci l i ty. A fol l ow-up questi on ascertai ned whether the organi za­
tion had prepared to evacuate i n  the past but not had to l eave . 
Resources 
To measure organi zati onal resources whi ch coul d be used i n  an 
emergency , i nformati on was sought as to how staff l earned of emergency 
procedures , what types of tra i n i ng staff had , i f  dri l l s  were conducted 
and i f  those dri l l s  actua l l y  i ncl uded mock simul ati ons of evacuati ons .  
We i nqui red about the number of staff and i f  the staff l i ved wi thi n  
a 10-mi l e  radi us ( for avai l abi l i ty for use i n  emergency) .  We al so 
asked about externa l  hel p from vol unteers or emergency agencies duri ng 
the evacuati on . 
Soc ia l  Cl imate 
To determi ne l evel of preparedness , we asked about how i nformati on 
on emergency behavior was d i s semi nated to empl oyees wi thi n  the faci l i ty. 
The l evel of measurement was hi erarch i cal wi th ( 1 )  no dri l l s ,  simpl y 
read ing  manua l s as one category ; ( 2 )  i nserv ice tra i n i ng wi th occasional 
fi re dri l l s  at l east once a month wi th i n servi ce tra i n i ng on evacuations ; 
( 4 )  fi re dri l l s at l east monthl y wi th mock simul ations or actual evacua­
tions carri ed out yearl y wi th or wi thout commun i ty support as the 
fourth l evel . 
We al so asked why organi zati ons had such dri l l s . Answer categori es 
were ( 1 )  for regul atory or certi fi cati on requi rements ; ( 2 )  because 
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of being  l ocated i n  an area threatened by a seasonal  hazard ( hurri cane , 
tornado , fl ood i ng ,  etc . ) ;  or ( 3 ) other , such as "bei ng a good i dea , "  
"you never know , "  etc . I f  the preparedness tra i n i ng i ncl uded s imu l ated 
or mock  evacuation exerci ses , simi l ar questions were asked . 
Other aspects of the organ i zati onal resources were ori gi nal l y  
i ntended for analys i s .  We asked about the yearly operati ng budget 
of the faci l i ty as  wel l as the percentage of that amount spent on 
emergency preparedness . Al most al l admi n i strators bal ked at these 
i nqui ries , and the questi ons were consequentl y dropped from the 
schedul e .  
Another question l i sted n i ne di ffi cul ties reported i n  the 
l i terature as constrai nts to evacuati on . The l i st was not arranged 
hi erarchi cal l y  but was s imply used to el i ci t  a response on each i ssue . 
Repl i es to these categori es i ncl uded ranking how di ffi cul t the probl em 
was for the organi zati on , measuri ng whether i t  was ( 1 )  of major concern 
duri ng the evacuati on , ( 2 )  of mi nor concern duri ng the evacuati on , 
or ( 3 )  of no concern duri ng the evacuati on . If  the i tem was not 
appl i cabl e i t  was pl aced in the "no-concern " category .  The l i st ended 
wi th an open-ended questi on aski ng if there were any further di ffi ­
cul ties that came to mi nd . The open-ended question did  not yi el d 
any further categori es and was subsequently dropped from the anal yses . 
An i ssue rai sed i n  the l i st of d iffi cul ti es of provi d ing  medi ca­
ti on for cl i ents duri ng the evacuati on el i c i ted an unanti ci pated 
response about how patients were i denti fied duri ng the evacuation 
from thei r home faci l i ty. Most organi zations reported taki ng al l 
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cl i ents • charts wi th the cl ients , wi th some faci l i ties reporti ng  havi ng 
dupl i cate charts avai l abl e for use duri ng emergenc ies . Two i nformants 
reported havi ng a pi cture of each cl i ent on the fi rst page of the 
cl i ent • s  chart for easy i denti fi cati on of the cl ient .  Some i nformants 
menti oned havi ng  wri st bands to i denti fy cl i ents . 
Another rel ated i ssue concerned medi cati on for cl i ents . Most 
i nformants i ndi cated that mai ntai n i ng proper medi cation l evel s for 
cl i ents duri ng evacuati ons was consi dered cri ti cal for the wel l -bei ng 
of thei r cl i ents . Almost al l the organi zati ons reported taki ng al l 
cl i ent medi cations wi th them when l eavi ng the i r  faci l i ty ,  even when 
cl i ents were pl aced i n  a hospi tal for the durati on of the evacuati on . 
Some respondents reported wheel i ng medi cation carts i nto the vans 
or buses that carri ed the cl ients to shel ter s i tes . Concern for patients • 
wel l -bei ng was of primary concern , wi th no one wanti ng  to upset cl ients 
any more than was necessary ,  parti cul arl y as some cl i ents were reported 
experienc i ng confus ion because of the move from thei r home base . 
We a l so asked how staff handl ed 11resi sti ve 11 patients . No one 
reported any probl ems i n  actual ly  removi ng cl i ents duri ng the evacua­
tion . 11We tal ked to them , 11 11We assured them , 11 or 11We put thei r mi nd 
at rest11 were among the responses g iven . One respondent menti oned 
that one cl i ent had to be 11hel ped , 11 apparentl y wi th two 11abl e-bodi ed 11 
staff members to l eave the premi ses . Probing i nto the matter was 
unsuccessful and we eventual ly  dropped the i tem from the ana lyses . 
Soci al Li n kages 
To ascertai n  how l i n kages to external emergency organi zati ons 
were handl ed ,  two questi ons were i ncl uded aski ng  what agenc ies had 
been contacted (e i ther federal , state , county ,  or l ocal ) by the 
organi zati on i n  pl ann i ng for emergenci es . We al so asked the reverse 
questi on--how many offi c ia l  agenci es ( such as FEMA) had contacted 
the faci l i ty about evacuati on pl ann i ng .  Si nce onl y  one faci l i ty 
reported any contact that questi on was al so dropped from the ana lysi s .  
To determi ne other l i nkages to the commun ity ,  we al so asked who 
assi sted the organ i zati on i n  evacuation efforts . Overwhel mi ng  repl ies 
were recei ved about most of the staff personnel comi ng in before bei ng 
cal l ed or "al l staff" reporti ng when cal l ed to assi st .  Onl y  one 
faci l i ty reported a n i ght shi ft refusi ng to conti nue worki ng  i n  case 
of a possi bl e  evacuati on . In thi s case the threat was uncertai n  and 
the staff had a l ready worked an ei ght-hour shift .  Frequent reports 
were made that fami l y  and fri ends of staff members arri ved wi th the 
staff to hel p al so . Operators of ambul ances and hearses as wel l  as 
other vol unteers "off the street" al so assi sted i n  the evacuati on 
efforts . The few i nstances i n  whi ch no vol unteers were reported as 
hel pers were in evacuations in whi ch the enti re communi ty was i nvol ved 
i n  the evacuati on from a major threat .  
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Soc ia l  l i nkages a s  i ndependent vari abl es were al so operati onal i zed 
by determi n i ng the organ i zati onal use of external sources of ai d and 
the types of externa l  hel p ( such as offi cia l  hel p and/or the use of 
vol unteers ) .  Al so used as i ndependent vari abl es were the sources 
of noti fi cati on about threats and l evel of preparedness wi thi n  the 
organi zati on for emergencies , i ncl udi ng evacuati ons . The s i ze and 
densi ty of the popul ation of the county i n  whi ch the faci l i ty was 
l ocated al so were determi ned and used as i ndependent vari abl es . The 
s i ze of the faci l i ty was al so used as an i ndependent vari abl e .  
Response Characteri stics 
Three vari abl es have been associ ated wi th assessment of ri sk 
and the devel opment of warn i ng bel ief--warni ng source , warni ng con­
tent , and past experience wi th di sasters or other threats ( Perry and 
Mushkatel , 1986 ) . Before i ssuing an evacuati on order , someone wi thi n  
the organi zati on must determi ne that the si tuati on i s  hazardous and 
proceed to i ssue an evacuation order.  Quarantel l i  ( 1980 ) argues that 
evacuati on as a col l ecti ve concept is primari l y  a communi ty-l evel 
phenomenon general l y  organi zed around a l ocal l y  integrated soc ial 
enti ty such as a town or c i ty. However , i n  thi s  study , commun i ty 
i s  referenced as a soci al  uni t  wi thi n a speci al i zed faci l i ty whi ch 
shares certa i n  characteri sti cs and i s  percei ved as di sti nct from the 
l arger soci ety wi thi n  whi ch i t  exi sts . 
An easi l y  measured vari abl e to determi ne warn i ng characteri sti cs 
i s  time . Fi ve questions yi e ldi ng a measurement of time were used : 
( 1 )  the time the threat was di scovered ; ( 2 )  at what time dec i s i on­
managers l earned of the threat ; ( 3) the time i t  took to evacuate 
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cl i ents from the faci l i ty ( even if not al l staff l eft wi th the cl i ents ) ;  
( 4 )  at what time the deci s ion was made to return to the faci l i ty ;  
and ( 5 ) the time when al l cl i ents were returned safel y to thei r 
quarters . We omi tted the return times of the few cl i ents who had 
been sent to hospi tal s as precautionary measures duri ng the evacua­
ti on and who were returned at a l ater time to the faci l i ty than the 
majori ty of cl i ents . 
The measures provi ded a method of ( 1 ) di scerni ng l ength of time 
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to evacuate per cl i ent  (measure i ncl uded cl i ents only ) ; ( 2 )  determi n i ng 
the l ength of time spent i n  the i n i tia l  evacuation effort ; and ( 3 ) 
determi n i ng the time away from the faci l i ty .  Length of  time to return 
cl i ents was someti mes reported as l onger than the i n i ti al wi thdrawal 
experience because of the l ack of buses fQr transporti ng cl i ents as 
wel l as other i nconven iences that hampered return efforts . 
Throughout the study, effecti veness of the evacuati on ( as measured 
i n  the time spent evacuating )  was used as the dependent vari abl e .  
Effecti veness was al so measured subjecti vel y by our respondents on 
a fi ve-poi nt scal e us ing one as 11Very i neffecti ve .. to fi ve bei ng 11very 
effecti ve . .. Effecti veness was further measured by the number of prob­
l ems encountered whi l e  evacuati ng .  Several questions addressed thi s  
i ssue : di ffi cul ties organi zations had i n  evacuati ng thei r cl i ents 
to safety , d i ffi cul ties at the shel ter s i tes , di ffi cul ties i n  return i ng 
cl i ents to the faci l i ty ,  and d iffi cul ties when cl i ents were al l back 
i n  thei r quarters . 
Data Analysi s 
Fi rst ,  the un i vari ate stati sti cs were compi l ed to provi de a quan­
ti tati ve descri pti on of the characteri sti cs of organi zations that 
evacuated and of the evacuati on process .  These al so provi ded a means 
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of ana lyz i ng the non-respondents to see i f  systemati c bias  was bei ng 
i ntroduced i nto the analysi s from non-response . Second , bi vari ate 
ana lysi s was used to exami ne rel ati onships  suggested i n  Chapter I I  and 
from the anal yti c framework presented i n  Chapter I .  Conti ngency tabl es 
analyzed measured l evel s of associ ation when vari abl es were nominal . 
T-tests were used to determine di fferences i n  means between di chotomous 
and conti nuous vari abl es . Pearson • s  correl ation was used when both 
vari abl es were conti nuou s .  ( Resul ts are presented i n  Appendi ces under 
Data . ) 
Thi rd , a regress ion model exami ned the analyti cal framework as 
specified .  Vari abl es chosen represent el ements of the theoreti cal 
model . The sel ection of vari abl es was based on the uni vari ate and 
bi vari ate ana lysi s and on havi ng reasonab ly  compl ete data on each 
vari abl e .  Fi nal l y ,  descri pti ve data col l ected i n  the tel ephone 
survey were used to provi de a qual i tati ve descri pti on of the 
evacuation experi ence . The effect of the response to the future emer­
gencies by the organi zati on was exami ned by ana lyz i ng changes that 
the organi zations have made or i ntend to make i n  the future evacuati ons 
because of probl ems encountered duri ng  the evacuati on . 
Because we used the uni verse of al l evacuati ons i n  a four-year 
period , s i gn i fi cant tests are not stri ctly appropri ate . For the most 
part , they are not reported . Where they are reported , they are 
i l l ustrati ve . Di fferences between categori es of data are di fferences 
i n  the uni verse . The magni tude of di fference i s  the only i mportant 
measure .  
Introducti on 
CHAPTER I V  
FINDINGS 
Thi s chapter provi des a descri pti ve ana lysi s of the fi ndi ngs 
from the study. Secti on One descri bes the census of cases and ana lyzes 
avai l abl e characteri sti cs of non-respondents to determi ne i f  non-response 
i ntroduces systemati c bias . The section al so descri bes the threat 
characteri sti cs for vari ati ons in regi onal di stri buti on , the types 
of threats caus i ng evacuati ons , the seasonal di stri buti on of the threat 
occurrences . Secti on Two gi ves the di stri bution of responses on the 
vari abl es studi ed . Secti on Three descri bes the probl ems experi enced 
duri ng  the evacuati on by respondents . Secti on Four summari zes the 
fi ndi ngs wi th respect to the hypotheses tested . 
Secti on One : Census and Non-respondents 
Census of cases . Si xty-two nurs i ng homes and rel ated home care 
faci l i ties were i denti fi ed from the medi a  arti cl es as hav i ng evacuated 
some or al l of thei r premi ses between October 1 ,  1983 , and December 
31, 1987 . Coi nc identa l ly ,  one faci l i ty wi thi n  thi s popul ati on 
evacuated twi ce on separate occasions  approximately one year apart 
but for two di fferent types of threats . These two evacuati ons were 
treated as separate cases , bri ngi ng the number of cases to 63. 
Incl uded i n  the 63 cases of reported evacuati ons were 19 nurs ing  homes 
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i n  P i nel l as County l ocated i n  the Tampa Bay region on the Gul f coast 
of Fl ori da . Al l these faci l i ti es had been evacuated duri ng Hurri cane 
El ena i n  1985 . Duri ng the peri od of intervi ewi ng ,  two evacuations 
of nurs i ng homes occurred that were used as case studies . Our census 
i s  65 cases of evacuations .  
Three types of  faci l i ties  cari ng for spec ia l  popul ati ons were 
i denti fied : nursi ng homes provi ding  some type of conti nuous medi cal 
supervi s ion or custod i al servi ces {N=61 ) ;  reti rement  type faci l i ti es 
providi ng  securi ty and other bas ic  servi ces such as housekeeping  but 
wi th mi n imal supervi s ion (N=2 ) ; and mental heal th faci l i ti es provid ing  
rehabi l i tati on and supervi sory care {N=2 ) .  The nursing  homes and 
rel ated care faci l i ti es provi ded i ntermediate and/or ski l l ed heal th 
care as wel l as custod i al servi ces to cl i ents . The reti rement type 
homes were associ ated wi th a chroni c  heal th care faci l i ty. The mental 
heal th faci l i ty provi ded rehabi l i tati ve as wel l as custod ia l  care 
to cl i ents wi th impai red mental capacities . For the rest of the d i s­
sertation al l cases are referred to as nurs i ng homes and rel ated care 
faci l i ti e s .  
Non-responders . Non-response al ways has the potenti al to bi as 
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the resul ts .  Si nce we had usabl e data from 46 nurs ing  homes and rel ated 
care faci l i ti es ,  we exami ned non-respondents and responders on avai l abl e 
characteri sti cs to see i f  non-responders were bi as ing  the resul ts . 
Reasons for non-response were d iv ided i nto four categori es : 
( 1 ) change i n  admi n i strati on or management of the organi zati on ( N=7 ) ;  
( 2 )  no evacuati on took pl ace at the faci l i ty {N=6 ) ;  ( 3 ) organi zation 
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refused to be interviewed when contacted (N=3 ) ; and ( 4 )  faci l i ty cou l d  
not be l ocated (N=3 ) . I n  a l l seven cases where there had been a change 
i n  admin i strati on or management , no one who had parti ci pated i n  the 
evacuati on was empl oyed at the time of the intervi ew.  Si x organi za­
ti ons stated that no evacuati on had taken pl ace . Three of these or­
gani zations had prepared to evacuate but d i d  not actual l y  l eave thei r 
bui l di ngs . One of these three organ i zati ons reported that thei r cl ients 
refused to l eave the faci l i ty because the l ocal c i v i l defense uni t  
was usi ng the faci l i ty a s  headquarters and the cl i ents consi dered 
the faci l i ty a safe pl ace to stay. One organi zation stated that they 
had prepared to evacuate but never l eft after al l .  Another organi za­
ti on reported that onl y  one cl i ent had l eft the home vol untari l y  and 
that no evacuati on of the overal l faci l i ty occurred . Two organi zations 
refused to be i nterviewed , stati ng they wanted to forget the i nc ident . 
Another organi zati on refused stati ng  that company pol i cy forbade outsi de 
intervi ews . We were unab le  to l ocate three of the faci l i ti e s .  Of 
the 49 faci l i ti es l ocated wi th veri fied evacuati ons ,  three (or 6 per­
cent ) refused to respond--a very l ow refusal rate . 
Non-responders and responders . Mortal i ty di fferences between 
responders and non-responders were qui te smal l .  No deaths had occurred 
among cl i ents duri ng the 46 evacuations for whi ch we had ful l data . 
There was one case of poss ibl e i ncrease i n  morbidi ty rates among cl i ents 
in the months fol l owi ng one evacuation but the admi ni strator coul d 
not veri fy the observation . There was one death reported i n  the medi a  
accounts of a fi reman who assi sted i n  evacuati ng a smal l faci l i ty .  
We d i d  not i ncl ude thi s  death { al though veri fi ed ) because the person 
ki l l ed was not connected di rectly wi th the organi zati on . 
I n  the non-response group there were three cases i n  whi ch at 
l east one death was reported by the med i a .  Al l reports i ndi cated 
that deaths had occurred as a resul t of fi res whi ch i nvesti gators 
fel t  were del i berately  set {arson ) .  Of the organi zati ons i n  whi ch 
deaths had occurred , we were abl e to contact onl y  one faci l i ty by 
tel ephone . After confi rming that an evacuati on had occurred and that 
one person had d ied duri ng the event ,  the admi ni strator refused to 
parti ci pate , stati ng she wanted to forget the whol e i nc ident . The 
other two faci l i ties did not have l i sted tel ephones and cou l d  not 
be l ocated through pol i ce records , l ocal ci vi l defense agenci es nor 
through regi onal and l ocal newspaper l i brari es . 
Tabl e 1 shows the d i stribution of mortal i ty among responders 
and non-responders . 
Tabl e 1 .  Mortal i ty Among Responders and Non-responders 
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We cannot argue that mortal i ty in the evacuations causes non-response . 
The number of i nstances i s  very smal l and i n  two of the i nstances the 
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reason for non-response was fai l ure to contact the faci l i ty .  I t  appears 
that non-response i s  unrel ated to mortal i ty from evacuati on . 
Nurs i ng home and rel ated home care faci l i ties are di stri buted 
unevenly across the Uni ted States . Twenty percent of al l nurs ing  
home and rel ated care faci l i ties in  the Uni ted States are l ocated 
i n  the Northeast , about 29 percent i n  the North Central , and approxi­
matel y 29 percent in the South , wi th the remai nder ( 23 percent ) l ocated 
i n  the West ( Stati sti cal Abstract of the Un i ted States , 1987 : 102 ; 
regi onal groupi ngs of states fol l ows use by the Uni ted States Nati onal 
Center for Heal th Stati sti cs , 1986 ) .  
Regi onal vari ati on of nurs i ng homes i n  the Un i ted States and 
i n  the census of evacuati ons i s  gi ven i n  Tabl e 2. The census contai ns 
19 evacuati ons of faci l i ti es in Pi nel l as County ( near Tampa Bay , 
Fl ori da ) . Al l these faci l i ti es were evacuated duri ng  Hurri cane El ena 
i n  August of 1985 . 
Whether the Pi nel l as County group i s  i ncl uded or not , the South 
shows a d i sproporti onate number of evacuati ons . Of the total group 
of 65 cases , more than hal f { 57 percent ) of reported evacuati ons occurred 
at faci l i ti es l ocated i n  the southern Uni ted States . Wi thout the 
Pi nel l as group , the South sti l l  accounts for almost 40 percent of 
al l reported evacuati ons .  The di stri bution of faci l i ti es shows that 
evacuati ons are more l i ke ly  in the South and l ess l i ke ly  i n  the West .  
It  al so shows that regional vari ati ons are the same for responders 
and non-responders . 
Tabl e 2 .  Nurs ing  Homes and Evacuati ons by Regi on 
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Al l Nurs ing  Homes* I ncl udi ng Pi nel l as 
( Region ) Al l Responders 
Excl udi ng Pi nel l as 

























*Census reporting  of nurs i ng and rel ated care faci l i ti es excl udes 
hospi tal -based nurs ing  homes . 
Source : Adapted from the Stati sti cal Abstract of the Uni ted 
States , 1987 : 102 . U . S .  Nati onal  Center for Heal th Stati sti cs , unpubl i shec 
data . 
( Reg ional  di stri bution of states i s  by Census defi n i ti on and avai l ab le  
i n  the code book on  request from the author. ) 
Tabl e 3 shows the seasonal vari ati on of evacuati ons for 
responders and non-responders . The di stri buti ons are d ifferent ,  wi th 
non responders more heavi l y  concentrated i n  the wi nter and responders 
i n  spri ng and fal l .  
In  the census 12 of the reported evacuations occurred duri ng 
the wi nter months ( January 1 through March 3 1 ) ,  8 duri ng spri ng 
(Apri l 1 through June 30 ) ,  32 duri ng the summer (Jul y  1 through September 
30 ) ,  and 13 duri ng the fal l ( October 1 through December 31 ) .  Al l 
14 of the Pi nel l as County evacuati ons occurred ei ther l ate at n i ght 
on August 30 , 1985 , or duri ng the early morni ng hours of August 31 , 
1985 . The l arge number of evacuations i n  the South i n  l ate summer 
Tabl e 3 .  Seasonal Vari ati on of  Evacuati ons 
I ncl udi ng Pi nel l as 
Season Responders Non-responders Total 
-------------Percent---------------
Wi nter 13 31 18 
Spri ng 13 1 1  12 
Sununer 52 42 49 
Fal l  22 16 21  
No . faci l i ti es 46 19 65 
Excl udi ng Pi nel l as 
Responders Non-responders- Tota-l 
-------------Percent-------------
19 44 26 
19 14 18 
3 1  21 28 
3 1  21 28 
32 14 46 
0'1 ...... 
are not surpri s ing .  Fl ori da i s  a regi on parti cul arl y susceptib le  to 
hurri canes and August the season for hurri canes , wh i ch affect a much 
greater area and more of a popul ati on than other , more l ocal i zed 
threats , such as fl oods or fi res . 
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Threats , whi ch caused evacuati ons ,  were pl aced in four categori es : 
( 1 )  weather ( N=37 ) ,  ( 2 )  human (N=7 ) ,  ( 3 )  external  mechani cal  fai l ure 
(N=19 ) , and ( 4 )  i nternal  mechan ical fa i l ure (N=2 ) . Fi fty-seven percent 
of the evacuati ons occurred because of weather-rel ated threats . Twenty­
three evacuat ions  ( i ncl udi ng the 19 i n  Pi nel l as County) were caused 
by hurri canes , 9 were rel ated to fl ood s ,  3 to externa l  fi res ( such 
as forest fi res ) ,  and 2 to other types of weather probl ems . The 
Pi nel l as County group of evacuati ons substanti al l y  a l ters the ana lysi s .  
When the Pi nel l as County group was omi tted from the ana lyses , the 
evacuati ons due to weather were reduced to 32 percent of the census 
and 39 percent of the sampl e .  Sti l l  the l argest si ngl e cause of 
evacuati ons i s  hurri canes--23 cases i ncl udi ng 19 from Pi nel l as County. 
The l arge number of evacuati ons from hurri canes col l aborates Wri ght 
and Rossi ' s  concl usi on that i nd iv idual vi ctimi zati on by hurri canes 
i s  the most common form of di saster experi ence (Wri ght and Rossi , 
1981 ) .  Thus  the skewi ng toward weather-rel ated causes i s  almost 
enti rel y due to the group of Pi nel l as County evacuati on s .  However , 
the threat of hurri canes i s  such a frequent occurrence i n  the South 
that some other l ocal i ty cou ld  repl ace Pi nel l as County i f  a di fferent 
four-year peri od i s  studi ed . 
A thi rd of a l l  evacuati ons were caused by mechani ca l  fa i l ure .  
I f  Pi nel l as County cases are omi tted , 32 percent of the census and 
42 percent of the evacuati ons  in the sampl e were due to external  
mechan i cal  fai l ures . Among the 19 evacuati ons rel ated to external 
mechan i ca l  fai l ures were ei ght caused by tra i n  derai l ments , seven 
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caused by expl osi ons or fi res near the faci l i ty ,  three caused by on-si te 
chemi cal spi l l s , and one caused by an acci dent of a truck carryi ng 
exp l osi ves . Mechani cal fai l ures i nternal to the faci l i ty accounted 
for two evacuati ons . 
Threats were regrouped i nto two categori es : ( 1 ) weather and 
( 2 )  non-weather . The "weather" group (N=37 ) i ncl uded al l weather­
rel ated evacuati ons .  The rema in i ng threats (N=28 )  were grouped to­
gether under " non-weather . .. The threats were regrouped because the 
human and internal mechan i cal  categori es had few cases and to match 
the common typol ogy of 11natural 11 versus "technol ogi cal .. hazards .  
I n  thi s  cl ass i fi cation , natural hazards or  threats are those rel ated 
to weather or geophysi cal di sturbances . Technol ogi cal hazards or 
threats refer to mechani cal or human-i nduced events , i . e . , non-weather 
rel ated threats . 
Tabl e 4 shows types of threats among respondents and nonrespondents . 
Excl udi ng Pi nel l as County reduces the number of weather-rel ated 
threats . It  i s  cl ear that the di stri bution of non-responders and 
responders i s  the same wi th respect to types of threats . 
The number of cl i ents evacuated from 46 faci l i ti es i ntervi ewed 
ranged from 4 to 274 ,  wi th a mean of 80 cl i ents . For non- responders 
Tabl e 4.  Types of Threats 
I ncl udi ng Pi nel l as Excl ud i ng Pi nel l as 
Threat ResEonders Non-resEonders Total ResEonders Non-resEonders Total 
--------------Percent--------------- -------------Percent--------------
Weather 57 58 57 38 43 39 
Non-weather 43 42 43 62 57 61 
No . faci l i ti es 46 19 65 32 14 46 
the number of beds per faci l i ty was used as a surrogate measure for 
the number of beds per faci l i ty was used as a surrogate measure for 
the number of cl i ents and ranged from 1 1  to 104 beds wi th a mean of 
44 . Non-responders are from a group of smal l er organi zations than 
those i ntervi ewed . 
Tabl e 5 provi des a compari son between the mean number of cl i ents 
per faci l i ty between responders and non-responders . 
We concl ude from the analyses of the several characteri sti cs 
on whi ch we have i nformati on about the non- response group--mortal i ty 
rates , regi onal di stri buti on , seasonal vari ati on , types of threats , 
and mean number of cl i ents--that systemati c bias i s  not being  i ntro­
duced i nto the study from the non-responders . Mi nor vari ations i n  
season of threat and s i ze of faci l i ty are not l arge enough to concl ude 
that non-response i ntroduces systemati c bias . 
Secti on Two : Uni vari ate Di stri buti ons 
Thi s secti on provi des a quanti tati ve descri ption of the variabl es 
used i n  the analyses of the evacuation experi ence . Fi rst ,  general 
characteri sti cs of the 46 respondi ng organi zations are exami ned for 
vari ati ons i n  threat , resources , social  cl imate , soci al l i n kages , 
extracomrnuni ty setti ng .  Second , we exami ne the evacuati on experi ence 
and effecti veness . The evacuati on experi ence i s  descri bed by desti na­
ti on si tes , shel ter sel ecti on , di stance travel l ed ,  assi stance duri ng 
evacuation , and the number of cl ients pi cked up by ki n or others are 
fi rst exami ned . Evacuation effecti veness i s  exami ned by the time 
i t  took to evacuate and the rate of evacuati on . Fi nal l y  we exami ne 
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Tabl e 5 .  Mean N umber of Cl i ents 
I ncl udi ng Pi nel l as 
Responders Non..:.responders Total 
Mean number of 








Excl udi ng Pi nel l as 









the changes the organi zations i ntend to ma ke i n  future evacuations . 
Threat . The types of threat that caused the evacuations and 
the time of year they occurred were di scussed i n  the previ ous secti on 
and wi l l  not be repeated here . The threats were found to be di stri ­
buted across al l t ime periods . Si xteen ( 37 percent)  of the 43 evacua­
ti ons , for whi ch we have data , occurred between 12 : 0 1  and 6 : 00 a . m . , 
14 ( 33 percent )  between 6 : 01 a .m .  and 6 : 00 p .m . , and 13 ( 30 percent ) 
between 6 : 01 p .m .  and mi dni ght.  
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The times the organi zati ons l earned of the threat were categori zed 
for peri ods when most patients were sl eep i ng ( approximately  9 : 00 p . m .  
to 7 : 00 a .m . ) and awake .  The fi ndi ngs do not suggest that time of 
day pl aces addi ti onal constrai nts on staff personnel for mov ing  cl i ents 
to safety or that addi ti onal time must be taken to waken and al ert 
cl ients . The resul ts from the data i ndi cated random occurrences of 
time of evacuati ons .  Twenty evacuati ons occurred duri ng normal waking 
hours , wi th 23 evacuations occurring duri ng the 9 : 00 p . m .  to 7 : 00 
a . m . time span . Al l the Pi nel l as County evacuati ons of nurs ing  homes 
occurred duri ng the l ate even i ng and earl y morn i ng hours . 
Resources . To ana lyze the l evel of preparedness , four questi ons 
were i ncl uded i n  the i ntervi ew schedul e about emergency p lann i ng .  
Organi zational personnel were asked i f  they had ( 1 )  an emergency pl an 
pri or to the actual evacuati on and ( 2 )  if yes , whether that p l an 
i ncl uded specific  procedures for evacuati on . Then we asked ( 3 )  how 
empl oyees l earned about emergency procedures , i ncl ud i ng evacuati on , 
and ( 4 )  what l evel of tra i n i ng was i ncl uded i n  teachi ng staff members 
about those procedures . 
Personnel i n  most organi zations consi dered themsel ves prepared 
for emergencies because of the use of fi re dri l l s .  Onl y  one organi za­
tion , a very smal l home hea lth care uni t ,  reported not havi ng  di s­
semi nated any i nformati on to staff about emergency procedures pri or 
to the evacuation . Three organi zati ons reported g i vi ng new empl oyees 
manual s wi th emergency guidel i nes outl i ned . Ten reported havi ng 
monthl y fi re dri l l s  al ong wi th i n servi ce tra i n i ng on emergency pre­
paredness.  Over hal f ,  24 of the 43 reporting (or 56 percent ) reported 
conducti ng monthl y  fi re dri l l s  on each shi ft wi th i nservi ce trai n i ng 
and at l east mock simul ati ons  of evacuati ons of the faci l i ty yearl y .  
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On-premi se dri l l s  were conducted wi th or wi thout an external 
emergency agency • s  attendance . Approximately 80 percent of the faci l i ­
ti es reported usi ng fi re dri l l s  on premi ses as means to i nform staff 
about emergency measures . Some faci l i ti es reported that personnel 
from the fi re department vi s i ted the faci l i ty at l east once a month 
and conducted fi re dri l l s  whi ch had to meet the fi re department • s  
standards .  Yet of al l the evacuati ons ,  only four  in  the group of 
46 respondents were due to fi res . Two of these fi res were attri buted 
to cl i ent negl i gence , the other two bl amed on el ectri cal probl ems . 
The i ncongrui ty of preparedness for threat from fi re becomes even 
more dramati c when the number of evacuati ons rel ated to weather i s  
noted--36 evacuati ons were rel ated to weather.  
To determi ne i f  preparedness for evacuati ons was associ ated wi th 
concern for threats , admi ni strators were asked why they had pl ans 
to evacuate . Of those respond i ng , seven reported havi ng  p l ans  as 
a company "pol i cy . " Ten menti oned pl ann i ng as being  "a good i dea . "  
Si x reported l i vi ng i n  a hazardous area and thus need i ng to be pre­
pared for an emergency .  Three reported that emergency pl ans were 
needed for l i cens i ng or for other regul ati ons , i ncl udi ng  i nsurance 
coverage . Severa l i nformants were unabl e to answer the questi on for 
the organi zati on , wi th "bei ng unsure "  as the major response . 
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The potenti al  number of staff avai l abl e to assi st i n  an evacua­
tion ranged from one person at a smal l home faci l i ty to 182 staff 
members at a faci l i ty cari ng for 274 cl i ents . The measure i s  suspect , 
however,  because some admi n i strators woul d  i ncl ude onl y  pati ent staff 
wi thout other personnel such as mai ntenance staff , d ieti ci ans , socia l  
workers or acti vi ty di rectors who may have hel ped out duri ng the actual 
evacuation . 
Organi zati ons used a vari ety of sources to hel p i n  evacuati ng .  
General l y, off-duty staff were cal l ed i n  to  hel p wi th the evacuation . 
Thi rty-four faci l i ti es i n  our sampl e cal l ed i n  the enti re staff , wi th 
al l pati ent care and al l management personnel respondi n g .  Two other 
faci l i ti es cal l ed onl y  management staff whi l e  one organi zati on cal l ed 
onl y  patient care personnel for assi stance . Three faci l i ti es reported 
that al l staff arri ved vol untari l y  at the faci l i ty wi thout bei ng 
summoned by the organi zation . Four faci l i ti es d id  not cal l extra 
staff because they were not needed or there was not time before the 
evacuati on started . 
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Other sources of assi stance i ncl uded : (1 ) l ocal external emer­
gency organi zati onal hel p ,  ( 2 )  non-l oca l external  emergency organi za­
ti onal hel p ,  ( 3 )  hel p from vol unteers wi th ties to cl i ents or staff 
wi thi n  the faci l i ty ,  and ( 4 )  hel p from other vol unteers or assi stants 
wi thout ties to faci l i ty .  In the l ocal external emergency hel p  cate­
gory ,  a i d  was recei ved from pol i ce ,  fi re departments , sheri ffs and 
l ocal emergency organi zati ons , i ncl uding  emergency teams , paramedi cs ,  
or county ci vi l defense agencies . I n  the non-l ocal external emergency 
a id  category ,  hel p was recei ved from the Nati onal Guard , state agencies 
or c i vi l  defense , or from sources outsi de the county i n  whi ch the 
evacuation occurred . 
Subsequently the category of vol unteer hel p was d i v ided to test 
the hypothesi s that aid recei ved from vol unteers wi th ties to res idents 
or staff of the faci l i ty may be more accessi b le  and/or more avai l ab l e  
i n  times of threat wi th short forewarning .  One category of  vol unteers 
i ncl uded fami l i es ,  fri ends , i n-house vol unteers , and other hel pers 
wi th ties to cl i ents i n  the faci l i ty. I n-house vol unteers i ncl uded 
hel pers who reportedl y  assi sted on a regul ar basi s at the faci l i ty 
but were not rel ated to any cl i ents or members of the staff . One 
faci l i ty reported havi ng a group of reti red persons who regul arly 
provi ded organi zed acti vi ti es and hel ped in emergenci es . The hel p 
recei ved from vol unteers who assi sted i n  the evacuati ons was credi ted 
frequentl y by admi n i strators across al l threats wi th thei r subjecti ve 
eval uati on of the overal l effecti veness of the evacuati on . 
The second category of vol unteers consi sted of al l others such 
as the Red Cross , medi cal personnel , or staff of ambul ances or buses 
who assi sted i n  evacuati ng cl i ents to shel ters when cal l ed by the 
faci l i ty.  Admi n i strators readi l y  acknowl edged external sources of 
a id  as extremel y hel pful . One organi zati onal admi ni strator commented 
on the val uabl e assi stance rendered by bus dri vers i n  hel pi ng cl i ents 
to enter and exi t buses when evacuating.  Duri ng one communi ty-wi de 
evacuati on caused by a chemi cal spi l l , an admi ni strator noted that 
ambul ances were vol untari ly  sent by area funeral homes both wi thi n  
and outs ide the county to hel p  transport cl i ents . 
Of the 27 organi zati ons reporti ng  hel p from external sources , 
12 reported that vol unteers wi th ties to cl i ents or staff personnel 
were the onl y  source o f  assi stance . Thi rteen organi zations reported 
recei vi ng hel p  from l ocal emergency agenci es as wel l  as vol unteers . 
Thi rteen faci l i ti es were onl y assi sted by emergency personne l , no 
vol unteers . Two faci l i ti es reported recei ving a id  from four sources-­
vol unteers , other non-offi cial  hel pers , l ocal emergency personnel ,  
and non- l ocal emergency personnel . Six faci l i ti es reported not 
recei vi ng any a id  from outside sources--vol unteers or emergency 
personnel .  Tabl e  6 descri bes assi stance wi th evacuation . 
Soci al cl imate . To exami ne perceptions of ri sk two questi ons 
were asked about past evacuations .  The organi zati ons were fi rst asked 
whether they had ever evacuated or had prepared to evacuate i n  the 
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Tabl e 6. Ass i stance wi th Evacuati on 
Type of Assi stance No . 
Onl y  vol unteers 
Vol unteers and external  hel pers 
Al l sources 
No outsi de source 
Total respondents 
past .  Thi rty-fi ve of 43  respondents ( or 78  percent ) reported no  
evacuati on in  the past at thei r faci l i ty .  Some of the respondents 
noted they had been at the faci l i ty i n  some capaci ty for n i ne years , 






The range of past evacuati ons wi thi n the rest of the group varied 
from one to four .  Fi ve respondents reported havi ng evacuated the 
faci l i ty once i n  the past ,  two reported havi ng evacuated twi ce , one 
di rector reported evacuating three times , and two di rectors reported 
four evacuations of the faci l i ty sometime i n  the past .  We d i d  not 
ascerta i n  exactly  when those past evacuati ons took pl ace . Of 45 
organi zati ons respondi ng  to our questi on on havi ng to prepare to 
evacuate i n  the past ,  40 (89 percent ) reported no preparati ons . On ly 
two organi zati ons reported one past preparation wi th no evacuati on . 
Three organi zations reported prepari ng to evacuate twi ce i n  the past 
but never l eavi ng thei r faci l i ty. 
We used the number of staff members cal l ed i n  to assi st i n  the 
evacuation as a surrogate fi gure for the number of staff avai l ab le  
at the time of  the evacuati on . We computed the rat io  of cl i ents 
evacuated to staff personnel . The average rati o of cl i ents to staff 
ranged from between fi ve cl i ents to one pati ent care staff to ten 
cl i ents to one pati ent  care staff wi th a mean of 3 . 8  cl i ents to one 
staff member .  I n  retrospect , aski ng for the number o f  regi stered 
nurses , l i censed practi cal nurses and a i des empl oyed by the organi za­
t ion may have provi ded a more accurate measure .  Phys ic ians  d i d  not 
appear to parti ci pate acti vely in most evacuat ions . I t  i s  uncl ear 
whether physi ci ans were i nvol ved i n  transfers of cl i ents to hosp i tal s 
duri ng evacuati ons  or i n  di schargi ng cl i ents from the hospi ta l s  once 
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the evacuati on was over.  We d id  not l earn of any i nstances in  whi ch 
assi stance i n  evacuati ng was rendered by physi ci ans or other speci al i sts 
such as podi atri sts or denti sts . Housekeeping and mai ntenance peopl e 
were menti oned most frequently  as bei ng on the premi ses at the evacua­
ti on si tes . 
We a l so determi ned who made the dec i s i on to evacuate . The over­
whel mi ng majori ty ( 64 percent )  of decis i on-makers for the organi zation 
were admi n i strators and/or di rectors of nurs i ng of the nurs i ng homes . 
These persons were normal l y  i n  charge of al l operations  at the faci l i ty 
except for di rect medi cal servi ces provi ded by physi cians or denti sts . 
Onl y  four faci l i ti es were evacuated through deci sions made by another 
staff member such as a safety di rector or mai ntenance person . 
Twel ve nurs i ng homes ( 22 percent ) reported that the deci si on 
to evacuate was made external ly through an authori tati ve source . 
Orders to evacuate were recei ved from pol i ce ,  fi re personnel , l oca l 
or state government offi cial s ,  or ci vi l defense personnel .  "We d idn ' t  
make the deci s ion-- i t was made for us" was a frequent comment . "When 
they tel l you to l eave , you l eave , "  sai d  a di rector. 
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A questi on was asked as to how organi zati ons l earned of the threat 
that forced the evacuati on for three reasons . The fi rst reason was 
to determi ne whether the source was internal or external . The second 
was to i denti fy l i n kages between nursing  home faci l i ti es and the com­
mun i ty .  The thi rd was to determi ne how organi zati ons confi rmed the 
threat . 
Of 46 respondents , 12 organi zati ons  ( 26 percent ) l earned of the 
threat from an i nternal source such as a staff member ,  or from an 
emergency · a l ert system such as a fi re al arm .  Al most three times as 
many , or 34 organi zati ons , reported l earn i ng of the threat from an 
external source . Thi rteen of those 34 organi zati ons were al erted 
by l ocal emergency uni ts such as the pol i ce ,  fi re ,  or sheri ff ' s  
offi ce . Fourteen faci l i ti es reported being  noti fi ed by personnel 
from ci vi l defense uni ts , rescue squads or emergency management teams , 
or acted on i nformati on to evacuate from other offi ci al sources , such 
as the mayor or governor ' s  offi ce . Two organi zati ons reported heari ng 
of the threat i n i tia l l y  through the medi a  but wai ted for further noti fi ­
cation from authori ti es before maki ng the deci sion to evacuate . Seven 
organi zations were unsure about how the threat was determi ned . 
How the organi zati on l earned about threat i s  summari zed i n  Tabl e 
7 .  Internal threats such as fi res were usua l ly  determi ned i nternal l y  
by staff personnel . Information about sl ow-moving  threats such as 
hurri canes , or mechan i cal ly i nduced threats l i ke chemi cal spi l l s  or 
veh i cu l ar acci dents , were l earned about from external  sources . 
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The number reported evacuated i ncl uded onl y cl i ents and not the 
number of staff who may or may not have evacuated wi th cl i ents . I n  
some i nstances some staff stayed wi th the veh i cl es transporti ng cl i ents 
to shel ters , whi l e  other staff drove personal  vehi cl es or rented U-haul 
trucks to the s i tes to assi st wi th setting up suppl i es for cl i ents 
at the shel ter . Some organi zati ons  reported staff assi sted i n  the 
evacuati on efforts and then returned to the faci l i ty to cal l cl i ents • 
fami l i es or provi de other assi stance such as cooki ng or cl eani ng . 
I n  other cases , a l l staff l eft wi th the cl i ents a l ong wi th vol unteers 
and other hel pers . 
Tabl e 8 provi des a descri pti on of the number of cl i ents evacuated 
( grouped by quarti l es )  by type of threat .  
76 
Tab le  8. Threat by Number of Peopl e Evacuated Usi ng Quarti l es 
Under Total of 46 
Threat Type· 53 54-78 79- 100 10 1+ Evacuations 
Weather 7 5 5 9 26 ( 57%)  
Non-weather 5 6 6 3 20 ( 43%) 
Total 12 11 11 12 46 ( 100%)  
Three measures were used as i ndi cators of  organi zati onal con­
straints--average age of cl ients , percent of non-ambul atory cl i ents , 
n umber of staff , and the number of fl oors . The average age of cl i ents 
ranged from 44 to 93 ,  wi th a mean of 74 .86 years . The number of non­
ambul atory cl i ents ranged from none to 100 percent wi th a mean of 
41 . 1 percent non-ambul atory cl ients . As expected , most faci l i ti es 
were one fl oor--37 faci l i ti es ;  fi ve had two fl oors , three had three 
fl oors , and one had s i x  fl oors . 
Soci al l i nkages . Si xty-one percent of the faci l i ties  i n  the 
sample  were associ ated wi th a l arger organi zati on . Seventeen of the 
reporting  44 faci l i ti es were i ndependent , 27 were connected to l arger 
corporati ons .  Thi rty-seven of the 42 organi zati ons reported that 
staff commuted l ess than ten mi l es to work . Fi ve reported that some 
staff l i ved beyond a ten-mi l e  radi us . Forty-two of the 45 respondi ng 
organi zations provided l ong-term care--over s ix  months--to cl i ents . 
Onl y  one provided short-term care and two provided custod i al care 
duri ng the day.  Twe l ve organi zati ons provi ded ski l l ed care wi th ei ght 
provi d i ng i ntermedi ate care . Fi fteen provi ded both s ki l l ed and i nter­
medi ate care . 
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Li nkages between cl i ents and the communi ty were exami ned . Twenty­
one faci l i ti es reported that no cl i ents were pi cked up by fri ends , 
ki n ,  or guardi an s .  Onl y  a t  one faci l i ty ,  a reti rement home associ ated 
wi th a nurs ing home , were hal f the resi dents pi cked up by fri ends 
or rel atives and taken to safety. In thi s case 7 5  persons were taken 
to homes of fami l i es and fri ends wi th the other cl i ents goi ng to 
offi ci al  Red Cross shel ters or to the homes of staff from the 
faci l i ty.  Three other faci l i ti es reported havi ng 20 to 22 cl i ents 
p icked up at the time of the evacuati on . 
In  21 faci l i ti es evacuati ng , the number of cl ients pi cked up 
by outsi de persons ranged from one to twel ve . Three faci l i ti es had 
between ten and twel ve persons picked up . E i ghteen of the twenty-one 
faci l i ti es had fi ve or fewer cl i ents pi cked up from the faci l i ty.  
Extracommuni ty. From secondary sources we determi ned the popul a­
tion of the county for each faci l i ty and cal cul ated the county • s  popu­
l at ion densi ty .  The most densel y popul ated area was P i nel l as County 
wi th 2 ,889 persons per square mi l e .  The popul ati on densi ty of pl aces 
ranged from 22 . 3  persons per square mi l e  to 2 ,889 persons per square 
mi l e ,  the mean bei ng 1173 . 7 persons per square mi l e .  
Organi zati ons general ly used a number of shel ters ei ther con­
secuti vel y  or s imul taneously .  The general evacuati on pattern was 
for cl i ents to be d i v ided up and transported to two l ocati ons .  Ski l l ed 
care faci l i ti es general l y  used a hospi tal for at l east one evacuati on 
s i te for some of thei r cl i ents . 
Of the 46 reporting  desti nati ons , about one thi rd ( 16 faci l i ti es ) 
used onl y  one s i te .  Another thi rd ( 15 faci l i ti es ) used two pl aces 
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as evacuati on s i tes . Seven organi zati ons used three si tes , wi th another 
seven organi zati ons going  to four si tes . Onl y  one organi zati on chose 
more than four si tes , wi th cl i ents bei ng d i v ided up among 10 hosp i tal s 
and several nurs ing  homes . 
Of the 15  organi zations that reported goi ng to two pl aces , 10 
made s imu l taneous moves to two si tes and remai ned at those two l oca­
tions  throughout the evacuati on . Fi ve organizati ons made consecuti ve 
moves . They moved al l cl i ents to one shel ter,  then moved cl i ents 
to another l ocation . I n  a few i nstances the second move was necess i ­
tated by the host faci l i ty bei ng unabl e to accommodate the evacuees 
for the l ength of time requi red for the enti re evacuati on . I n  other 
cases cl i ents had been moved to safety outsi de the faci l i ty and were 
then transported to a more permanent shel ter when a si te was l ocated . 
A variety of pl aces were used as shel ters : school s ,  hospi tal s ,  
other nurs i ng homes , hotel s ,  parks , churches , and i nd i vi dual homes . 
Some of the si tes were desi gnated offi ci al shel ters whi ch were shared 
wi th other evacuees from the communi ty .  Thi s presented probl ems for 
some organi zati ons who had menta l l y  impai red i nd iv idual s i n  thei r 
group . Not al l shel ters were one-story structures whi ch meant that 
equi pment ,  such as wheel chai rs , had to be haul ed upstai rs .  
Of 45 organi zati ons reporting shel ter s ite s , two onl y  used 
hospi tal s as shel ters for thei r cl i ents , ei ght used one or more other 
nurs ing homes and at l east one hospi tal as shel ters , four used a hos­
pi tal and a desi gnated shel ter , one used a hospi tal pl us another 
nursi ng home and another type of shel ter and one used a hospi tal  pl us 
a church . Seven onl y  used other nurs ing homes as shel ters . One used 
a nurs ing home pl us the homes of staff . Of those using schoo l s for 
shel ters , ei ght used school s only ,  three used school s and a hospi tal , 
and two used school s and other nurs ing homes . Four used other types 
of shel ters such as churches , motel s ,  hotel s ,  or recreati onal 
bui l di ngs .  Four organi zati ons were abl e to use part of  thei r own 
faci l i ty as an evacuati on s i te .  
Evacuation effecti veness . I n  thi s  study evacuati on effecti veness 
i s  the time to evacuate to safety. The times taken to evacuate ranged 
from ten minutes to seven hours , wi th a mean of 2 . 5 hours . To 
standard i ze for di fferent s ize i nsti tuti ons the ti me was d i v i ded by 
the number of cl i ents yi el di ng a rati o of time ( i n  mi nutes ) expended 
per cl i ent .  The evacuati on rate ranged from . 08 mi nutes per person 
to 6 . 20 mi nutes per person wi th a mean of 2 . 19 mi nutes per person . 
One find i ng i s  that time to evacuate i s  not rel ated to number of 
persons evacuated ( see Appendi x  F ) . 
Section Three : Evacuati on Probl ems 
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Thi s section provi des a qual i tati ve descri ption of the vari abl es 
used i n  the ana lysi s of the evacuati on experi ence . We exami ne possi bl e  
problem areas i ncl udi ng convergence , the deci s ion to evacuate , the 
i denti fi cation of the threat ,  the return of evacuees , med i a  i nter­
ference , cl ient  wel fare , and the provi s ion of medi cati ons .  
Convergence . Anecdotal observati ons suggest that convergence 
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of hel pers and si ghtseers at the s i te of a di saster can hamper emergency 
efforts . However , when asked if convergence was a probl em for the 
organi zation i n  evacuati ng , onl y one admi ni strator agreed . In  that 
case the admi n i strator menti oned that return i ng to the nurs ing  home 
was a probl em ,  not l eavi ng , because 11everybody seemed to be goi ng  
back at the same time and i t  took u s  much l onger than when we l eft 
the home ori gi na l l y  . .. 
Sel ection of shel ters . The sel ecti on of desti nation si tes depended 
on a number of factors . As woul d  be expected , the avai l abi l i ty of 
space for cl i ents was ci ted as the major reason for si te sel ecti on . 
Exi sti ng  pl ans , or other pri or arrangements among faci l i ti es for use 
of other heal th care faci l i ties , were al so important consi derati ons 
for s i te sel ecti on . For those wi th prior evacuati on pl ans , deci s ions  
about where to  take cl i ents were frequently made i nternal l y  by manage­
ment of the nurs ing  home faci l i ty. 
External dec i s i ons made by offi cial s or other authori t ies were 
al so ci ted as reasons why certai n  s ites were chosen as shel ters . 
For exampl e ,  the Red Cross has desi gnated shel ters whi ch are acti vated 
i n  a communi ty-wi de emergency or by a speci fi c  request by authori ti es . 
In  some communi ty-wide evacuati ons , shel ters were needed beyond a 
certai n di stance for safety reasons , thereby e l imi nati ng nearby 
accommodati ons for cl i ents that were i n  exi sti ng organi zati onal pl ans . 
The cl i ent ' s  physical  condi tion frequentl y affected the deci s ion 
about the evacuati on ·s i te .  If  the cl i ent was percei ved as needi ng 
addi tional medi cal attenti on or as bei ng "under the weather , " the 
cl i ent was pl aced i n  a hospi tal . Those persons were the fi rst to 
l eave the faci l i ty ,  general ly  i n  ambul ances . Moreover , these cl i ents 
were often retai ned at the hospi tal s  unti l al l the other cl i ents were 
returned to the faci l i ty .  Since persons who were sent to hosp i tal s 
were not representati ve of the general nurs ing home popul ati on , we 
di d not take thei r final  return times i nto account when reporti ng 
the endtime of the evacuati on . 
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Several admi n i strators menti oned the accommodati ons for the 
el derl y provi ded by the Red Cross di d not meet the el derl y ' s parti cul ar 
needs . Because the cots and food provi ded were i nadequate for thei r 
cl i ents , addi ti onal transportati on had to be used for carryi ng 
suppl ies , such as mattresses , to evacuati on si tes . One di rector com­
mented that cl i ents found the cots provi ded by the Red Cross d iffi cul t 
for resting "ol d bones and frai l ski n "  and that mattresses wou ld  
defi n i te ly  be taken next time an evacuati on occurred . On the other 
hand , one admi ni strator i ndi cated that pl acing mattresses on the fl oor 
was hard on staff who "di d  most of thei r work on thei r knees--and 
that can be ti ri ng . " For staff worki ng 12-hour shi fts--wh i ch occurred 
i n  many of the evacuati ons--thi s aspect mi ght have been among the 
worst experiences of the evacuation . 
Some el ementary school s used as shel ters had teachers ' bathrooms 
l ocked , forc i ng el derly cl i ents to use " ki d-s i zed" toi l ets . One 
di rector commented that faci l i ti es at the el ementary school were 
adequate , but the hei ght of toi l et faci l i ties  "wore them out bendi ng  
over al l the time . " A few of  the offi ci al shel ters such as school s 
were not a i r-condi ti oned and were used temporari l y  unti l management 
cou l d  fi nd better accommodati ons for thei r cl i ents . 
Concern for cl i ents . Another i ssue that arose from unsol i ci ted 
comments made by admi n i strators was the need to keep cl i ents i n  con­
tact wi th staff fami l i ar to them. It  was apparently important for 
organi zations to provi de staff personnel that remai ned with cl i ents 
throughout the evacuat ion . "We worked 12-hour shi fts " sai d  one ad­
mi n i strator.  Another said ,  "Our staff stayed wi th al l our cl i ents , 
even at the hospi tal . "  
Several times we heard that staff remai ned wi th cl i ents to calm 
and reassure them duri ng  the enti re evacuati on .  "Some [cl i ents] are 
confused anyway , and we d i dn ' t  want to add to thei r confusi on "  noted 
several admi n i strators . As many of the cl i ents were i n  thei r ei ghties 
and n i neties , thi s concern was voi ced as normal organi zati onal pro­
cedure . We d i d  not have any reports of fami l i es assi sti ng wi th cl i ent 
care at the evacuati on s i tes . Admi ni strators al so made cons i derabl e 
efforts to mai ntai n schedul es ( such as snacks and meal s )  fami l i ar 
to cl i ents , to a l l evi ate as much stress as possi b le  to cl i ents duri ng 
the evacuation . 
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It was al so important to admi ni strators to i nsure that al l medi ca­
ti on be admi n i stered on a regul ar schedul e to al l c l i ents throughout 
the enti re evacuati on . Admi ni strators noted several ways that medi ca­
tion schedul es were mai ntai ned . Al l med i cati ons were general l y  taken 
wi th the cl i ents to the evacuati on si te ,  even when cl i ents went to 
a hospi tal . Several di rectors menti oned wheel i ng med i cati on carts 
onto the vehi cl es evacuati ng the cl i ents . At one faci l i ty where an 
evacuation occurred because of a propane l ea k ,  both cl i ents and medi ­
cati on carts were wheel ed out the door of the faci l i ty i nto the ad­
jacent parki ng l ot .  
A frequent deterrent to evacuati ng for heal th care faci l i ti es 
i s  sai d  to be the fear for i ncreased rate of mortal i ty and/or morbidi ty 
i n  movi ng such a sensi ti ve popul ati on from thei r normal envi ronment.  
Management did  not express fear about moving thei r cl i ents from the 
faci l i ty but were careful to return thei r cl ients as soon as possi bl e .  
Overal l ,  very few di ffi cul ties were reported after cl i ents were 
returned to thei r quarters . Two organi zati ons reported that some 
of thei r cl i ents suffered ski n abrasi ons duri ng the evacuati on ,  noti ng 
al so the fragi l i ty of some el derl y persons '  ski n .  Some admi n i strators 
mentioned the extra cauti on staff had taken duri ng the evacuation 
i n  maki ng  sure the cl i ents were moved every two hours . I n  normal 
nurs i ng home procedures , c l i ents , especi al ly  bedridden ones , are turned 
every two hours to prevent bedsores from devel opi ng .  
Some organi zations reported l eavi ng cl i ents i n  hosp i tal s where 
they had been taken as a precaution duri ng the evacuati on to be sure 
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cl i ents were sati sfactory before returni ng them to the faci l i ty .  
Such cl i ents were reported as havi ng "breathi ng  probl ems " or "havi ng 
heart probl ems . .. One organi zati on reported pl aci ng  cl ients i n  the 
hospi tal because of breathing  di ffi cul ti es after the cl i ents were 
returned fol l owi ng  the evacuation . I n  thi s i nstance , the evacuati on 
was caused by a forest fi re nearby and smoke was sti l l  i n  the vi ci n i ty. 
Only  one organ i zati on i ndi cated that a staff member was upset 
wi th the evacuati on and tri ed to get medi cal  compensation for 11 Stress 11 
from the evacuati on experi ence . The faci l i ty refused the request 
and reported , "She l eft [the organi zati on] soon afterwards . .. 
The onl y  other i nstance of stress reported may have been 
experi enced by a fami ly .  One di rector menti oned that a woman taken 
home by her fami l y  duri ng  the evacuati on was so di sori ented by the 
change in surroundi ngs that she kept cal l i ng the faci l i ty to fi nd 
out when she coul d  get her personal i tems 11 S i nce she was sure she 
wasn • t  ever goi ng back . It  d idn • t  bother the fami l y  or us--we just 
reassured her everythi ng was taken care of--but she sure cal l ed a 
l ot of times , .. sai d the di rector. The di rector al so menti oned that 
both the woman and her fami ly  were 11very gl ad 11 when she was returned 
to the home . 
Deci s ion maki ng. It was not al ways consi dered necessary for . 
al l staff to l eave wi th cl i ents . A few di rectors menti oned that staff 
members went wi th cl i ents but returned to the faci l i ty to cal l fami l i es 
of cl i ents and/or prepare for the return of cl i ents . Some staff 
remai ned at the faci l i ty throughout the evacuati on . Thus some 
evacuati ons  were for prevention or protection of cl i ents , not for 
the benefi t of the overal l organi zati on . 
How l ong  the evacuati on l asted general ly  depended on the ci rcum­
stances of the threat • s  impact . Frequentl y an outsi de source--usual ly  
offi c i al --decreed when the organi zati on coul d return thei r cl i ents 
to the faci l i ty .  The one faci l i ty that reported hav i ng  evacuated 
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for an enti re week--the l ongest period of evacuati on i n  the study-­
had been i nundated wi th fl oodwaters and requi red consi derabl e cl ean-up . 
The di rector reported that the repai rs i ncl uded 11many new appl i ances 
before the i nsurance and heal th peopl e woul d  l et us return . .. 
An earl i er versi on of the i ntervi ew schedul e attempted to deter­
mi ne the time spent i n  making the deci s ion to evacuate . Most managers 
were unabl e  to respond to the questi on c i ti ng  external  constrai nts 
on the deci s ion process .  Another constra i nt was ambi gui ty about whether 
the evacuati on · woul d  actual l y  take pl ace . One admi n i strator phrased 
the probl em wel l .  11We were put on a lert unti l noti fi ed offi c ial l y  
to l eave , .. he sai d .  He al so noted that the two and a hal f  hours spent 
110n a l ert 11 were d i stressi ng for staff , who were not sure what was 
expected of them duri ng that time .  He noted h e  spent a l ot o f  time 
reassuri ng the staff, but not any time making the deci s ion to l eave . 
11They wai ted unti l they [the l ocal emergency personnel ]  were sure 
we had to l eave and then they got us out , 11 he sai d .  
Threat i denti fi cati on by organi zati onal personnel . Heal th care 
faci l i ti es appear to rel y  more on offi ci al noti fi cation when evacuation 
i s  necessary than do i nd iv idual s duri ng a simi l ar ci rcumstance . I n  
most evacuations where i nd iv idua l s are i nvol ved 9 fri ends , neighbors , 
ki n ,  and medi a sources provi de i nformati on about threat .  However , 
no managers i n  thi s  study reported bei ng noti fi ed of a threat by a 
personal fri end . A few admi n i strators and some staff personnel re­
ported that on heari ng  about the threat from a staff member ,  they 
immedi ately turned on the radi o  or tel evi s ion to l earn more about 
the emergency. One admi n i strator noted that confusion was created 
among h i s  staff because they l i stened to the radi o  whi l e  wai ting  for 
offi c ia l  noti ces .  
Extens i ve commun i ty preparati ons for evacuati ons were evi dent 
in the Pi nel l as County group . Si x faci l i ti es from Pi nel l as County 
reported being  i nformed of the need for evacuati on through a cal l -down 
system i nsti tuted by the l ocal ci vi l defense uni t .  The cal l -do\'m 
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system had been i n i ti ated by l ocal emergency managers to i nform heal th 
care and rel ated faci l i ti es when evacuati on was requi red for hurri canes , 
a frequent threat i n  the southern states . Al though thi s was the fi rst 
time the cal l -down system had been operati ve , managers i n  Pi nel l as 
County thought i t  an effi ci ent noti fi cati on method . 
Communi cati on probl ems between emergency agenci es and organi zati ons 
were a l so noted by management .  Duri ng one evacuation al ert , two nurs ing  
homes were noti fi ed by offi cia l s that they were to  evacuate , si nce 
they were l ocated i n  an offi cia l  evacuation zone . The faci l i ti es 
apparentl y attempted to cal l i n  staff and prepared to l eave . · 
Preparations were compl eted for evacuati ng for at l east one nurs i ng 
home . However9  one of the admi ni strators cl aimed they were 11forgotten .. 
by offi ci al s i n  the evacuati on process .  The admin i strator conti nued 
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to wai t  wi thout rece i vi ng  further communi cati on about the threat or 
evacuati on procedures from offi ci al s .  Nurs ing  home staff who attempted 
to get to the faci l i ti es duri ng the cri si s were turned away at offi ci al 
barri cades . Nei ther organ i zation ever evacuated from the danger zone . 
The two organi zati ons responded very di fferentl y to our questi ons . 
One faci l i ty was wi l l i ng to di scuss the probl ems encountered . The 
other organi zati on refused to answer even bas i c  questi ons about the 
number of beds i n  the faci l i ty or the types of servi ces offered by 
the organi zati on . Si nce the two faci l i ti es had onl y  prepared to 
evacuate and never l eft thei r premi ses--al though the threat was real -­
they were el imi nated from the ana lysi s .  
Preparedness for evacuation . Two i ssues were i nvol ved i n  exami n ing  
the l evel of  preparedness of  the organi zati on for the evacuati on . 
The fi rst i ssue rel ated to emergency pl ans exi sti ng pri or to the 
evacuati on . The second i ssue rel ated to the pri or experience--or 
l ack  of experi ence--among organi zati onal members wi th ei ther an actual 
evacuati on or i n  prepari ng  for an evacuati on . The two i ssues di ffered , 
because a pl an can exi st pri or to an emergency and not be tested , 
whi l e  an experi ence provides di rect exposure . 
Mock or s imu l ati on evacuati on exerci ses were another matter . 
Sometimes the mock simul ati ons of evacuati ons were carri ed out i n  
a genera l communi ty emergency exerci se , whi l e  others were conducted 
wi th agencies such as l ocal ci vi l defense uni ts .  Most evacuati on 
s imu l ation exerci ses conducted by the organi zati ons were carri ed out 
i nternal l y , wi thout external  support uni ts ,  but wi th pati ents actual l y  
bei ng moved to the front l obby or l oadi ng dock o r  to a n  exteri or area . 
Admi n i strators were general l y  pl eased wi th thei r emergency pl ans and 
i ndi cated no reason to change them . 
Return of evacuees . Return of evacuees posed few probl ems for 
management of the nurs ing  home faci l i ti e s .  Only  one faci l i ty that 
had been evacuated returned cl i ents to the faci l i ty after 9 : 00 p .m .  
Some nurs ing  home managers el ected to reta i n  thei r cl i ents at the 
shel ter si tes (many si tes were other nurs i ng homes ) for an add i ti onal 
n i ght so as not to have to return cl ients duri ng darkness . On the 
other hand , most admin i strators reported c l i ents were happy to be 
i n  thei r own quarters . Comments such as "everybody was gl ad to get 
back"  and "rel ieved but happy to be back "  were frequently made about 
the return experience . 
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Another unsol i ci ted comment heard frequently was how ti red cl i ents 
and staff were when they returned to the faci l i ty .  One admi n i strator 
noted , "We gave them a col d supper i n  bed--they were al l so ti red . "  
Another di rector i nd i cated that cl i ents had not been abl e to rest 
because there were no beds , onl y chai rs provi ded by offi c ia l s at the 
shel ter s i te ,  and most cl i ents needed to 1 i e  dO\'In to rest .  
Several admi n i strators reported that the tri p back to  the faci l i ty 
was much l onger than the i n i ti al wi thdrawal . Al though we d i d  not 
spec ifi cal l y  ask about the mechani cs of the return tri p ,  di rectors 
menti oned that they "went the same way they l eft , "  meani ng  the same 
transportati on was uti l i zed by the organi zati on to return to the 
faci l i ty .  One di rector reported her appreci ati on of the hel p of the 
l ocal U- haul agency i n  arrangi ng transport for the arti c les needed 
duri ng  the evacuation . A few managers reported that buses provi ded 
by emergency offi ci al s were sl ow to arri ve for the return tri p ,  whi ch 
was very annoyi ng  because 11everyone was anxi ous to get back . 11 Several 
i nformants menti oned the heavy traffi c encountered i n  return i ng .  
Return tri p procedures di d not seem to be a part of emergency pl ans , 
ei ther among the organi zati ons or among the offi cia l s orchestrati ng 
the evacuation . 
Evacuati on mode l . At the begi nning of thi s  di ssertati on , an 
anal ytic  framework was g i ven for anal yz i ng the factors that affect 
evacuati on (Quarantel l i , 1980 ) .  · The model states that the effecti ve­
ness of the evacuati on depends on the type of threat pl us  the avai l ­
abi l i ty of resources , socia l  cl imate of the organi zati on , soci a l  
l i nkages to the communi ty and the extracommun ity setti ng .  To compl ete 
the ana lysi s we tested the evacuati on model . 
Effecti veness of Evacuati on = Type of Threat + Resources 
+ Soci al  Cl imate + Soci al Linkages + Extracommuni ty 
Effecti veness of evacuati on was operati ona l i zed as time taken 
to evacuate the faci l i ty .  The total amount of time ( i n  mi nutes ) to 
evacuate was recorded . Thi s produced a measurement (TIMEVAC ) whi ch 
coul d  be compared across the enti re census of faci l i ti e s .  TIMEVAC 
was used ( rather than time per cl i ent)  because rate was not rel ated 
to the number of persons evacuated . 
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The type of threat was treated as a bi nomi a l  vari abl e .  Ei ther 
the vari abl e was weather rel ated or not rel ated to weather . We cal l ed 
thi s vari abl e THREATD . 
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Resources were measured by three vari abl es : the number of sources 
of external hel p ( NUMHELP ) ,  the ratio of staff to c l i ents ( RATIOSP ) ,  
and the presence of an evacuation pl an ( EVAPLA ) . 
Soc ial cl imate was measured by the number of cl ients evacuated 
( PEREVAC ) ,  the average age of cl ients {AVEAGESj and the percentage 
of non-ambul atory cl i ents (AMBULAT) .  
Soc ia l  l i n kages were measured by associ ati on wi th a l arger organi ­
zati on ( DEPEND ) and popul ati on densi ty of the communi ty ( POPDEN ) .  
(Note : Extracommun i ty was not used i n  ana lysi s . ) 
Ordi nary l east squares estimate of the most parsimoni ous model 
are : 
TIMEVAC = 1 . 103 + - 1 . 151 THREATD + 1 . 156 NUMHELP + 0 . 001 POPDEN 
The model needs further testi ng across other spec ia l  popul ati ons 
before any concl usions can be drawn . However,  the resul ts are somewhat 
unusual . As expected , the equati on supports the proposi ti on that the 
response to non-weather threats us faster than to weather-rel ated 
threats . The equation further suggests the greater number of sources 
of hel p ,  the l onger the evacuati on time . Further,  the greater the 
densi ty of popul ati on of the county, the l onger the evacuation time .  
We can offer no expl anation for these l atter fi ndi ngs . Data to 
support the equati on are i n  Appendi x G under Evacuati on Model 
Resul ts .  
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
Overal l ,  the organi zations cari ng for the speci al i zed popul ati ons 
i n  nurs i ng homes and rel ated home care faci l i ties  coped wel l wi th 
emergency evacuati ons . The manner i n  whi ch organi zati ons handl ed 
emergency evacuati ons suggests that the conti nui ty of responsi bl e 
care for cl i ents i s  of foremost concern to the organi zati onal personnel , 
both management and staff . The l ack of i njuries and deaths of cl ients 
duri ng  the evacuations i s  a tri bute to the managers and staff of the 
organi zati ons cari ng for these speci al i zed popul ati ons . 
Unl i ke other vi cti ms of di saster, i nd iv idual cl i ents i n  nurs i ng 
homes and rel ated home care faci l i ties are i n  a uni que pos i ti on when 
an evacuati on i s  necessary .  There are several reasons for thi s uni que­
ness . Fi rst , i nd i v i dual cl i ents l ack respons i bi l i ty for thei r own 
wel fare .  By enteri ng a nurs ing home o r  home care faci l i ty ,  i ndi v idual s 
forfei t many of thei r consti tutional ri ghts about thei r obl i gati ons 
to themsel ves and thei r fami l i es . Among these forfei tures i s  the 
abi l i ty to deci de when a ri sk  i s  threateni ng .  
Second ,  fami l i es and ki n share l i ttl e responsi bi l i ty for the 
care of persons i n  such faci l i ties . I n  a sense the heal th care 
organi zation functi ons as a surrogate fami l y .  I t  i s  the organi zati on 
that recei ves the warning  and al erts the cl i ents . I t  i s  the organi za­
tion that determi nes what the ri sk  i s  to the cl i ents . I t  i s  the or­
gani zati on that determi nes the si te for shel teri ng ,  how to travel 
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and when to return . Cl i ents are total ly  dependent on the deci s ions  
made by the organi zati on about 11 Safety11 concerns . 
But thi s  safety i s  not wi thout i ts l imi tati ons . Concern for 
i nd i v i dual property--and perhaps d i gn i ty--i s forfei ted i n  the endeavor 
to secure the safety of cl i ents . We heard several comments on how 
di ffi cul t i t  was to transport cl ients • wheel chai rs because of al l 
the 11baggage 11 cl i ents stuffed i n  them on l eavi ng .  Cl i ents shoul d  
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not be 11al l owed 11 to carry as many possessi ons  wi th them .  Other comments 
al l uded to the probl ems of provid ing di fferent mattresses for cl i ents 
other than thei r 11own . 11 That evacuees want to take certai n  i tems--
even pets--wi th them i s  understandabl e the way they do i n  evacuati ons 
as i nd iv idual s ,  but not when these i nd iv idual s become cl i ents i n  a 
nurs ing  home or rel ated heal th care faci l i ty. 
Goffman ( 1961 ) noted that insti tutional i zed persons and the peopl e 
who care for them behave toward each other with speci fi c behaviors 
resul ting  from the 11 basi c spl i t 11 between the l arge managed group of 
cl i ents and the smal l supervi sory staff. Thi s study of evacuati ons 
suggests that the manneri sms of two separate groups are conti nued 
throughout a cri si s .  The cl i ents remai ned dependent  on the care 
provi ded by the organi zati on even when they were taken to offi ci al 
shel ters wi th avai l abl e Red Cross personnel or to hospi tal s  wi th 
nurs i ng staff. 
Li kewi se , the organi zation d id  not rel i nqui sh the respons ibi l i ty 
of cari ng for i ts cl i ents throughout the evacuation experi ence . 
Routi nes-- i ncl udi ng the constant provi si on of medi cations and the 
two-hour movement of bedri dden cl i ents--were conti nued as i f  cl i ents 
were at the home faci l i ty. Frequently the care of cl i ents was 
admi n i stered by staff personnel on an around-the-cl ock bas i s .  
The si tuati on of speci al i zed popul ati ons of nurs i ng homes and 
rel ated care faci l i ti es i s  unusual . Al though reports i n  the med i ca l  
gerontol ogy l i terature fear i ncreased morbi d i ty among cl i ents , 
physi ci ans were not di rectl y  i nvol ved i n  the dec i s i on to evacuate 
cl i ents . Management of the faci l i ti es ,  or , i n  some i nstance , other 
staff members made the deci s ion to evacuate . Med ical  deci si ons were 
ad hoc dependi ng on how the cl i ent "appeared " to staff members . 
Organi zations appear to have i nterpreted offi c ia l  noti fi cati ons 
as mandati ng the evacuation of cl i ents , not of the enti re faci l i ty 
nor the enti re staff . Even i n  potenti al l y  tragi c chemi cal spi l l s  
where toxi c fumes present threats to anyone i n  contact wi th the 
substance , not al l staff i n  the faci l i ty were evacuated . Why thi s  
i s  so i s  uncl ear . We can only surmi se that i n  evacuati ng onl y  the 
cl i ents , the organi zati on i s  ful fi l l i ng i ts l egal responsi bi l i ty to 
provide safe condi tions for cl ients . What the organi zational  
responsi bi l i ty is  to staff needs further study. 
I ssues 
A number of i ssues were rai sed by the fi ndi ngs . The findi ngs 
suggest that the structure of the organ i zati on as  an i nsti tuti on may 
have more to do wi th the effecti veness of the evacuati on as measured 
i n  time evacuated per person than the use of vol unteers or external  
hel p sources . External  hel p  was general l y  provi ded by trai ned 
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emergency personnel from fi re or pol i ce departments . 
Rol e  Abandonment 
There was no evi dence of rol e  abandonment or that workers l eft 
thei r jobs to attend to fami l i es duri ng cri si s  si tuat ions .  Confl i ct 
between fami l y  and organi zational respons i bi l i ti es d i d  not affect 
performance of work tasks by nursing  home managers and staff. On 
the contrary ,  when heari ng of an emergency at thei r faci l i ty ,  staff 
members , a l ong  wi th thei r fami l i es , were reported as goi ng  to the 
faci l i ty vol untari l y  to assi st in the emergency .  
When addi ti onal staff were needed to  assi st in  the evacuati on , 
not one nurs ing  home reported having di ffi cul ty reachi ng  staff or 
i n  getti ng thei r immedi ate favorabl e response to hel p .  Even i f  
fami l i es were evacuati ng  themsel ves , the staff general ly  responded 
by maki ng sure fami l y  members were taken care of and then goi ng to 
the faci l i ty to hel p wi th the cl i ents . 
Fami l y  members of staff , especi al ly  mal e  spouses and ol der chi l d­
ren , often a ided i n  evacuation efforts by undertaki ng the phys i cal ly  
heavi er tasks such as l i fti ng  cl i ents onto buses and carryi ng  mat­
tresses . One faci l i ty wi th an extensi ve evacuati on pl an spec ifi cal l y  
menti oned whose responsi bi l i ty i t  was to care for young  chi l dren of 
staff duri ng evacuation s .  
The assi stance i n  emergenci es supports Dynes and Quarantel l i • s  
( 1976 }  concl usi on that a total rol e  structure may be organi zed around 
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a set of val ue pri ori ties whi ch provi des di recti on during  cri si s  si tua­
tions .  I n  thi s study ,  the rol e  of care provi der for i ncapaci tated 
cl i ents appears to di rect nurs i ng home worker behavior.  At the time 
of an emergency ,  other l ess sal i ent  or confl i cti ng  rol es were 
el imi nated . 
The fi ndi ngs support the propos i ti on that the fami l y  uni t  makes 
i nternal adjustments about appropri ate rol es i n  an emergency .  The 
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fact that so many fami l y  members engaged in rol es appropri ate to hel pi ng  
may i ndi cate that descri ptions of resources i n  the evacuati on l i terature 
overl ook an important aspect of organi zati onal copi ng  strategi es .  
Use of Other Vol unteer Helpers 
We need to construct better methods of di scern i ng how organi zati ons 
use vol unteers i n  times of emergency .  Several faci l i ti es menti oned 
hel p recei ved from vol unteers other than fami l y  members . Some admi n i s­
trators mentioned peopl e 11wal king i n  off the streets 11 to hel p i n  
evacuati ng the cl i ents . Almost one-thi rd of the faci l i ties  reported 
vol unteers as thei r onl y  source of a id  other than staff. 
The types of assi stance provided by vol unteers need further study. 
Bes i des hel pi ng move cl i ents , vol unteers frequently assi sted i n  the 
care of cl i ents at shel ter si tes . Whether these were the same or 
di fferent vol unteers i s  unc lear.  Several groups of vol unteers conti nued 
thei r assi stance throughout the peri od of evacuati on unti l normal 
routi nes were resumed at the faci l i ty. One admi n i strator noted that 
an ol der group of vol unteers who regul arl y worked at the nurs i ng home 
assi sted i n  prepari ng the beds and performi ng other c l ean-up tas ks 
before residents were returned from the evacuation s i te .  
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Di ssens ion between staff and vol unteers about appropri ate domains  
duri ng the emergency di d not appear to be a probl em .  Vol unteers and 
staff coordi nated efforts to get the necessary tasks--even the d iffi ­
cul t or l ess  desi rabl e--accompl i shed . Vol unteers assi sti ng wi th aspects 
of resi dents ' care were wel comed by staff and management a l i ke .  
Al though we d i d  not ask questi ons about vol unteer hel pers , many 
respondents spontaneously  reported being  grateful for the support 
of the commun i ty and the number of vol unteers duri ng  the cri si s  
si tuati on . Several menti oned how d iffi cul t the evacuati on woul d  have 
been wi thout vol unteer hel p .  
Overal l ,  the evacuati on rate d id  not i ncrease or  decrease wi th 
the use of vol unteers . Si ze of organi zation was correl ated to the 
use of vol unteers as l arger organi zati ons used vol unteers more frequentl y 
than smal l er organi zati ons . The correl ati on may be expl a i ned by the 
greater number of l i n kages to outside sources gi ven the l arger number 
of cl i ents . The speci fi c  number of vol unteers hel p ing  i n  an evacuation 
was unknown to admi n i strators . 
The number of vol unteers assi sti ng i n  the evacuati ons  supports 
the proposi t ion that i nd ivi dual s not i nvol ved i n  a cri si s are wi l l i ng  
to adopt appropri ate hel pi ng behavior  i n  an emergency. Thi s  performance 
of tasks appropri ate to hel p ing in an emergency aga i n  i ndi cates that 
the use of l atent resources i s  overl ooked i n  organi zati onal coping  
strateg ies .  Yet organ i zati ons recogni zed the assi stance provided . 
Whether thi s type of a id  i s  treated as a resource i n  evacuati on pl ans 
needs further study. 
Care of Specia l i zed Popul ati ons During Evacuati ons 
The findi ngs support the propos i tion ( Kreps , 1978 ; Stal l i ngs , 
1987 ; Drabek ,  1986) that conti nui ty and adaptati on of structure 
characterize organi zati ons duri ng cri si s  si tuati ons . They support 
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the proposi ti on that the greater the conti nui ty between d i saster rol es 
and normal responsi bi l i ti es ,  the l ess probl emati c i s  d i saster mobi l i za­
tion l i kely to be ( Drabek ,  1986 ) . 
Si gn ifi cant i nterest was expressed about how cl i ents were cared 
for duri ng the enti re evacuati on process of nursi ng home and rel ated 
care faci l i ties . Part of thi s  approach to cl i ent care may be due 
to l egal mandates or corporate pol i c ies . For exampl e ,  a hypothesi s 
coul d be made that di fferences i n  responses of organi zati ons of nurs i ng 
home and rel ated care faci l i ties were di fferent from those of other 
organi zati ons from a l egal standpoint .  Heal th care organi zations 
must conti nue that care because they must answer to a vari ety of out­
s i de agents i ncl udi ng l ocal and state regul ati ons ,  i nsurance provi ders , 
and federa l  statutes . 
Other specia l i zed popul ations may or may not recei ve s imi l ar 
treatment. Gi ven a pri son popul ati on , the concern for the physi cal 
wel l -bei ng of cl i ents mi ght not be as cri ti cal . On the other hand , 
organi zati ons cari ng  for i ncarcerated cl ients may vi ew thei r obl i gati ons 
as protecti ng  soci ety from thei r cl i ents . The conti nui ty of care 
woul d  then be i n  keepi ng thei r popul ati ons away from the publ i c  at 
l a rge . Thi s  i s  a questi on for further study. 
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The mul tidimens i onal  aspects of cari ng for " undesi rabl e "  specia l  
popul ations duri ng  emergencies i ncl ude both pol i ti cal  and soc i al con­
strai nts to maki ng the deci s ion to evacuate a speci al popul ati on .  
Important i nteract ion effects such as communi ty res i stance i n  assi sti ng 
a pri son evacuation because of percei ved probl ems wi th safety may 
i ntrude on organi zati onal deci si on-making about an evacuation . Few 
evacuati ons i nvol ve i ncarcerated cl i ents bei ng moved from thei r 
faci l i ty to another faci l i ty .  School popul ati ons , on  the other hand , 
woul d l i kel y recei ve the same concern from staff and admi n i strati on 
as do nursi ng  home resi dents . 
Response Characteri sti cs 
The questi on remai ns whether s i gn i fi cant di fferences i n  response 
to threat exi st between nursing home and rel ated home care organi zations  
and that of  i nd iv idual s or fami l y  uni ts .  Gi ven our i nformation , the 
immediate response to a threat appears to be i ntent al ertness , combi ned 
wi th genui ne concern for cl i ent wel fare . Thi s supports the Jani s-Mann 
conceptual i zati on of i ncreased awareness of i ndi vi dual s when faced 
wi th a cri si s si tuation . An organi zati on may act as a surrogate 
responder for the i nd iv idual cl i ent . 
Organi zations rel i ed to a greater extent on offi ci a l  sources 
than on other types of sources for i nformati on about the threat .  
Organi zati ons d i d  not want to move thei r cl i ents unl ess cl i ents were 
di rectl y threatened . Deci s ions to evacuate usual l y  occurred under 
orders from an external  source i f  it was an external threat .  
The l ack of cogn i ti ve awareness pl aces constrai nts on staff as 
wel l as emergency responders who must deal wi th resi sti ve persons .  
When asked what steps were taken when cl i ents refused to evacuate , 
admi n i strators repl i ed that cl i ents were general l y  reassured by staff 
personnel wi th whom they were fami l i ar or cal med down through conver­
sat ion . One manager noted that the objector was 11 bodi l y  removed from 
the premi ses . 11 Not one admi n i strator menti oned gi v ing  cl i ents medi ca­
tion to rel i eve stress duri ng the evacuati on . 
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The l ack of l ocomoti on has been ci ted as an i ssue i n  movi ng  cl i ents 
to safety. I n  thi s study the number of non-ambul atory cl i ents , however,  
was not correl ated to the evacuation rate . Nei ther was the average 
age of the cl i ents correl ated wi th evacuati on rates . 
Movi ng a l arge number of cl i ents presents di rect l ogi sti cal prob­
l ems that must be deal t wi th i n  an effi cient manner for the safety 
and heal th of cl i ents . I nstead of having  detai l ed pl ans , organi zati ons 
i nsti tuted ad hoc operati ng procedures wi th al l staff members cal l ed 
to assi st i n  mov i ng  cl i ents . Al though the addi tion of vol unteers 
was frequently credi ted wi th the ease of movement ,  the total number 
of staff present and not the avai l abi l i ty of vol unteers , was correl ated 
wi th l ower evacuati on rates . 
Bel i ef i n  Warni ng Message 
Admi ni strators and other manageri al deci sion-makers pl aced greater 
rel i ance on warn i ng messages from authori ti es than any other source 
of warn i ng messages . Thi s rel i ance i s  especi a l l y  evi dent when the 
threat was external to the faci l i ty.  The rel i ance on authori ty may 
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di spel any i nherent ambi gui ty about the threat and the consequent 
need for evacuati on for the organi zati onal dec is i on-ma ker . I n  one 
case , when a faci l i ty was threatened wi th fi re ,  c l i ents were i n i ti al l y  
evacuated to a n  i nternal  desti nati on--a l obby--but taken outsi de the 
faci l i ty when tol d  to do so by personnel from the fi re department . 
Contrary to the di saster l i terature on the i nd i v i dual tendency 
to deny ri sk when confronted wi th a threat , i n  thi s  study there was 
no evi dence to suggest that the fi rst reacti on to the threat was deni al . 
On the contrary , several admi n i strators reported setti ng  i n  moti on 
immedi ate preparations for evacuati on even when tol d  by authori ties 
that an evacuation was uncertai n at the time of warn i ng .  
Apparentl y most emergency agencies and authori ties are aware 
of the speci al i zed popul ati ons wi thi n  heal th care and rel ated home 
care faci l i ties i n  thei r juri sdi cti ons . After i ssui ng warni ngs to 
the organi zati ons ,  authori ties and emergency agenci es frequently 
remai ned to hel p evacuate cl ients . I n  onl y  one case d i d  emergency 
offi cia l s order an area evacuated , warn the nurs ing  home personnel , 
and then 11forget11 to evacuate the faci l i ty .  The case i s  now under 
l i ti gati on . 
Pl anni ng for Evacuati ons 
The fi ndi ngs from the study i ndi cate that organi zations are not 
s i gn i fi cantl y i nfl uenced by pol i cies  (e i ther l egal or i n-house ) that 
requi re evacuati on pl ans . The di fferences between those organi zations 
reporti ng  havi ng evacuati on pl ans because of pol i cy or l egal mandate 
and those reporti ng havi ng pl ans for other reasons were i nsi gn i fi cant . 
There was no correl ati on between rate of evacuation per person and 
the expressed reasons  why organi zations had evacuati on pl ans . 
The l ack of i nteraction between state and federal emergency 
organi zati ons and the nurs i ng homes and rel ated care faci l i ties  may 
i ndi cate that the s i fting  down of preparedness for emergenci es i s  
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not reachi ng the target organi zati ons . Thi s  suggests that such 
organi zati ons have been overl ooked i n  the past when pl ann i ng for these 
l ow-probabi l i ty events . How such organizati ons can be assi sted i n  
pl ann i ng for evacuati ons needs further study . 
The proposi ti on that the most extens i ve evacuati on pl ann i ng  wi l l  
be i n  communi ti es that are l arger as measured by popul ati on dens i ty 
was supported by the data from Pi nel l as County .  Bes i des havi ng  the 
hi ghest popul ation densi ty ( 2 , 280 persons per square mi l e ) , i t  was 
the onl y  area i n  whi ch respondents reported havi ng a cal l -down tel e­
phone system among nursi ng  home organi zati ons i n i ti ated by c i vi l defense 
personnel . 
That the more extens i ve pl ann ing for emergenci es occurs i n  areas 
frequently v i ctimi zed by di sasters remains  uncl ear.  Al though Pi nel l as 
County i s  i n  an area threatened annual l y  by hurri canes , an actual 
storm wi th wi nds of hurri cane force i s  an i nfrequent occurrence i n  
the area . Nor d i d  respondents i n  Pi nel l as County report any more 
past preparati ons for evacuations than respondents from other regions 
of the country. 
General l y  procedures fol l owed duri ng the emergency were those 
l earned previous ly  duri ng  fi re dri l l s . Thus thi s  study genera l l y  
supports research on earthquake rel ated evacuations about l earned 
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behavior  for emergency evacuations (Arnol d  et al . ,  1982 ) . For many 
organi zati ons , fi re dri l l s  may be the onl y source of i nformati on about 
evacuation procedures other than manual s .  How the rel i ance on fi re 
dri l l s  for tra i n i ng staff about evacuati on procedures affects effecti ve­
ness of evacuati on remains  probl emati c .  Some admi n i strators menti oned 
l earn i ng from fi re department personnel how to use emergency suppl ies 
such as hoses , whi l e  others mentioned onl y the arri val of fi re personnel 
at thei r premi ses for safety inspecti ons or monthl y  fi re dri l l s .  
Very few organi zati ons reported bei ng i n  contact wi th or contacted 
by emergency agencies about evacuati on pl ann ing .  Those that reported 
bei ng i n  contact wi th other than fi re departments tol d us they were 
i n  contact wi th the l ocal ci vi l  defense agency. 
Length of Evacuati ons 
The majori ty of the evacuati ons were for preventati ve or protecti ve 
measures for short peri ods of time .  Cl ients were gone from thei r 
premi ses a mean of 41 . 33 hours , or about a day and three quarters . 
Twenty-three were gone from the ir  faci l i ty l ess than 24 hours . Onl y  
one organi zati on reported bei ng away from i ts faci l i ty for a n  enti re 
week .  
The rel ati vel y  short l ength of evacuati ons rai ses a questi on 
on organi zati onal effecti veness for l ong-term evacuati ons .  Who 
assumes responsi bi l i ty for fi ndi ng conti nued shel ter for the 
evacuees of special  faci l i ti es i f  the bui l di ng that houses the speci al 
popu l ation i s  destroyed or made unsafe , as occasi onal l y  happens duri ng 
a tornado or fl ood , needs attenti on . 
The effects of l ong-tenm evacuati on on the hea l th and wel l -bei ng 
of cl i ents of nurs i ng homes and rel ated care faci l i ti es needs further 
s tudy . El derl y cl i ents as wel l as caretakers woul d  fi nd i t  extremely  
di ffi cul t to remai n  i n  makeshi ft quarters and 11make do 11 unti l repai rs 
are compl eted at the faci l i ty.  If  the nursing  home faci l i ty is  made 
unusabl e and an organi zati on cannot ful fi l l  i ts stated objecti ves , 
the organi zati on cou l d  l ose l egi timacy and cease to surv i ve .  I f  that 
occurs , cl i ents woul d have to fi nd other sources of care . The stress 
on fami l i es and cl i ents woul d then escal ate . Under such condi ti ons  
both morbi di ty and mortal i ty rates mi ght escal ate . 
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Pl anni ng  or cari ng  for spec ial i zed groups of the genera l  popu l a­
ti on i s  apparentl y not defi ned as a responsi bi l i ty of the quasi -publ i c  
agencies charged wi th the protection of the general publ i c .  The Red 
Cross assumes most of the shel teri ng and feedi ng duri ng communi ty 
emergenci es , but whether i ts duti es i ncl ude speci al  accommodati ons 
for the el derl y ,  chi l dren , or pri soners i s  not cl ear . Yet not one 
organi zati on menti oned using other than a Red Cross shel ter when an 
offi c ia l  shel ter was used as a desti nati on s i te .  The i nteractions 
between organi zations cari ng  for the e l derl y  popul ati ons and the Red 
Cross needs further study. 
Desti nati ons of Evacuees 
Shel ters were chosen for several reasons .  The most important 
concern was adequate room for groups of cl i ents . Cl i ents were fre­
quentl y di vi ded and sent to one or more l ocati ons al ong  wi th staff . 
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How organizations choose shel ter s i tes i n  a communi ty-wide 
emergency i s  unc lear from thi s  study. The Red Cross pl ans about 
shel teri ng speci a l  popul ati ons such as nurs i ng homes or rel ated heal th 
care faci l i ti es remai n  murky .  The Red Cross is  charged wi th providi ng  
shel ter to  publ i c  not pri vate faci l i ties  i n  emergenc ies . The pol i cy ,  
however, i s  not uni versal l y  appl i ed across communi ti e s .  Both pri vate 
and publ i c  nurs ing  homes and rel ated heal th faci l i ti es l ocated wi thi n  
the same communi ty faced wi th the same threat rel i ed o n  Red Cross 
shel ters at some time or other.  Sti l l  other faci l i ties  of s imi l ar 
si ze and structure d i d  not uti l i ze a pl an for the use of offi c ia l  
shel ters . I n  smal l er communities the rel i ance on offi c ia l  shel ters 
provi ded by the Red Cross was often assumed , whether the faci l i ty 
was wi thi n the publ i c  doma i n  or not . 
Adequacy of accommodati ons provi ded by the Red Cross was not 
al ways at a l evel sati sfactory for el derly cl i ents . Whi l e  the Red 
Cross general l y  shel ters and feeds evacuees , the food prov i s i ons  are 
not adequate for the needs of the el derl y .  El derly cl i ents frequentl y 
requi re spec ia l  food preparati on and addi ti onal dietary suppl ements 
for heal th cond it ions . Admi n istrators were consi stent i n  reporti ng 
about the organi zati onal preparati on of food at offi ci al  shel ters 
or the bri ngi ng of food to offi cia l  shel ters by staff personnel . 
Speci al i zed popul ati ons have needs outs i de of those necessi ties 
provided in  standard shel ters . 
The fi ndi ngs suggest that organi zati ons may move just to the 
boundary of safety, It  appears that both organi zati ons and/or 
authori ti es were aware of shel ters at the mi n ima l  di stance from the 
threat to dimi ni sh di sl ocati on of cl i ents . I n  the Pi nel l as group 
of heal th care faci l i ti e s ,  organi zati ons whi ch were l ocated on water­
front property frequently reported havi ng reci procal agreements wi th 
other nurs i ng homes at h i gher el evations i n  case of hurri canes , an 
annual threat in that reg ion .  
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The overal l number of moves as wel l  as the number of consecuti ve 
moves made to shel ters rai ses some questi ons about desi gnati on of 
offi c ia l  shel ters . To avoid addi tional stress bei ng pl aced on cl i ents , 
the i deal movement  i n  an evacuati on i s  to one s i te for the period 
of ri sk  and then returni ng to the faci l i ty for al l cl i entel e .  Fi ve 
of the organi zations reported making subsequent tri ps after the i n i ti al 
wi thdrawal . 
The number of moves as wel l as the use of several desti nati on 
s i tes may not be unusual for heal th care faci l i ti e s .  Some Mi ssi ssauga 
hospi tal s had to evacuate consecuti vely  duri ng the fi ve-day evacuati on . 
That an organi zation was taken to an offi c ia l  shel ter (a church ) and 
then tol d to l eave by church members because a pi cn i c was pl anned 
l ater i n  the day suggests that better coordi nation i s  needed beb1een 
authori ties and shel ter provi ders . 
Evacuati on Costs 
Who assumes payment for evacuation costs i s  a vi abl e i ssue for 
further research .  Organi zati ons were ei ther unabl e or di si ncl i ned 
to provi de cost estimates about the evacuati on or about dri l l s  
associ ated wi th evacuati on preparedness tra i n i ng .  Costs can be 
absorbed by the organi zation , passed on to i nsurance carri ers or 
Med icaid , or ,  i f  a communi ty-wi de di saster , to state and federal 
agencies . Determi n ing  the amount of time spent each month on dri l l s  
was unsuccessful . 
The Future 
There have been s i gn i fi cant changes i n  the care of the el derl y 
i n  Ameri ca duri ng the l ast four decades .  Thi s growi ng  ol der segment 
of the popul ati on wi l l  need more chroni c  care faci l i ties  such as 
nurs ing  homes , conval escent homes , and adul t day care tenters i n  the 
future . The proportion of the el derl y recei vi ng adequate heal th care 
has improved the overal l survival chances of thi s group i n  add i tion 
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to provi d ing  the el derl y wi th an improved qual i ty of l i fe . In i ti al 
steps to curb the abuses and defi ci enci es of the past of those cari ng 
for the el derly have been taken . But the sheer growth of thi s  segment 
of Ameri ca • s  popul ati on suggests probl ems i n  the care of the el derl y, 
especi al l y  duri ng evacuati ons . 
The federal i n i ti ati ve to reduce hospi tal costs by shorteni ng 
l ength of hospi tal stays has several impl i cati ons .  The use of nurs i ng 
homes for short-term cl i ents wi l l  i ncrease .  The i ncrease i n  short-term 
cl i ents may decrease the number of ambul atory cl i ents , suggesti ng  
a need for more personnel i n  times of emergenci es . 
No doubt regul ations { through government authori ty or i nsurance 
or accredi tati on ) requi ri ng dri l l s ,  especi al l y  for the rare events 
requi ri n g  evacuat ion , have been successful i n  al l ev i ati ng some of 
the probl ems organi zati ons of speci al popul ati ons  faced i n  the past 
i n  times of emergency. Even if the event is not one that fal l s  under 
the organi zati on • s  defi n i ti on of an "emergency . "  the knowl edge of 
essenti al tas ks to perform for the safety of c l i ents i s  avai l ab le  
to the staff from dri l l  rehearsal s . 
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Few offi c ia l  pol i ci es are desi gned to al ert government offi ci al s 
about the specia l  needs of these popul ati ons . The burden of 
responsi bi l i ty has fal l en on nurs i ng home operators to evacuate thei r 
cl i ents successful ly .  Frequently that evacuati on does not start unti l 
an 110ffi ci al 11 announcement i s  made or gi ven to an admi n i strator of 
the faci l i ty .  Yet these admi n i strators remai n  for the most part out 
of contact wi th government offi cial s i n  the pl ann i ng and executi on 
of evacuati on efforts . I n  some i nstances i t  takes twi ce as l ong  for 
cl i ents to be returned to the faci l i ty than to evacuate i n i ti al l y ,  
creati ng major probl ems for both faci l i ty operators and el derl y 
pati ents al ready exhausted by the phys ical exertion of the move . 
To the credi t of nurs i ng home operators and staff there have been 
few tragedi es duri ng evacuati ons . 
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APPEND IX  A 
L IST OF ACRONnts USED IN  STUDY 
AP--Assoc iated Press 
DOE--Department of Energy 
DRC--Di saster Research Center 
EMS--Emergency Medi cal Systems 
FEMA--Federal Emergency Management Agency 
FTE--Ful l Time Equi va lent 
HUD--Hous i ng and Urban Devel opment 
NAS--Nati onal Academy of Sci ences 
NCHS--Nati onal Center for Heal th Stati stics 
NOAA--Nati onal Oceanograph i c  and Atmospheri c Admi n i strati on 
NORC--Nati onal Opi n i on Research Center (Uni versi ty of Chi cago ) 
NRC--Nati ona l  Regu l atory Commi ssion 
NWS--National Weather Serv i ce 
ORNL--Oak Ridge Nati onal Laboratory 
SMSA--Standard Matropol i tan Stati sti cal Area 
TMI --Three Mi l e  I s l and 
UPI --Uni ted Press I nternati onal 
USDOC--Un i ted States Department of Commerce 
USFEMA--Uni ted States Federal Emergency Management Agency 
USGAO--Uni ted States General Accounting Offi ce 
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APPENDI X  B 
SAMPLE OF LETTER SENT TO ADMINISTRATORS 
Dear Admi n i strator : 
The Socio l ogy Department of the Uni versi ty of Tennessee i n  cooperati on 
wi th the Oak Ri dge Nati onal laboratory and the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency i s  conducti ng a study about evacuati ons of faci l i ti es 
that servi ce speci al popu l ati ons such as hospi tal s and nurs i ng homes . 
The study exami nes what organi zati ons d id  when forced to evacuate 
some or al l of thei r faci l i ti es .  We are contacti ng you because your 
faci l i ty was i denti fi ed as havi ng experienced an evacuati on in the 
l ast four years . Your assi stance i n  thi s  effort wi l l  hel p improve 
the way faci l i ti es such as yours manage emergency evacuati ons . 
The data requi red for our study wi l l  be col l ected duri ng December ,  
1987 . I t  i s  important that we tal k wi th the person i n  your organi za­
ti on who has the most i nformati on on the evacuati on experi ence . We 
wi l l  cal l to arrange a convenient time to di scuss the evacuati on 
experi ence . 
If  you have prepared a summary report on your experi ences duri ng the 
evacuation , we woul d l i ke to obtai n a copy . By readi ng the report 
we can avo id  aski ng  unnecessary questi ons .  Pl ease forward any rel evant 
reports to : 
Ms . Barbara Mul l er Vogt 
901 McCl ung Tower,  Department of Soci ol ogy 
The Uni versi ty of Tennessee 
Knoxvi l l e ,  TN 37996-0490 
Al l the i nformati on provided about the evacuation wi l l  be treated 
i n  a confi dential  manner . The col l ected data and any report we recei ve 
wi l l  be gi ven an i denti fi cati on code when transcri bed to tape . The 
data wi l l  only be avai l ab le  to the project managers . After the project 
i s  completed we wi l l  destroy al l i nformation l i nking your organi zati on 
to the code number.  Nei ther you nor your organi zati on wi l l  be i denti ­
fi ed i n  the final document . 
The resul ts of the study wi l l  be publ i shed i n  a report avai l ab le  to 
al l government offi ci al s and representati ves and other i nterested 
parti es . You may obta i n  a summary of the resul ts by requesti ng a 
copy when you are contacted . 
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If there are any questi ons about the project , you can contact us at 
the above address . Our Knoxvi l l e tel ephone number i s  ( 6 1 5 )  974-6021 .  
Thank  you for your assi stance . We l ook forward to tal ki ng wi th you .  
S incerely,  
Barbara M. Vogt 
Project Di rector 
APPENDIX C 
SAMPLE COD ING FORM FOR ANALYSI S  OF NEWSPAPER ARTICLES 
SOURCE : SECTION : 
LENGTH OF STORY : 
KEYWORD : DATE OF SOURCE : 
MAPS/PHOTOS INCLUDED : 
DETAILS OF INCIDENT 
TYPE OF FACILITY :  _____ ...... NAME OF FACI LITY : ______ _ 
LOCATION :  ---------------------
DATE OF INCIDENT : _______ TIME OF INCIDENT : ____ _ 
CAUSE OF INCIDENT : _________________ _ 
DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT : _______________ _ 
DESTINATION OF EVACUEES : _______________ _ 
NUMBER OF EVACUEES FROM FACILITY :  __ .NUMBER EVACUEES OVERALL : __ _ 
DURATION OF EVACUATION :  ________________ _ 
INJURIES/DEATHS AT FACI LITY : _______ OVERALL : ____ _ 
DAMAGES : _____________________ _ 
F I RST RESPONDERS : __________________ _ 
NAMES OF PERSONNEL LI STED I N  ARTICLE : ___________ _ 
EVAC . PROBLEMS I DENTIFIED BY NEWSPAPER ARTICLE : --------
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COMMENTS BY EVACUEES : ________________ _ 
COMMENTS BY CODER:  
APPEND IX D 
QUESTIONNAIRE FIND INGS 
A .  Accommodations 
1 .  Trucks and vans were needed to transport mattresses to shel ter 
sHes . 
2 .  The hei ght of bathroom faci l i ti es i n  el ementary school s used as 
shel ters were i nadequate or dHfi cul t to use by el derl y-- 11wHh thei r 
weary bones . .. On occasi on teachers ' bathrooms were found l ocked up . 
Some admi n i strators recommended bri ngi ng the faci l i ty ' s 11potty chai rs " 
i nstead of so many wheel cha i rs .  
3 .  More than one story l evel s i n  shel ters created probl ems i n  trans­
porti ng pati ents , wheel chai rs and mattresses . "Al l are heavy i tems--both 
up and downstai rs . "  
4 .  Pati ents needed bedrest.  When mattresses not avai l abl e ,  just 
the cots provi ded by outsi de agencies were i nadequate for resti ng . 
Ol der patients • fragi l e  skin  made i t  d iffi cul t to use cots and to 
be turned on the cots as requi red every two hours . Some ski n  abrasi ons 
resul ted from using cots . 
5 .  Frequently l i nens were l ost or mi spl aced when mov i ng to another 
faci l i ty .  Not al l l i nens were marked wi th the faci l i ty ' s name . Ad­
mi n i strators thought di sposabl e  l i nens were better--as l ong as they 
took al ong enough pl asti c trash bags for di sposal . 
6 .  One offi ci al shel ter--a church--tol d a group they woul d  have to 
be out at noon because of offi cia l  church functi on that afternoon--a 
pi cn i c .  Better coordi nati on of expectati ons of shel ter hosts woul d  
sol ve probl em. 
B .  Pati ent Care 
1 .  Identi fi cati on of cl i ents was a reported concern , espec i al ly  for 
those cl i ents l acki ng  cogni ti ve functi ons . The use of i denti fi cati on 
arm-bands was thought feasi bl e  for cl i ents . Some managers had dupl i ­
cated medi cal charts wi th pati ent ' s  recent picture on top that travel l ed 
wi th cl i ent to an from the evacuati on si te .  
2 .  Cl i ents frequentl y were reported a s  bei ng ti red when returned 
to faci l i ty after evacuation but as havi ng "enjoyed the change of 
scenery .  11 
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3 .  Onl y  one faci l i ty reported cl ients refused to l eave the faci l i ty 
when advi sed to evacuate , and for good reason . The county emergency 
uni t had set up thei r offi cia l  command post i n  thei r faci l i ty and 
pati ents fel t "safe . "  Thi s coul d be probl em for both cl i ents and 
offi ci a l s  i f  al l had to l eve at a l ater time .  
C .  Preparedness of staff for emergency 
1 .  Fi re dri l l s  were ci ted as means to i nform staff about emergency 
procedures . Some i n-servi ce tra i n i ng accompan ied dri l l s  and most 
managers menti oned s imu l ated evacuati ons about once a year as part 
of tra i ni ng .  
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2 .  Some managers menti oned staff were noti fi ed a week pri or to dri l l  
that a dri l l  wou l d  be forthcomi ng .  Management personnel fel t  the 
advance noti ce gave time for staff to make sure everyone knew what 
to do i n  emergency .  
3 .  Menti on was made that staff personnel d i dn ' t  mi nd the dri l l s  but 
that pati ents objected to fi re al arms going  off--once every shift 
about once a month i n  some faci l i ti es . 
4 .  Few managers menti oned bei ng i n  contact wi th state or federal 
agencies about evacuati on pl ann i ng at thei r faci l i ty. However,  most 
admi n i strators menti oned fi re personnel conducti ng month ly  dri l l s  
at thei r faci l i ties . 
D .  Return 
1 .  Sometimes cl ean-up at faci l i ty prevented cl i ents from return i ng .  
Cl ean-up took l onger than expected when there was any type of damage , 
espec ia l l y  i f  i nsurance companies or heal th offi cia l s were i nvol ved . 
2 .  Actual fl ood i ng or damage i n  faci l i ty was general l y  not expected . 
Evacuation pl ans di d not appear to account for extended stays from 
the faci l i ty .  
3 .  Return i ng to  faci l i ty took l onger than expected because of  con­
vergence of peopl e return i ng home . 
APPEND IX  E 
SAMPLE QUESTIONNA IRE 
Hel l o .  I 1 m Barbara Vogt from the Uni versi ty of Tennessee . We have 
contacted you about an evacuati on study sponsored by the Soc i ol ogy 
Department of Uni vers i ty of Tennessee and the Oak Ri dge Nati onal Labora­
tory through a contract wi th the FEMA. Di d you recei ve our l etter? 
I F  NOT RECEIVED , USE THIS  
( Your faci l i ty was i denti fi ed from newspaper reports as havi ng  ex­
perienced an evacuati on wi thi n the l a st four years . The study exami nes 
the strategi es that organi zati ons that care for specia l  popul ati ons 
( l i ke nurs i ng homes and hospi tal s )  use when they evacuate some or 
al l of thei r faci l i ti es .  Your assi stance in thi s study wi l l  hel p 
improve the way i n  whi ch faci l i ties  such as yours cope wi th an emer­
gency i n  whi ch an evacuation occurs . )  
Do you have time to tal k wi th me now--the i ntervi ew wi l l  take about 
30 mi nutes--or i s  there a time when I can cal l you back and tal k wi th 
you ?  
We want you to know that al l the i nformati on you provi de about the 
evacuati on wi l l  be treated i n  a confi denti al  manner accord i ng to 
Uni vers i ty of Tennessee research pol i ci es .  Nei ther you nor your 
organi zation wi l l  be i denti fied i n  the fi nal report . 
If  you have no objecti ons ,  we woul d  l i ke to tape the i nterview. Thi s 
saves both time i n  record ing answers and provi des a check on the data 
we rece i ve .  We wi l l  noti fy you when the tape has been transcri bed 
and destroyed . Al so , i f  there i s  some questi on you can • t  answer or 
woul d  prefer not to answer,  tel l me and we wi l l  s k ip  that questi on . 
Do you have any questions?  
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Date Time Recorder 
Organ�i-za�t�i�o-n---- ---------- =Te�l�.--,
----------------
Contact Ti tl e ------------------- ------------------------
On the API ( or UP I )  news syndi cate reported an evacuati on 
occurred at your faci l i ty because -----------------------
( 1 )  Do you recal l the i nc ident? 
a. Yes 
b .  No 
IF NO ASK: Do you know of anyone i n  your organi zati on who coul d hel p 
us find out about the evacuati on? ( Probe i f  necessary)  
Name of person 
Affi l i ati on 
Coul d you pl ease connect me wi th that person? Thank you . 
( Qu i t  and go to start of questi onnaire wi th new contact . )  
( 2 )  I n  your opi n i on , what were the reasons for the evacuati on ? 
{ 3 )  When and how d i d  your organi zati on l earn about the probl em? 
( 4 )  Who i n  your organi zati on made the deci s i on to evacuate? 
( 5 )  Once the evacuati on started , how l ong i t  took to get your cl i ents 
to a safe pl ace ?  
( 6 )  How many peopl e evacuated from your faci l i ty? 
( 7 )  Does that number i ncl ude onl y your cl i ents or does i t  i ncl ude 
staff personnel who were at the faci l i ty at the time of the emergency? 
(8 )  Di d your organizati on have to cal l i n  extra staff to hel p  wi th 
the emergency evacuation? 
(9)  Were there any others who ai ded your organi zati on in  evacuati ng 
your cl i ents? 
( 10 )  What means di d you use to get your cl i ents to shel ter? 
( 11 )  How di d you handl e cl i ents who d idn ' t  want to l eave? 
( 12 )  Sometimes when peopl e  hear about a probl em ,  they may attempt 
to tel ephone for i nformati on . Wou l d  you say the n umber of i ncomi ng 
tel ephone cal l s  were l ess than average , about average for a normal 
day , averaged twi ce as many as usual or much more than that? 
( 13 )  How did you hand l e  tel ephone cal l s  duri ng the emergency? 
( 14 )  How did you hand l e  attention from the medi a  duri ng the evacuati on? 
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( 15 )  About how many of your cl ients were picked up by fri ends , rel ati ves 
or guardians and taken to safety? 
( 16 )  Where were your c l i ents taken? (Get pl ace names i f  possi bl e ) .  
( 17 )  Approximatel y  how many mi l es away are those pl aces ? 
( 18 )  About how many cl i ents woul d  you estimate went  to each pl ace? 
( 19 )  What k ind of di ffi cul ties did your organi zati on have at the pl aces 
where you took your cl i ents duri ng the evacuation? 
( 20 )  When and how did your organi zation l earn that it was safe to 
return your cl i ents to thei r quarters? 
( 21 )  Who i n  your organi zation made the dec i s i on to return to your 
faci l i ty? 
( 22 )  What d i ffi cul ti es d id  your organi zati on experi ence i n  getti ng 
your cl ients back to thei r quarters after the emergency was over? 
( 23 )  About what time d id  the evacuati on end for your organi zati on , 
that i s ,  al l cl i ents were al l returned to thei r quarters? 
( 24 )  Were there any further d iffi cul ties wi th your cl i ents after the 
evacuati on event was over? 
( 25 )  Now I ' m goi ng to read you a l i st of di ffi cul ties organi zati ons 
have ci ted when they evacuate some or al l of thei r faci l i ty .  Pl ease 
i ndi cate whether the d iffi cul ties duri ng the evacuati on at your 
faci l i ty were major, mi nor or of no concern to you .  
( a )  Getti ng confi rmati on about the threat was di ffi cul t .  
( b )  Knowi ng what agencies to cal l for hel p i n  evacuati ng was d iffi cul t .  
( c )  Tel ephone l i nes were overwhel med duri ng the evacuation . 
(d ) Contacting  or noti fying rel ati ves or guardians about the emergency 
was d i ffi cul t .  
( e )  Peop le  arri v i ng duri ng  the evacuati on created traffi c d i ffi cul ti es . 
( f )  Staff unprepared to move cl i ents safel y duri ng the evacuati on 
was a d iffi cul ty. 
( g )  Fi ndi ng a safe pl ace to take cl i ents was di ffi cul t .  
( h )  Getting rel ati ves o r  guard ians to p ick  up cl i ents was d i ffi cul t .  
( i )  Getting medi cation to cl i ents duri ng the evacuation was di ffi cu l t .  
( j )  Were there any other d iffi cul ti es that come to mi nd? 
( 26 )  Were any of your cl i ents i njured or d ied as a resul t of the 
evacuati on ? 
( 27 )  Were any staff members i njured or d ied as a resul t of the 
evacuation ? 
( 28 )  What woul d  you say thi s  evacuation cost your organ i zati on?  
Now I am going to  ask  you some questi ons about how your organi zation 
dea l s wi th emergenci es in general . 
( 29 )  How many times has your organi zati on actual l y  evacuated i n  the 
past?  
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( 30 )  Have you ever had to actual l y  prepare for an evacuati on but didn • t  
have to l eave after al l ?  
( 3 1 )  Has your organ i zati on asked any agenci es to provi de i nformati on 
to your organi zati onal personnel about threats that mi ght cause a 
possi b le  evacuati on pri or to tel l i ng the general publ i c  about the 
threat . If so , who are they? 
( 32 )  How woul d staff members l earn about emergency procedures that 
i ncl ude evacuati ons?  
( 33 )  Di d you have an emergency plan in  pl ace pri or to the evacuation? 
a .  Yes 
I F  NO GO TO Q .  37 b .  No 
c .  Don • t  know 
( 34 )  Di d that emergency pl an i ncl ude procedures for evacuation? 
( 35 )  Why d id  you have pl ans to evacuate? 
( 36 )  Prior to the recent evacuati on experience did your organi zation 
i ncl ude dri l l s  as part of emergency pl ann i ng?  
( 36a ) If  yes , ask :  Were these penci l  and paper dri l l s ,  staff movi ng 
to predesi gnated posi tions or mock stimul ati ons of emergenci es that 
i ncl uded evacuati on ?  
( 37 )  In  the past have you ever been i n  contact wi th l ocal o r  county 
agencies about evacuati on pl anni ng for your faci l i ty? If  so who were 
they? 
( 38 )  Have you ever been i n  contact wi th or been contacted by state 
or federal agencies about evacuati on pl ann i ng for your faci l i ty? If  
so  who are they? 
These next few questi ons concern your organi zati on overal l .  
( 39 )  What i s  the approximate annual operati ng budget for the faci l i ty ?  
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( 40 )  What are the major servi ces provi ded by your organi zati on ? 
( 4 1 )  I s  your organ i zation i ndependent or part of a l arger organ i zation? 
( Name the parent organ i zation ) 
( 42 )  How many cl i ents do you usual l y  care for on a dai l y  basi s at 
your faci l i ty? 
l 43 )  Is your faci l i ty one-story or mul ti story? 
Number of fl oors------
( 44 )  Approximately  what percentage of your cl i ents are non-ambul atory? 
By non-ambul atory , I mean cl i ents that are unabl e to get out of bed 
wi thout hel p .  Peopl e that are unab le  to get i nto a wheel chai r from 
thei r bed by themsel ves wou l d  be i n  thi s category. 
( 45 )  Approximately  what percentage of your cl i ents are femal e? 
{ 46 )  Do you care for most of your cl i ents on a l ong-term or short-term 
bas i s ?  By l ong-term we mean more than 6 months . Short term care 
woul d  be up to 6 months . 
( 47 )  What i s  the age range of your cl i entel e? 
( a )  Under 35 
( b )  26-50 
( c )  51-65 
( d )  Over 66 
( e )  Al l ages 
( 48 )  What age range are most ( at l east 51%) of your cl i ents? 
( 49 )  How many staff members are usual ly  on duty at your faci l i ty? 
( 50 )  What woul d you say i s  the normal dai l y  rati o of cl i ents to pati ent 
care staff--2 cl i ents to 1 staff member , 5 to 1 staff , 10 to 1 staff , 
20 to 1 staff , 50 to 1 staff or more? 
If  MORE , ask : What do you mean by 11More? 11 
( 51 )  Do most of your staff l i ve i n  the immedi ate area or do they have 
to commute more than 10 mi l es to work? By most ,  I mean at l east si xty 
percent of your staff . 
I t • s d iffi cul t to exami ne the effecti veness of an evacuation . One 
cou l d  measure the overal l time to evacuate a certai n  number of peopl e ,  
the number or l ack of deaths or i njuri es , or the l ack of confusi on 
on the part of staff i n  getti ng cl i ents to safety. There are a l so 
subjecti ve eval uati ons that express the organi zational v iew of the 
eval uati on . 
( 52 )  I f  I asked your organi zation to rate the effecti veness of an 
evacuation overal l from a staff viewpoi nt , what i n  your opi n i on do 
you thi nk the response of your organi zation woul d  be? 
The evacuati on experience was :  1 .  Not a t  al l efecti ve 
2. Somewhat effecti ve 
3 .  About everage 
4 .  Moderatel y  effecti ve 
5 .  Very effecti ve 
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( 53 )  What woul d  your organi zati on do di fferently the next time a threat 
forced an evacuation?  
I s  thi s your correct address? 
One further question , i s  there a summary report about the evacuation 
that you cou ld  send us?  
a .  Yes 
b .  No 
c. Other 
Make sure address i s  correct : 
901 McCl ung Tower 
Uni versi ty of Tennessee 
Knoxvi l l e ,  TN 
That ' s  a l l the i nformati on we need ri ght now. We appreci ate your 
cooperation . Is there anyth ing el se you want to tel l me about the 
evacuation that you thi nk  woul d  be hel pful for our study? (Wri te 
on back of thi s  page . ) Thank you for the opportun i ty to tal k wi th 
you .  
APPENDIX F 
HYPOTHESES 
Thi s appendi x  exami nes each of the hypotheses i n  l i ght of the 
uni vari ate data , qual i tati ve fi ndi ngs , and mul ti vari ate analysi s .  
Where appropri ate , bi variate analys i s  i s  used when other i nformati on 
i s  i ncomplete .  Data to support thi s  analysi s are avai l abl e and may 
be used wi th permi ssion of the author. 
Soci al Li nkages 
H . l .  The greater the s i ze of the faci l i ty ( as measured i n  number 
of cl i ents ) ,  the hi gher the use of external  hel p (as  measured 
by number of outs i de sources . 
The s ize of faci l i ty was not correl ated wi th use of external hel pers . 
H . 2 .  The greater the s i ze of the faci l i ty ( as measured i n  number 
of cl i ents ) ,  the h i gher the use of vol unteers ( as measured i n  
use of vol unteers ) .  
The s ize of faci l i ty was not rel ated to the use of vol unteers . 
H . 3 .  The greater the popul ation dens i ty of the commun i ty ,  the greater 
the hel p  avai l ab le  i n  evacuati on (as measured i n  use of vol un­
teers and external hel p ) .  
The popul ati on densi ty was not rel ated to the use of vol unteers , but 
popul ation densi ty was rel ated to use of external hel pers . The greater 
the popul ati on densi ty of a communi ty,  the hi gher the use of externa l  
sources of  hel p by the organi zati on when threatened .  
H . 4 .  The greater the popul ati on dens ity ,  the more l i nkages to offi ci al  
sources in  preparedness pl anni ng (as measured in  number of agency 
contacts wi th organi zati on ) .  
Popul ati on den si ty was not rel ated to contacts wi th agencies . 
H . S .  The greater the popul ation densi ty ,  the hi gher the l evel of 
preparedness tra i n i ng (as measured i n  type of dri l l s  at 
faci l i ty) . 
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Popul ati on densi ty was not rel ated to l evel of preparedness as 
determi ned by dri l l  type . 
H . 6 .  The greater the s i ze o f  commun i ty ,  the greater the number of 
offi ci a l  she l ters used . 
The s i ze of communi ty was not rel ated to the number of shel ters used 
as evacuati on s i tes . 
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H . 7 .  The smal l er the commun ity ,  the greater the use of vol unteers . 
The s i ze of commun i ty was not rel ated to the greater use of vol unteers 
i n  evacuati ons .  
H . 8 .  The smal l er the communi ty,  the l ess dependence o n  offi ci al 
sources for noti fi cati on about threat . 
The s i ze of commun i ty was not rel ated to offi c ial sources of notifica­
ti on , but the popul at ion densi ty was rel ated to the use of offi cial  
sources for noti fi cati on about threat .  Communi ti es wi th l ower popu­
l ati on densi ties are l ess l i kel y to use offi c i al sources of noti fi ca­
ti on about threat than l arger communi ti e s .  
Threat 
H . 9 .  Evacuati on rate i s  d i rectly rel ated to type o f  threat to 
organi zati on . 
Both evacuati on rate and the time taken to evacuate the faci l i ty were 
rel ated to the type of threat . Evacuati ons due to weather rel ated 
threats were more l i kely to take l onger--both i n  time taken to 
evacuate overal l and i n  the rate of evacuati on . Non-weather rel ated 
evacuati ons were shorter i n  terms of times to evacuate and evacuation 
rate . 
H . lO .  The greater the number of threats (as measured i n  past evacuations 
or past preparati ons for evacuati on ) ,  the hi gher the l evel of 
preparedness ( as measured by type of dri l l s ) .  
There was no rel ati onshi p between the number of past evacuations  or 
past preparations for evacuations and the type of dri l l s .  
H . l l . The greater the number of past threats (as  measured i n  past 
evacuations or past preparati ons for evacuati on ) the greater 
the l evel of contacts between offi c ia l  agenci es and organi zati ons . 
There was no rel ati onshi p between the number of past evacuations or 
past preparations for evacuations and the number of agency contacts . 
Soci al Cl imate 
H . l2 . The greater the s i ze of cl i ent popul ati on , the s l ower the 
evacuati on rate . 
The s i ze of cl i ent popul ati on was correl ated wi th evacuati on rate 
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but was correl ated to the time taken overal l to evacuate the faci l i ty. 
H . l3 .  The greater the number of dependent cl i ents (as  measured by 
percentage of ambul atory cl i ents and average age ) ,  the s l ower 
the evacuation rate . 
The number of non-ambul atory cl i ents was not correl ated to the evacua­
ti on time but the average age was correl ated to the time taken to 
evacuate . The hi gher the average age of cl i entel e ,  the sl ower the 
time taken to evacuate the faci l i ty. 
H . l4 .  The hi gher the number of staff avai l abl e ,  the faster the 
evacuati on . 
The number of staff avai l ab le  at time of evacuation was not correl ated 
wi th the evacuati on rate but was correl ated to the overal l evacuati on 
time .  
Resources 
H . l5 .  The greater the l evel of resources (as  measured by number of 
external sources of hel p ) ,  the faster the evacuati on rate . 
The number of external sources of hel p was not correl ated ei ther wi th 
the evacuati on rate or the evacuation time .  
H . l6 .  The greater the l evel of resources (as measured by use of vol un-
teers ) ,  the faster the evacuati on rate . 
Organi zati ons who had vol unteers assi sti ng wi th the evacuati on effort 
evacuated more qui ckly than those wi thout such hel p .  The fi ndi ngs 
i ndi cate use of vol unteers l owers evacuation time .  
H . l7 .  The greater the number of staff avai l abl e ( as measured i n  staff 
ava i l able  or ease of commute ) ,  the faster the evacuati on rate . 
The number of staff avai l abl e to hel p cl i ents was correl ated to the 
overal l time to evacuate but not to the evacuati on rate . Those 
organi zati ons who had more staff evacuated more qui ckly than those 
who had l ess staff avai l abl e .  Di stance commuted was not rel ated to 
e i ther evacuati on time or evacuati on rate . 
H . l8 . The greater the l evel of resources (as measured by pl ann i ng } ,  
the faster the evacuati on rate . 
Pl ann i ng as measured by type of dri l l s  was not rel ated to the time 
taken to evacuate or to the evacuati on rate . 
H . l9 .  The greater the l evel of resources (as  measured as part of 
l arger organization } ,  the faster the evacuation rate . 
The association of the organi zation wi th a l arger corporati on was 
rel ated to the evacuati on rate but not to the evacuati on time .  
I ndependent organi zati ons had a hi gher evacuation rate--the time per 
cl i ent  to evacuate was hi gher than the time taken per person to 
evacuate for organi zations associ ated wi th l arger organi zati ons .  
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APPENDIX  G 
EVACUATION MODEL RESULTS 
FULL MODEL 
TIMEVAC=CONSTANT + THREATD+NUMHELP+RA TIOSP+EVACPLA+PEREVAC+ 
AMBULAT+AVEAGES+DEPEND+POPDEN 
DEP VAR: TIMEVAC N: 40 MULTIPLE R: .802 SQUARED MULTIPLE R: .643 

















































-0.0 1 0  







.66485 1 0  
.6322869 









30 1 .608 
6.012 0.000 
REDUCED MODEL 
TIMEVAC=CONSTANT + THREATD+NUMHELP+POPDEN 









0.4 1 7  
4.543 






COEFFICIENT STD ERROR STD COEF TOLERANCE T P(2 TAIL) 
1 .1 03 
-1 .151 






ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE 
0.000 




.75366 1 5  
.7256743 
.75685 1 9  
SOURCE SUM-QF-SQUARES OF MEAN-SQUARE F-RATIO P 
REGRESSION 79.807 
RESIDUAL 55.416 
3 26.602 1 7.282 0.000 
36 1 .539 
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1 .375 0.1 78 
-2.5 1 9  O.Q16 
3 .404 0.002 
5.873 0.000 
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